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INTRODUCTION-AMENDMENT AND DISMEMBERMENT
How should constitutional designers structure the rules of constitutional
change? Much has been written about constitutional design in general, but
relatively little exists on the architecture of constitutional amendment.1 My
purpose in this Article is to introduce a new idea to the literature on
constitutional amendment-the idea of constitutional dismemberment-to
challenge us to better understand the uses and functions of the rules of change
in codified, uncodified, and partially codified constitutions.
Constitutional dismemberment is at once a phenomenon, a concept, a
doctrine, and a theory: it is occurring around the world; it fills a conceptual
void in the literature on constitutional change; courts can operationalize it when
they evaluate the constitutionality of amendments; and it formns the core of a
larger theory of how constitutions do and should change. The prescriptions
associated with constitutional dismemberment are intended for new, not
existing, constitutions-both because amending constitutional amendment
rules is difficult if not paradoxical2 and, more importantly, because the idea of
constitutional dismemberment requires us to reimagine constitutionalism.
The impetus behind the theory of constitutional dismemberment is that
some constitutional amendments are not amendments at all. They are self-
conscious efforts to repudiate the essential characteristics of the constitution
1. See Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 913, 918-28 (2014).
2. See PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF LOGIC, LAW,
OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE 11-14 (1990).
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and to destroy its foundations. They dismantle the basic structure of the
constitution while at the same time building a new foundation rooted in
principles contrary to the old. These constitutional changes entail substantial
consequences for the whole of law and society. Political actors must modify
their behavior in conformity with new popular expectations, and courts must
reinterpret the constitution in conformity with the change, overruling
inconsistent precedent and developing new lines of jurisprudence. This
reconstructed constitution becomes virtually unrecognizable to the pre-change
generation, for whom the constitution now seems entirely new, not merely
amended. And yet-here is the problem-we identify transformative changes
like these as constitutional amendments no different from others.3
Constitutional amendments come in two types: they can either be
corrective or elaborative. Properly defined, a constitutional amendment is a
correction made to better achieve the purpose of the existing constitution. The
Twelfth Amendment to the United States Constitution, for example, is properly
identified as an amendment.4 The founding Constitution required each
presidential elector to cast two votes for president; the candidate with the most
votes would become president and the runner-up, vice president.' The election
of 1800 exposed the design flaw in this arrangement when two candidates
earned the same number of electoral votes.6 It took nearly three dozen ballots
of voting by state delegations for the House of Representatives to ultimately
break the tie and select Thomas Jefferson as president. The Twelfth
Amendment was designed to reduce the possibility of a tie by requiring electors
to differentiate their selections for president and vice-president.8 It corrected a
technical flaw in the original Constitution.
A constitutional amendment can also be elaborative. An elaboration is a
larger change than an amendment insofar as it does more than simply repair a
fault or correct an error in the constitution. Like a correction, an elaboration
continues the constitution-making project in line with the current design of the
constitution. Instead of repairing an error in the constitution, however, an
elaboration advances the meaning of the constitution as it is presently
understood. For example, the Nineteenth Amendment is best understood as an
elaborative amendment: it advances the meaning of the Fourteenth9 and
3. Gary Jacobsohn has described changes like these as "constitutional revolutions." See Gary
Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Theorizing the Constitutional Revolution, 2 J.L. & CTS. 1 (2014). But as with other
efforts to account for these changes by describing them as "new constitutions," this formulation has
difficulty reconciling form with function: as a matter of form, these changes are ordinarily identified as
amendments in a codified constitution yet, functionally, they do more than simply repair or adjust the
constitution. I suggest in this Article that we need a new way to understand these changes-a new
understanding that is attentive to both form and function. See infra Section I.A.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (1804).
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
6. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 55 (2005).
7. EDWARD J. LARSON, A MAGNIFICENT CATASTROPHE: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF
1800, at 241-70 (2007).
8. See Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: Constitutional
Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REv. 565, 617-20 (1999).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868) (entrenching the Equal Protection Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
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Fifteenth Amendments,10 making good on the promise of equality in these two
Reconstruction Amendments, though here that promise was extended to a new
class of voters not intended for that protection at the time of the proposal and
ratification of the revolutionary equality amendments. The Nineteenth
Amendment prohibits gender discrimination in voting,1 an expansion of the
franchise that was not corrective in the sense of fixing a design flaw in the
Constitution but was nonetheless consistent with a plain reading of equality
rights as well as the existing framework of the Constitution. In this Article, I
use the term amendment to refer to both corrective and elaborative
amendments.
A constitutional dismemberment, in contrast, is incompatible with the
existing framework of a constitution because it seeks to achieve a conflicting
purpose. It seeks deliberately to disassemble one or more of a constitution's
elemental parts. A constitutional dismemberment alters a fundamental right, a
load-bearing structure, or a core feature of the identity of a constitution. It is a
constitutional change understood by political actors and the people to be
inconsistent with the constitution at the time the change is made. To use a
rough shorthand, the purpose and effect of a constitutional dismemberment are
the same: to unmake a constitution. I also suggest in this Article that
constitutional dismemberment can occur by judicial interpretation, but I focus
primarily on dismemberment outside of courts.
Constitutional dismemberment is a descriptive concept, not a normative
one. A constitutional dismemberment can either improve or weaken liberal
democratic procedures and outcomes. For example, the Civil War Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution are better understood as dismemberments. The
Thirteenth,12 Fourteenth,13 and Fifteenth Amendments14 consolidated the Union
victory over the Confederate States and collectively wrote into the Constitution
a ringing declaration of the equality of all persons, if only as an aspiration.15
Their most important function, however, was to demolish the infrastructure of
slavery in the original Constitution.16 They tore down the major pillars of
America's original sin: the Three-Fifths Clause,17 the Fugitive Slave Clause,18
the Migration or Importation Clause,1 9 and the Proportionate Tax Clause.2 0
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (1870) (protecting the right to vote against discriminatory denial
or abridgement on account of race or color).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (1920) (protecting the right to vote against discriminatory denial
or abridgement on account of gender).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1865) (abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for a crime).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
15. Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment
Approach, 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 539, 596 (2002).
16. See Jamal Greene, Originalism's Race Problem, 88 DENVER U. L. REV. 517, 519 (2011).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
18. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
19. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. This clause was made temporarily unamendable until the year 1808.
See id art. V.
20. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. This clause was likewise made temporarily unamendable until the year
1808. See id. art. V.
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Scholars have suggested that the Civil War Amendments created a new
constitution,21 a new constitutional order,22 or a new regime.23 We can of
course conceptualize these three amendments as constituting a new regime, a
new order, or a new constitution. But as a matter of constitutional form, the
U.S. Constitution identifies each of them as an amendment, entrenched serially
in the Founders' constitutional text alongside other amendments ratified before
and since, many of them mundane by comparison. Constitutional form and
function therefore lead us down different paths in our effort to make sense of
the Civil War Amendments: formally, we are compelled to identify these three
constitutional alterations as mere amendments, but functionally we know they
amount to something more. Yet they are neither mere amendments nor do they
amount to promulgating a new constitution, a new order, or a new regime.
They are best understood as constitutional dismemberments that occupy the
space between an amendment and a new constitution; they aim to unmake a
constitution without breaking legal continuity.
One of the key pillars of constitutional dismemberment is the principle of
variable difficulty in constitutional change. The basic point of variable
difficulty is a prescription for constitutional design: political actors should be
directed by the rules of constitutional change to satisfy different thresholds for
amendment than for dismemberment. Amendments should be subject to a
lower threshold of direct or mediated popular consent than dismemberments,
which should be authorized only by a higher degree of agreement. The reason
why follows from the important difference between an amendment and a
dismemberment: an amendment continues the constitution-making project in
line with the current design of the constitution, while a dismemberment is
incompatible with the existing framework of the constitution and instead seeks
to unmake one of its constituent parts-its rights, structure, or identity. Where
the rules of change do not state a distinguishable procedure for
dismemberments-for example, where the constitution entrenches only one
procedure for formal constitutional change-the theory of constitutional
dismemberment suggests a default procedure to legitimate a dismemberment.
Here, when the constitution is silent on the distinction between amendment and
dismemberment, the deep constitutional transformation that dismemberment
entails can be legitimated, with few exceptions, only by at least the same or
similar configuration of constitution-making bodies that made the commitment
that dismemberment later seeks to undo. This is ordinarily the original
ratification procedure that authorized the constitution at its creation.
Mutuality is the operational rule of constitutional dismemberment.
Subject to a narrow class of exceptions that I describe more fully below, the
21. See, e.g., Eric Foner, Blacks and the Constitution 1789-1989, 183 NEw LEFT REv. 63, 68
(1990); Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Document?,
40 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (1987); Donald G. Nieman, From Slaves to Citizens: African-Americans,
Rights Consciousness, and Reconstruction, 17 CARDOzO L. REv. 2115, 2116 (1996).
22. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1097 (2001).
23. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 46, 58-80 (1991).
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rule of mutuality authorizes a constitution's dismemberment using only at least
the same procedure that was used to ratify it. What underlies the rule of
mutuality is a principle of symmetry: removing something fundamental from a
constitution should be permissible using only the same procedure that was used
to put it in or something more onerous. Incorporating the rule of mutuality into
the larger rules of constitutional change would result in at least two tracks of
procedures: one for those changes that are consistent with the existing
constitution and, accordingly, require no special measure of popular
approval--changes that we can identify as constitutional amendments, both
corrective and elaborative. This lower track should impose more demanding
thresholds for elaborative amendments than for corrective amendments. The
second track of procedures would entrench a more onerous procedure to be
used specifically for constitutional dismemberments-that is, for those changes
that do not cohere with the existing constitution because they transform its
rights, structure, or identity. Entrenching these procedures in a constitution
allows all manner of changes to be made without breaking legal continuity and
importantly without inviting the instability that constitution-making entails.24
The rule of mutuality has two major purposes: one oriented to courts, and
the other to a void in the central concept in the study of constitutional change.
For decades now, courts around the world have exercised the extraordinary
power to invalidate a constitutional change that judges believe violate the
constitution.25 On their view, political actors are not authorized to make
transformative changes to the constitution without breaking legal continuity;
they must instead write a new constitution in order to validly introduce changes
of that magnitude. Judges have invoked the theory of constituent power-the
core concept in the study of constitutional change-as the justificatory basis for
their extraordinary decision to invalidate a constitutional amendment.
Stated most simply, constituent power theory proposes a rigid division of
labor between the people and their representatives in government: only the
people may found an altogether new constitution while their representatives in
government are authorized to act in their name to do no more than change a
constitution in harmony with the constitution's own terms. Yet constituent
power theory refers to the people as an amorphous whole, with neither
quantification nor qualification of who the people are, how they exercise their
power, and when we know their actions are valid. Where the constitution does
not entrench two tracks of rules of change, the rule of mutuality gives shape to
constituent power theory by establishing a rebuttable presumption that the
people exercise their constituent power when they speak in the same way they
did when they wrote the constitution to begin with. Unlike the conventional
approach to constitutional change which disallows transformative changes on
24. Importantly, creating two separate tracks would not preclude entrenching multiple degrees
of rigidity within each of the two tracks-a design of constitutional change that I have elsewhere
described as an escalating structure of constitutional amendment. See Richard Albert, The Expressive
Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59 MCGILL L.J. 225, 247-57 (2013).
25. YANIV RozNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS OF
AMENDMENT POWERS 179-225 (2017).
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the theory that they create a new constitution, the theory of constitutional
dismemberment and its accompanying rule of mutuality instead seek to
maintain legal continuity and to discourage the extraordinary action of
invalidating a constitutional change. Therefore, the two instrumental purposes
of the rule of mutuality are to save a constitutional change from invalidation
where a court concludes that the change is inconsistent with the existing
constitution and, more broadly, to redeem the theory of constituent power.
Recognizing the distinction between amendment and dismemberment
suggests answers to pressing questions and controversies in constitutional law
today. How should constitutional designers structure the rules of constitutional
change? How may political actors legally and legitimately formalize
transformative changes to the constitution? How should scholars evaluate
constitutional changes believed to violate the constitution's rights, structure, or
identity? Should courts review the constitutionality of constitutional
alterations?
In this Article, I identify, define, and theorize the idea of constitutional
dismemberment and explain how the concept can explain many of the
extraordinary, constitutional transformations we see around the world today. I
begin in Part I by highlighting three contemporary challenges in the study of
constitutional change. I focus here on current challenges in constitutional
design, the controversial though increasingly frequent use of judicial power to
invalidate a constitutional amendment, and the ubiquitous though insufficiently
precise theory of constituent power.
In Part II, I illustrate the phenomenon of dismemberment by showing its
breadth of application to both codified and uncodified constitutions in
connection with constitutional rights or structure, and its relevance to changes
that improve or deteriorate the democratic values of liberal constitutionalism. I
draw from different types of constitutions around the world, including the
codified Constitutions of Brazil, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Saint Lucia, and the
United States; the uncodified Constitutions of New Zealand and the United
Kingdom; and the partially codified Constitution of Canada.
Next in Part III, I examine some of the implications of dismemberment
for contemporary problems in constitutional change, including the problem of
liberal democratic degeneration around the world, the problem of juristocracy,
and the problem of legal discontinuity. I give special attention in this Part to
how we might apply the idea of constitutional dismemberment to imposed
constitutions, colonial constitutions, and the concept of constitutional
resilience. I conclude with thoughts on the implications of constitutional
dismemberment, both for the study of constitutional change and for the way in
which constitutions are, and should be, altered in practice.
I. THE CHALLENGES OF CONSTIrruTIoNAL CHANGE
The distinction between amendment and dismemberment can help resolve
three of the major challenges facing constitutional designers and scholars of
constitutional change today. The first major challenge in the field is how to
2018] 7
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distinguish the multiplicity of changes that constitutions undergo. The idea of
dismemberment prescribes different procedures for altering constitutions-
procedures that vary according to the degree of change. The second major
challenge in the field confronts the questions whether and how courts should
evaluate the constitutionality of constitutional changes. Courts around the
world have invalidated constitutional amendments for exceeding the power of
amending actors. Constitutional dismemberment resists the doctrine of
unconstitutional constitutional amendment and instead suggests a catalytic, not
obstructive, posture for courts when reviewing the constitutionality of
constitutional changes. The third major challenge concerns the actual design of
the textually-entrenched rules of constitutional change. Constitutional designers
have struggled to create formal rules of change that do what these rules are
intended to do: create a transparent, predictable, and rational process for
altering the constitution. Constitutional dismemberment suggests a two-track
model of constitutional design, as well as an accompanying default rule that
political actors should respect where a constitutional text does not entrench any
relevant rule at all. On each of these three fronts, the theory of constitutional
dismemberment can bring greater clarity than we currently have.
A. The Dividing Line in Constitutional Alteration
Existing theories of constitutional change correctly recognize that some
changes are more significant than others, but they have not yet specified what
classifies a change as one type or another. Even those theories of constitutional
change that identify criteria for what counts as an amendment arrive at a
solution by classifying a constitutional change only by the outcome it produces,
rather than by connecting the outcome to the process by which it is achieved.
These conventional approaches generate an unhelpful binary classification:
either a constitutional alteration properly amends a constitution or it so
radically transforms a constitution that conceptually it yields a new
constitution, even though no new constitution has been promulgated. As I will
explain later, my solution creates gradients of change ranging from amendment
to dismemberment o new constitution, with the possibility of amendment and
dismemberment along different scales of magnitude. The result is a continuum
of constitutional change rather than a binary classification.26
1. Four Propositions
Consider an example from John Rawls in reference to the United States
Constitution: Would a constitutional change repealing the First Amendment's
guarantee against a State religion be a valid use of the formal amendment
procedure in Article V?2 7 For Rawls, the answer is no: "[A]n amendment to
repeal the First Amendment and replace it with its opposite fundamentally
contradicts the constitutional tradition of the oldest democratic regime in the
26. See infra Sections I.C, II.C.
27. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 238 (1993).
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world." 2 8 Rawls recognizes that neither the constitutional text nor any
constitutional theory can prevent political actors from deploying the rules of
Article V to make a change for which they have the required support, but he
would define the repeal of the First Amendment as a "constitutional
breakdown, or revolution in the proper sense, and not a valid amendment of the
constitution."29 In Rawls' understanding of how constitutions should change,
the use of Article V to repeal the First Amendment would create a new U.S.
Constitution, even though the resulting amendment would be formally
entrenched in the "old" constitution as a mere amendment, and despite 'there
being no new codification promulgated as a new constitution. This Rawlsian
view reflects the conventional understanding in the field of constitutional
change: either a constitution is amended consistently with the constitution, or
the alteration is so transformative that we cannot call it an amendment and we
must instead recognize that conceptually it creates a new constitution.30
In the late nineteenth century, Thomas Cooley likewise insisted that an
alteration inconsistent with an existing constitution should not be called an
amendment. He wrote that an amendment "must be in harmony with the thing
amended, so far at least as concerns its general spirit and purpose," adding that
"[i]t must not be something so entirely incongruous that, instead of amending
or reforming it, it overthrows or revolutionizes it." 31 And yet we have seen
many examples of constitutional changes formalized using the rules of
constitutional amendment that were, in Cooley's own words, "entirely
incongruous" with the existing constitution. For Cooley, it is plainly incorrect
in constitutional theory to define such changes as constitutional amendments:
[A]ny step in the direction of establishing a government which is entirely out of
harmony with that which has been created under the constitution,... though it may
be taken in the most formal and deliberate manner, and in precise conformity to the
method of amendment established by the constitution, is inoperative in the very
nature of things. . . . The framers of the constitution must very well have
understood that his was the case, and must have acted upon this understanding;
and they abstained from forbidding such changes because they would be
illegitimate as amendments, and for that reason impossible under the term they
were making use of.3
Cooley outlines in this passage the key elements in the conventional theory of
constitutional change, all complementary to and derivative of the position taken
by Rawls. The Rawlsian view holds to the legal fiction that an amendment
refers only to an alteration that is consistent with the existing constitution and
that any alteration inconsistent with it must be interpreted as creating a new
constitution, even if the old constitution is not formally replaced with a new
28. Id. at 239.
29. Id.
30. See Richard Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13, 19-23 (Andrds
Koltay ed., 2015).
31. Thomas M. Cooley, The Power to Amend the Federal Constitution, 2 MICH. L.J. 109, 117
(1893).
32. Id. at 119.
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Cooley makes explicit three points that are implicit in the conventional
theory of constitutional change. First, that the test for distinguishing a
constitutional amendment from a new constitution is not whether the change is
achieved through the process of constitutional amendment entrenched in the
constitution. As Cooley writes, even if a constitutional alteration is "in precise
conformity to the method of amendment established by the constitution," the
change is "inoperative" as an amendment if it is "entirely out of harmony with
that which has been created under the constitution."33 Second, that a
constitutional alteration inconsistent with the existing constitution is
"illegitimate." Finally, that a constitution implicitly entrenches the distinction
between an alteration that qualifies as an amendment and one that creates,
though only conceptually, a new constitution. Cooley explained that the
framers "must have acted upon this understanding" and that they "abstained
from forbidding" the kinds of changes that would yield a new constitution,
because the very nature of amendment is to keep an amended constitution in
harmony with an old one.34
Reading Cooley alongside Rawls allows us to isolate the four
propositions that constitute the conventional theory of constitutional change.
First, the binary proposition: a constitutional alteration results either in an
amendment or in a conceptually new constitution. Second, the substantive
proposition: a constitutional alteration formalized using the rules of amendment
does not always result in a proper amendment. Third, the illegitimacy
proposition: a constitutional alteration that results in something other than an
amendment is illegitimate under the existing constitution. Fourth, the implicit
limitations proposition: even where a constitutional text does not identify
which kinds of constitutional alterations would qualify as a constitutional
amendment versus a new constitution, this distinction is implicit in the nature
of an amendment.
These four propositions recur in the modem scholarship on constitutional
change. For instance, Walter Murphy argues that "valid amendments can
operate only within the existing political system; they cannot deconstitute,
reconstitute, or replace the polity." 35 The suggestion here is that the use of the
amendment power to deconstitute, reconstitute, or replace the polity is not an
amendment at all, but rather the creation of what we can identify conceptually
as a new constitution. More recently in his study of Article V in the United
States, Jason Mazzone makes the case that an amendment only "fine-tunes
what is already in place-or, in a metaphor eighteenth-century Americans used,
puts the ship back on its original course."3 6 These views draw from the core of
Carl Schmitt's influential theory of constitutional change. Schmitt argues that
33. Id
34. Id.
35. Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and
Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 163, 177 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
36. Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1754 (2005).
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the authority of political actors to amend a constitution is limited by a
constitution itself. Political actors, he writes, may amend a constitution "only
under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the constitution as
an entirety is preserved."3 He specifies that "the authority for constitutional
amendment contains only the grant of authority to undertake changes,
additions, extensions, deletions, etc., in constitutional provisions that preserve
the constitution itself."38 Any amendment hat exceeds this authority effectively
creates a new constitution-a constitution-making power that ordinary
amending actors are not authorized to exercise, according not only to Schmitt,
but also to the dominant and largely unchallenged view in the field.
2. The Foundations of the Conventional Views
These conventional views of constitutional change are rooted in the
theory of constituent power. Stated simply, the theory proposes a rigid division
of labor between the people and their representatives in government: only the
people may found an altogether new constitution, while the people's
representatives are authorized to act in the people's name to do no more than
change a constitution in harmony with the constitution's own terms. Despite its
great influence in law, constituent power theory is remarkably imprecise as to
how the people are to exercise this power.40
The two core concepts in the theory are the pouvoir constituant and the
pouvoir constitue.41 These two concepts refer to two different groups of
persons, each linked to the other through the constitution in a hierarchical
relationship of the distribution and exercise of power such that one group is
37. CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 150 (Jeffrey Seitzer transl. ed., 2008).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Constraining Constitutional Change, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 859, 866-67 (2015) (discussing the dominant view in the field); Douglas Linder,
What in the Constitution Cannot be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 728-33 (1981) (suggesting that the
Corwin Amendment would have created a new United States Constitution); Walter F. Murphy, An
Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 754-57 (1980) (arguing that an amendment
can be unconstitutional); Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of Eternity Clauses: The German
Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429, 435-45 (2011) (tracing the history of unconstitutional constitutional
amendment in Germany); Yaniv Roznai, Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular
Sovereignty, in THE FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 23, 24-37
(Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou eds., 2017) (arguing that the amendment
power is limited); Md. Ariful Islam Siddiquee, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in South
Asia: A Study of Constitutional Limits on Parliaments' Amending Power, 33 J.L. POL'Y &
GLOBALIZATION 64, 70 (2015) (defending the theory and doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional
amendment); George D. Skinner, Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional Amendment, 18
MICH. L. REV. 213, 221 (1920) (arguing that Article V is limited). There are some noteworthy
exceptions to the conventional view that the amendment power is limited. See, e.g., Richard Albert,
Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIz. ST. L.J. 663 (2010) (rejecting the use of unamendability in
constitutional design and proposing a functionally similar alternative); John R. Vile, Limitations on the
Constitutional Amending Process, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 373 (1985) (arguing that there are no implicit
limitations on the use of Article V).
40. The theory has its origins in Emmanuel Joseph Sieybs' French Revolutionary pamphlet.
See EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYtS, QU'EST-CE QUE LE TIERS tTAT? (2002) (originally published in 1789).
Sieybs set out to construct a notional justification for the idea that the right to self-determination belongs
to the people alone.
41. Id. at 53.
2018] 11I
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
subordinate to the other. The superior group is the pouvoir constituant, which
in translation is the constituent power, a term used to refer to the body of
people in whom supreme power resides.42 The inferior group is the pouvoir
constitud, meaning the constituted power, a term used to refer to the institutions
a constitution creates to carry out the duties and discretionary authority
delegated by the people in that constitution. The major premise of the theory is
that no constitution can properly be formed by a constituted power; instead, the
constitution must be understood to have been created by the exercise of
constituent power, which is to say by the people themselves.43 The corollary
premise of the theory is that the authority of the constituted power is limited to
only changing the constitution in ways that remain true to the constitution
created by the constituent power.
Constituent power theory is embedded in the legal fiction that the people
actually authorize constitutions either in their writing or ratification, or both.
The people sometimes participate directly in the constitution-making process in
referenda to ratify a new constitution, as was the case for recent constitutions in
Egypt (2014)," Zimbabwe (2013),45 Kenya (201 0),46 Bolivia (2009),47 and Iraq
(2005).48 But many important constitutions were not adopted with direct
popular ratification. This list includes constitutions or constitutional acts in
Canada (1982),49 Germany (1949),50 India (1950),51 South Africa (1996),52 and
the United States (1787). 3
It is hard to know why the legal fiction persists. The idea of "the people"
as it is currently understood is too amorphous, too under-determined, and too
romanticized to have significant purchase in explaining how constitutions are
written or ratified. As Claude Klein and Andrds Saj6 have observed, "[t]he
'people' is not sufficiently structured to develop a constitution" nor can we say
that actual individuals are "very welcome by the actual constitution-making
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Reza Sayah & Mohammed Tawfeeq, Egypt Passes aNew Constitution, CNN (Jan. 18,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/18/world/africa/egypt-constitutionlindex.html.
45. See Zimbabwe Approves New Constitution, BBC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21845444.
46. Kenyans Back Change to Constitution in Referendum, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2010), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-10876635.
47. See Simon Romero, Bolivians Ratif New Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 25, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/world/americas/26bolivia.html.
48. See Iraqi Constitution Passes, Officials Say, CNN (Oct. 25, 2005), http://
www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/25/iraq.constitution.
49. The Constitution Act, 1982 is a statute of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. See
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 c. 11 (U.K.).
50. The Basic Law was adopted by the Parliamentary Council and ratified by Germany's
subnational units. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 144, translation at http://www.gesetze-
im-intemet.de/englisch gg/index.html.
51. The Indian Constitution was adopted and enacted by a Constituent Assembly. See INDIA
CONST. pmbl.
52. The South African Constitution was enacted by a Constitutional Assembly. See In re
Certication of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1997 (1) BCLR I
(CC).
53. The U.S. Constitution was ratified in state conventions. See U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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elite."5 4 The people are more often than not represented by executives who
negotiate constitutions as elite bargains, by legislators who vote on a package
of proposals, by Constituent Assembly members who deliberate on and debate
the content of constitutions, and sometimes by one or more of these groups of
representatives in some special sequence or combination.55
Constituent power theory is therefore not a descriptive account of how
constitutions are made and changed, but rather a normative aspiration for how
some scholars believe they should be made and changed. Scholars persuaded
by the theory seem to elide these distinctions when they invoke constituent
power to defend limitations on the amendment power or to justify an
invalidation of a constitutional amendment. But even the aspiration itself is
unclear. It may be for new constitutions to be written or authorized directly by
the people, an eventuality that becomes a real possibility as the peoples of the
countries of the world continue to get swept into the trend of popular
consultation that political actors appear gradually to be embracing. The
aspiration may alternatively be more conservative: it may be both to constrain
how political actors change constitutions and also to equip scholars and jurists
with a vocabulary to oppose changes they might resist for any number of
reasons. There may be a third aspiration: to foster constitutional stability and
endurance. One important effect of constituent power theory is to make it
difficult to change the fundamental core of a constitution unless the people,
whoever they are, manifest their will to allow such a change. The result of
constituent power theory is therefore to privilege the status quo, which may in
turn create a more stable constitutional order and help the constitution endure.
Whether these normative ambitions are positive goods is a different question
from whether constituent power theory reflects the realities of constitutional
change.
3. The Missing Concept
The conventional theory of constitutional change can explain what an
amendment is: it is a change that is consistent with the framework of a
constitution. The conventional theory can also explain the constitution-making
moment when a new constitution is created and entrenched against ordinary
repeal. But conventional theory requires a theoretical leap to accept that a
constitutional change passed as an ordinary amendment amounts to a new
constitution even where no new text has been promulgated. Important changes
like the Civil War Amendments are, of course, more than mere adjustments,
yet to say that they create a new constitution requires us to ignore that the thing
we identify as the constitution remains unchanged in form, except to the extent
54. Claude Klein & Andrds Saj6, Constitution-Making: Process and Substance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 419, 424 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andr-s
Saj6 eds., 2012).
55. See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Justin Blount, Does the Process of Constitution-
Making Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 201, 205 (2009) (reporting that referenda were involved in
the ratification of less than twenty-five percent of constitutions in a study sample of constitutions
adopted from 1789 to 2005).
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of the alteration.
We therefore need a new concept to fill the void that exists in the
conventional theory of constitutional change between an amendment and a
new, actual constitution. The middle ground should serve as a bridge between
these two constitutional changes. On one end, an amendment is a constitutional
alteration that continues to develop the constitution in the constitution-making
path that began at its founding moments. On the other, it is an alteration that
yields a new constitution, at least in form and also, though not always, in
significance, as scholars argue was the case in the United States with
Reconstruction. There is room in the middle of these two forms of
constitutional alteration for a concept that is more than an amendment but less
than a new constitution.
We can conceptualize this middle ground as the unmaking of a
constitution without breaking legal continuity. This is the phenomenon I
identify as a constitutional dismemberment. A dismemberment is a self-
conscious effort perceived as the unmaking of the constitution with recourse to
the rules of constitutional alteration. A dismemberment introduces a change
that is incompatible with the constitution's existing framework and purpose. A
dismemberment introduces a transformative change to the constitution, but it
does not produce a new constitution because, as a matter of form, the
constitution remains what it was prior to the change, except to the extent of the
change itself. The theory of constitutional dismemberment accordingly does
not recognize a new constitution until a new constitution is in fact self-
consciously adopted by the relevant political actors choosing to launch and
successfully complete the formal constitution-making process for that purpose.
B. Enforcing the Boundaries of Constitutional Change
Courts have enforced these four propositions in the course of reviewing
the constitutionality of constitutional changes. They have done so consistently
with the conventional theory of constituent power, enforcing the boundaries of
constitutional change by drawing a line between those constitutional alterations
that they believe are consistent with the constitution and those they believe are
not. Courts around the world have in fact been applying something like the
concept of dismemberment in the course of reviewing the constitutionality of
constitutional amendments without recognizing it as such. Yet they have taken
the wrong jurisprudential lesson from the distinction between a constitutional
amendment and a constitutional dismemberment.
1. Three Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments
Imagine a constitutional challenge to the Eighteenth or Nineteenth
Amendments at the time of their passing for violating the federalist foundations
of the U.S. Constitution. Although it is the keystone of the architecture of the
Constitution, federalism as a structure and allocation of vertical powers is not
made formally unamendable in the text. Could the Supreme Court of the
United States have held that either amendment was unconstitutional-and in
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turn annulled it-on the theory that the amendment violates the unwritten
federalist foundations of the Constitution?56 This is a close analogue to the
question confronting many courts around the world when an amendment is
challenged as unconstitutional, the main difference being that the U.S.
Constitution makes nothing formally unamendable.
Today it is not uncommon for supreme or constitutional courts to annul a
procedurally-perfect constitutional amendment on the theory that the
amendment is unconstitutional. The doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional
amendment has traveled the globe, from its political foundations in France and
the United States, to its doctrinal origins in Germany, to its practical
application in constitutional States in nearly every region of the world,
including Argentina, Austria, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, South Africa, South
Korea, Switzerland, and Tanzania, to name but a few.57 However, its increasing
frequency does not make it any less extraordinary nor any more reasonable.
Consider three high court rulings-one each from Colombia, Taiwan, and
India-where judges have invalidated an amendment for exceeding what they
view as the implicitly limited amendment power that amending actors are
presumed to hold under the conventional theory of constituent power. The four
propositions are central to the outcome in each case. But note that the idea of
dismemberment rests deep within the rulings, although the courts do not seem
to recognize it.
Begin with Colombia. The Constitutional Court of Colombia has created
the "substitution of the constitution" doctrine, which authorizes Congress only
to amend the Constitution but not to replace it, on the theory that the power of
constitutional replacement "is reserved for the people in their authority as
primary constituent power."58 As Carlos Bernal has explained, the core of the
doctrine is that "the power to amend the constitution comprises the power to
introduce changes to any article of the constitution text" on the condition that
"these changes can neither imply a derogation of the constitution nor its
replacement by a different one."5 9 In the Court's first judgment establishing the
doctrine, it stressed implicit limitations on the amendment power:
The derivative constituent power, then, lacks the power to destroy the Constitution.
The constituent act establishes the legal order and, because of that, any power of
reform is limited only to carrying out a revision. The power of reform, which is
constituted power, is not, therefore, authorized to annul or substitute the
56. The United States Supreme Court considered constitutional challenges to both the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments after they were passed. In each case, the Court rejected claims
that the amendments violated federalism. See Leser v. Gamettt, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922); Rhode Island
v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920).
57. See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments-The Migration and
Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 670-710 (2013).
58. Mario Cajas Sarria, The Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine and the
Reform of the Judiciary in Colombia, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Sept. 1, 2016),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/09/the-unconstitutional-constitutional-amendment-doctrine-and-the-
reform-of-the-judiciary-in-colombia.
59. Carlos Bernal, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of
Colombia: An Analysis of the Justication and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement Doctrine, 11
INT'L J. CONST. L. 339, 341 (2013).
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Constitution from which its competence is derived. The constituted power cannot .
. . grant itself functions that belong to the constituent power and, therefore, cannot
carry out a substitution of the Constitution not only because it would then become
an original constituent power, but also because it would undermine the bases of its
own competence. . . . The power of reform, a constituted power, has material
limits, because the power to reform the Constitution does not include the
possibility of derogating it, subverting it or substituting it in its integrity.'
The Court stressed that the amendment power in Colombia is limited, even
though the constitutional text imposes no explicit limitations on it.61 The reason
why, wrote the Court, is that the amending power is a constituted power, a
lesser and bounded power in comparison to constituent power, the latter being
a power that is "absolute, unlimited, permanent, without limits or jurisdictional
controls, because its acts are political and foundational and not juridical, [and]
whose validity derives from the political will of the society."62 The Court
therefore saw its role as protecting the Constitution from its replacement-what
the Court described as its "eliminat[ion]" or "substitut[ion]"-by anything less
than a procedure legitimated by constituent power.6 3 The Court has often relied
on this substitution doctrine since its first appearance in 2003.64
Turn next to Taiwan. The Taiwanese Constitution authorizes no formal
limitations on constitutional amendment, provided amending actors can
successfully assemble the required majorities and meet the required
thresholds.65 Yet the absence of a formally unamendable rule has not stopped
the Taiwanese Constitutional Court from striking down a series of
constitutional amendments. In one case, the National Assembly adopted a set
of amendments in 1999 that the Court subsequently invalidated on both
procedural and substantive grounds.66
The constitutional challenge began when members of the Legislative
Yuan filed a petition arguing that the amendment passed by the National
Assembly-where votes had been cast in anonymous ballots in the second and
60. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 9, 2003, Sentencia C-551/03,
paras. 37, 39 (Colom.), translated in COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LEADING CASES 341 (Manuel
Jos6 Cepeda Espinosa & David Landau eds., 2017).
61. Joel Col6n-Rios, Beyond Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Supremacy: The
Doctrine oflmplicit Limits to Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 44 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L.
REv. 521, 531 (2013).
62. Sentencia C-551/03, para. 29 (quoting Core Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court,
octubre 1, 1992, Sentencia C-544/02, para. 10 (internal quotation marks omitted)), translated in Col6n-
Rios, supra note 61, at 530-31.
63. Col6n-Rios, supra note 61, at 531 (quoting Sentencia 551/03, para. 34).
64. See, e.g., Bernal, supra note 59, at 343-46; Vicente F. Benitez R. & Germtn A. GonzAlez
H., The Role of Courts Sustaining Democracy: An Approach from Transitional Regimes, 36 REVISTA
DERECHO DEL ESTADO 41, 48-50 (2016); David Landau, Political Support and Structural Constitutional
Law, 67 ALA. L. REv. 1069, 1107-08 (2016); Gonzalo Andres Ramirez-Cleves, The Unconstitutionality
of Constitutional Amendments in Colombia: The Tension Between Majoritarian Democracy and
Constitutional Democracy, in DEMOCRATIZING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
THEORY AND THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 213-20 (Thomas Bustamante & Bemardo
Gongalves Fernandes eds., 2016).
65. See MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION], ch. XIV (1947) (Taiwan).
66. See Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499, Mar. 24, 2000 (Taiwan Const. Ct. Interp.),
http://wwwjudicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p0301.asp?expno-499.
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third readings-violated the Constitution's amendment rules.67 They also
argued that there were irregularities in the vote because some of the
amendment proposals had been defeated in the second reading but were still
voted on again in the third. The amendment, moreover, required the National
Assembly to be constituted according to a proportional allocation given to
political parties on the basis of votes they had received in the latest election of
the Legislative Yuan, a separate constitutional organ. The challengers claimed
that this change would make all of those persons unaffiliated with a political
party ineligible for selection to the National Assembly. The challengers raised
other concerns, including that the amendment improperly extended term limits
and also sowed confusion about their duration.6 8
The Court held the amendment unconstitutional. Anonymous balloting,
the Court explained, violated the principles of "openness and transparency" in
the legislative process.69 As for the voting irregularities, the Court held that
they "contradict the fundamental nature of governing norms and order that
form the very basis and existence of the Constitution, and are prohibited by the
norms of constitutional democracy."70 The rule of proportional representation
in the National Assembly based on political party votes received in Legislative
Yuan elections violated the principles of "democracy and constitutional rule of
law."7  The extension of term limits likewise violated the principle of
"democratic state of constitutional rule of law." 72 The Court also explained in
general terms how it reached the conclusion that these amendments were
unconstitutional:
Although the Amendment to the Constitution has equal status with the
constitutional provisions, any amendment that alters the existing constitutional
provisions concerning the fundamental nature of governing norms and order and,
hence, the foundation of the Constitution's very existence destroys the integrity and
fabric of the Constitution itself.. .. The democratic constitutional process derived
from these principles forms the foundation for the existence of the current
Constitution and all [governmental] bodies installed hereunder must abide by this
process.3
As in other cases around the world where courts have rejected an amendment,
here the Taiwanese Constitutional Court set the Constitution itself as the
limiting reagent for lawful constitutional change. It held that constitutional
changes inconsistent with the Constitution would destroy the Constitution as it







73. Id. (alteration in original).
74. The Taiwanese Constitutional Court has since dialed back its activism in constitutional
politics, and it may in fact be on the path downward to constitutional irrelevance. See Ming-Sung Kuo,
Moving Towards a Nominal Constitutional Court? Critical Reflections on the Shift from Judicial
Activism to Constitutional Irrelevance in Taiwan's Constitutional Politics, 25 WASH. INT'L L.J. 597
(2016).
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Constitutional Court's self-given duty to protect the Constitution from its
"eliminat[ion]."
Courts in Colombia, Taiwan, and elsewhere in the world have not built
this approach from scratch. Their judgments derive from ideas developed in a
set of Indian Supreme Court rulings that have migrated to courts in
constitutional democracies in both the Global North and South, in the East and
West, and in civil and common law regimes. Inspired by German theory and
doctrine, the Indian Supreme Court has created a vague but judicially self-
entrenching "basic structure doctrine" to justify its power to review
constitutional amendments for their constitutionality.
The impetus for the Indian doctrine was the national legislature's
virtually unfettered power of formal constitutional alteration. With the
exception of certain classes of change that require state ratification, the
legislature may alter the Indian Constitution with a simple majority vote in
each house of the legislature as long as a two-thirds quorum of all members is
present. By comparison to other constitutional democracies, this is a very low
threshold for formal alteration.7 8 It is so low that it raises the risk that
legislators will treat the Constitution like a statute, making it as easily
changeable and indistinguishable from one.79 The legislature's power is even
greater in light of the absence of any formally unamendable rule in the
Constitution. It is therefore possible, perhaps even likely, that the legislature
would be tempted to exploit its textually unlimited power of formal alteration
to make constitution-level changes with a simple legislative majority vote. The
"basic structure doctrine" was thus created to justify limiting the legislature's
constitutional amendment power to only those changes that cohere with the
Constitution.80
The Indian Supreme Court has come a long way on whether it has the
power to review an amendment. It first declared in 1951 that the amendment
75. See Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499, supra note 66; supra note 63 and accompanying
text.
76. See A.G. Noorani, On India's Debt to a German Jurist, Professor Dietrich Conrad,
FRONTLINE (Apr.-May 2001), http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fil809/18090950.htm; see also
Aharon Barak, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 44 IsR, L. REv. 321, 325 n.22 (2011)
(noting the probable link between the basic structure doctrine and German scholarship). There is an
important historical connection between the idea of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment and
the German doctrine of constitutional identity. See Monika Polzin, Constitutional Identity,
Unconstitutional Amendments and the Idea of Constituent Power: The Development of the Doctrine of
Constitutional Identity in German Constitutional Law, 14 INT'L J. CONST. L. 411 (2016).
77. INDIA CONST. art. 368, § 2.
78. See DONALD LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 170 (2006) (ranking the
Indian Constitution as one of the easiest to amend in his study sample).
79. See ANDRAS SAJ6, LIMITING GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM
39-40 (1999); Kathleen M. Sullivan, ConstitutionalAmendmentitis, AM. PROSPECT 20, 22-23 (1995).
80. The court-created "basic structure doctrine" was not a necessary outcome. Conventions of
unamendability could have emerged from the political process in order to constrain the legislature's
exercise of its textually-unlimited amendment power. See Gert Jan Geertjes & Jerfi Uzman, Conventions
of Unamendability: Covert Constitutional Unamendability in (Two) Politically Enforced Constitutions,
in AN UNAMENDABLE CONSTITUTION? UNAMENDABILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES (Richard
Albert & Bertil Oder eds., forthcoming 2018).
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power is unlimited.81 Sixteen years later, the Court indicated a turn in the
opposite direction: the Court in 1967 laid the foundation for invalidating an
amendment at some point in the future, holding that the amendment power
could not be used to abolish or violate fundamental constitutional rights.82 The
Court's new position on implicit limits on amending powers was rather
controversial, which perhaps explains why the Court held that it would apply
this power only prospectively, not retrospectively.
The Court held a few years later that the amendment power could be used
only as long as it did not do violence to the Constitution's basic structure.8 3 The
organizing logic of this "basic structure," according to the Chief Justice, was
that "every provision of the Constitution can be amended, provided in the result
the basic foundation and structure of the Constitution remains the same."" The
basic structure consists of various principles, including constitutional
supremacy, the republican and democratic forms of government, the secular
character of the State, the separation of powers, and federalism.85 These
elements of the basic structure doctrine are not spelled out in the Constitution's
text. Nor are they the result of a popular consent-driven constitutional design
that entrenches a hierarchy of importance allowing the people to distinguish
among different values. These and other elements of the basic structure
doctrine identified since then have emerged from the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution, just like the basic structure doctrine itself.
The Court took the next step nearly one decade later when it invoked the
basic structure doctrine to invalidate actual constitutional amendments to the
Constitution's formal amendment rules.86 The amendments had proposed to
prevent the Court from evaluating the constitutionality of any amendment at
all. They established the rule that "no amendment of this Constitution ... shall
be called in question in any court on any ground"87 and that "for the removal of
doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be no limitation whatever on the
constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or
repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article."88 When the Chief
Justice held these amendments unconstitutional, he relied on the vocabulary of
destruction, the same language we read in the rulings of the Colombian and
Taiwanese Constitutional Courts. The Chief Justice wrote that although
"Parliament is given the power to amend the Constitution," it is clear that this
"power cannot be exercised so as to damage the basic features of the
Constitution or so as to destroy its basic structure."89 Protecting the constitution
from its destruction is the key idea behind the basic structure doctrine. It also
informs the substitution of the constitution doctrine and the rulings of most, if
81. See Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, (1952) SCR 89 (India).
82. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762 (India).
83. Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India).
84. Id.
85. Id. para. 316.
86. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCR 206 (India).
87. The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, sec. 55 (India).
88. Id.
89. Minerva Mills Ltd., (1981) 1 SCR 206.
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not all, other courts that make the extraordinary decision to invalidate an
amendment on substantive grounds.
2. The Conventional Rule and the Remedy
Many high courts around the world have given themselves the task of
guarding the constitution from changes they believe would destroy its original
design. The language of destruction recurs with frequency in other cases. A
recent judgment of the Belizean Supreme Court is illustrative:
There is though a limitation on the power of amendment by implication by the
words of the Preamble and therefore every provision of the Constitution is open to
amendment, provided the foundation or basic structure of the Constitution is not
removed, damaged or destroyed.... I therefore rule that even though provisions of
the Constitution can be amended, the National Assembly is not legally authorized
to make any amendment to the Constitution that would remove or destroy any of
the basic structures of the Constitution of Belize.90
This imagery of destruction is familiar in scholarship on constitutional change,
so old that it was not new when William Marbury wrote in a 1919 paper
published in the Harvard Law Review that "it may be safely premised that the
power to 'amend' the Constitution was not intended to include the power to
destroy it." 91 He, too, adhered to the conventional theory of constitutional
change I have described as rooted in four propositions.
Invalidation is the ordinary judicial remedy for passing an amendment he
Court believes exceeds the scope of the amendment power. The court annuls
the amendment on the theory that it is a new constitution masquerading as an
amendment. The conventional rule is therefore that a constitutional change
amounting to a new constitution can be valid only if the change is made by a
constituent power and not by an inferior constituted power. However, what
remains inadequately answered is why invalidation must be the court's
response to a transformative constitutional change.
Constituent power is a sociological concept, neither a legal nor a moral
one. In the eyes of constituent power-setting aside for now how we actually
identify it-the formal trappings of law are less important than political
effectiveness and societal acceptance. Where the political class recognizes the
validity of a constitutional change and the people approve or acquiesce to it,
that change has a claim to legitimacy though not necessarily to legality: a
constitution can therefore be simultaneously illegal yet democratically
legitimate.9 2 This is one of the implications of Bruce Ackerman's theory of
"constitutional moments."93  Although Ackerman does not . present
90. British Caribbean Bank Ltd. v. Att'y Gen. of Belize, Claim No. 597 of 2011, para. 45
(2012), http://www.belizejudiciary.org/web/supreme-court/judgements/legal2O12/eighth%20
amendment.pdf.
91. William L. Marbury, The Limitations Upon the Amending Power, 33 HARv. L. REv. 223,
225 (1919) (italics in original).
92. See Richard Albert, Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and Their Democratic
Foundations, 50 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 169, 175-77 (2017).
93. See ACKERMAN, supra note 23 (introducing the theory of "constitutional moments"); 2
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (theorizing the Reconstruction and the
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"constitutional moments" in these terms, his theory is an account of how
constituent power has been exercised in U.S. history.
The range of valid exercises of constituent power is boundless in cases of
legally discontinuous changes. There are no rules of process to legitimate the
outcome; the very fact of a popular outcome marking a new beginning is its
own source of legitimation. But for a legally continuous change that keeps the
constitution in force, the question becomes how to identify the exercise of
constituent power where its exercise does not follow the rules of a
constitutional text. The answer will differ across jurisdictions because the rules
for recognizing the exercise of constituent power are jurisdiction-specific.
Constituent power in France, for example, will not mobilize in the same way as
constituent power in Germany, which have two different constitutional
traditions.
Recognizing the exercise of constituent power is governed by local rules.
These rules track the constitutional history of the people in the jurisdiction,
how the people interact with and speak through their representatives and
institutions, and whether the people and elites will recognize a purported
exercise of constituent power as valid. In the case of the United States, history
and modem politics suggest that there are three basic rules for recognizing the
valid exercise of constituent power. First, the rule of extraordinariness: the
transformative constitutional change must occur either through extraordinary
institutions, like conventions, or with recourse to some extraordinary
procedure, as in the Reconstruction. Second, the rule of consent: the change
must be supported by significant popular consent manifested either directly or
indirectly. Third, the rule of federalism: the change must be validated in both
federal- and state-level institutions.94
3. Constitutionalizing Constituent Power
Courts that have annulled constitutional amendments for exceeding the
scope of the amendment power must believe either that they can accurately
identify an exercise of constituent power or, more likely, that they can
recognize when a constitutional change has been supported by something less
than constituent power. The body we call "the people" is not necessarily the
same across jurisdictions. Its configuration changes according to local norms
and indeed it may also change across time. Ackerman recognized as much
when he argued that the major path to constitutional change in the United
States since the New Deal is no longer formal amendment via the federalist
New Deal as constitutional moments); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2014) (making the case that the Civil Rights movement created a constitutional moment).
94. On this point, I depart from Akhil Amar's theory of majoritarian constitutional
amendment, which aggregates popular will across the nation without regard to state distribution of
popular support. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
The rule of federalism points to the principal reason why Ackerman's theory of the "constitutional
moments" in the New Deal and the Civil Rights Movement stand on less firm ground today than the
Founding and Reconstruction: the victories of the first pair remain contested in court unlike the victories
of the second pair because the first pair was consolidated only at the level of national law without the
same depth and intensity of acceptance at the state level.
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structures of Article V, but rather transformative judicial appointments through
national institutions-namely, the Senate, the Presidency, and the Supreme
Court.95
Whether in the United States or elsewhere, constituent power cannot be
cabined by the rules entrenched in a constitutional text. The nature of
constituent power is such that it cannot be constitutionalized as a matter of
enforceable constitutional law. But the text can certainly attempt to direct how
constituent power can be validly exercised. One way to direct its exercise,
though never successfully to constrain it, is to entrench the procedures that the
constituent power uses to constitute the constitutional order at its point of
origin.
Although Article V of the U.S. Constitution seeks to constitutionalize
constituent power, it does so while conceding its inability to impose
enforceable rules on its exercise. Under Article V, there are four ways to
formally change the Constitution. The first pair of procedures authorizes two-
thirds of both Houses of Congress to propose an amendment hat becomes valid
when three-quarters of the states ratify it through either the legislature or a
convention, the choice being up to Congress. The second pair authorizes two-
thirds of the states to petition Congress to call a convention to propose a
constitutional change that becomes valid when three-quarters of the states ratify
it either in a legislature or a convention, again the choice left to Congress.96
Each procedure may be used to alter anything in the Constitution; nothing
today is formally unamendable.9 7
Here are the four separate formal procedures that authorize a textual
alteration to the Constitution: (1) Congress proposes, by two-thirds
supermajority, a constitutional change, and the change becomes valid when it is
ratified by three-quarters of the states in legislative votes; (2) Congress
proposes a change by two-thirds supermajority, and the change becomes valid
when it is ratified by three-quarters of the states in conventions; (3) two-thirds
of the states petition Congress to call a constitutional convention to propose a
constitutional change, and the change becomes valid when it is ratified by
three-quarters of the states in legislative votes; and (4) two-thirds of the states
petition Congress to call a constitutional convention to propose a constitutional
change, and the change becomes valid when it is ratified by three-quarters of
the states in conventions.
But one of these four methods of formal change is unlike the others. The
fourth is similar to the one that was used to ratify the U.S. Constitution. The
1787 Philadelphia Convention approved the Constitution for the states to ratify
according to the following rule: "The ratification of the conventions of nine
95. Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1164, 1171-73
(1988).
96. U.S. CONST. art. V.
97. The slave trade and related taxation provisions were formally unamendable until 1808 but
these have, of course, since expired. See id. For an important study on constitutional sunset provisions
like these, see SOFIA RANCHORDAS, CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2014).
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states, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the
states so ratifying the same."98 Note that the ratification of the Constitution was
made subject to the approval of state conventions. This ratification procedure
for the Constitution therefore reminds us of the fourth Article V amendment
procedure requiring two-thirds agreement in a convention to propose
constitutional changes that later become valid where three-quarters of states
ratify those changes in conventions. But there is an important difference: the
three-quarters threshold for ratifying a constitutional amendment amounts to
ten of the original thirteen states present at the Founding. This ten-state
amendment ratification threshold therefore creates a higher ratification
threshold for amending the Constitution than the nine-state total that was
required to ratify the Constitution to begin with-evidence of how strongly the
drafters and ratifiers wished to preserve the content of the Founding
Constitution.
How should we interpret the choice to entrench in Article V a ratification
threshold for constitutional amendments that is similar to the one used to ratify
the entire Constitution? And why would the authors of the Constitution create
three other rules for constitutional change-rules that were not used to ratify
the Constitution? The answers to these questions help us understand constituent
power in the United States.
Article V entrenches both powers of amendment and dismemberment, as
well as the power of formal constitutional creation, all without stating so in
those terms. The four procedures in Article V give political actors the tools to
exercise the full scope of powers to change the Constitution, both within the
existing constitutional order, so as to retain legal continuity, and also from
outside the constitutional order, in order to found a new constitution that leads
to legally discontinuous constitutional change. The first two Congress-initiated
procedures authorize amendment consistent with the Constitution. The fourth
procedure has the widest range.99 It authorizes both amendment and
dismemberment, and it also contemplates the creation of a new constitution.
This procedure is substantially the same one used in 1787 to step outside of the
Articles of Confederation in order to propose and thereafter ratify an altogether
new constitution, except that it requires one more state to approve the change
for a successful ratification.
The third procedure-a convention to propose amendments that become
valid if ratified by three-quarters of the state legislatures-does not
constitutionalize constituent power, but the constituent power may nonetheless
choose to make a new constitution using this process. It would thereafter be up
98. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
99. It has never successfully been used since the adoption of the Constitution, nor has the
third. See William B. Fisch, Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America, 54 AM. J.
COMp. L. 485, 490 (2006). Scholars have explored its present viability as a method to formally amend
the Constitution. Compare Michael B. Rapport, Reforming Article V. The Problems Created by the
National Convention Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96 VA. L. REv. 1509, 1512 (2010)
(arguing that the process as currently understood "does not work"), with Gerard N. Magliocca, State
Calls for an Article Five Convention: Mobilization and Interpretation, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE
Novo 74, 75 (challenging the view that the process is "not a practical device" for constitutional change).
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to political elites and the people to recognize the validity or not of that
purported exercise of constituent power. Whether to follow the directions
outlined in the constitutional text is the choice of the constituent power alone.
That is the lesson of the violation of the Articles of Confederation in 1787. The
choice to break from the unanimity rule for constitutional amendment and in
turn to adopt a new ratification standard was illegal when judged against the
legal standard set by the Articles of Confederation, but it was thereafter
legitimated by the popularly-supported ratification of the Constitution
according to the new rule of ratification.
There has been only one successful use of the fourth procedure in the
history of the United States-and that was the Founding itself. This does not
mean that the Founding period is the only instance of the exercise of
constituent power in the United States. As Ackerman suggests, constituent
power has been exercised many times in U.S. history. The point is not that the
fourth procedure is the only way to exercise constituent power; it is instead that
the fourth procedure is the only way the Constitution expresses the form that
constituent power might take. It may, of course, take others. But this was the
only form then known to the Constitution's authors when they suggested
exercising constituent power to ratify the Constitution. The authors of the
Constitution knew from their own experience that the codified text is no barrier
to constitutional change when the people manifest their will to unmake the
constitution and make a new one.
C. Constitutional Design for Formal Alteration
The rules of change in the U.S. Constitution place it in a small group of
constitutions that distinguish between amendment and dismemberment. These
constitutions authorize dismemberment using constitution-making
procedures-and they do so without breaking legal continuity in the regime.
These constitutions of course do not use the twin terms amendment and
dismemberment, but the idea is evident in their design. The Swiss Constitution,
for example, distinguishes in its text between "total" and "partial" revision.100
Partial revision is understood to refer to amendments-changes that cohere
with the Constitution-while total revision entails substantially bigger changes
that transform the Constitution into something it is presently not.101 We see a
similar division of powers between constitution-changing and constitution-
making in a few other constitutions of the world,102 namely in Austria,10 3 Costa
Rica,10 4 and Spain.105 This framework for formal alteration properly attends to
both the content and process of constitutional change.
100. CONSTITUTION FtDtRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 192
(Switz.).
101. Id. arts. 193-94.
102. See Albert, supra note 1, at 93 0-32.
103. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 1/1930, as last
amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBL I No. 62/2016, art. 44 (Austria).
104. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA, Nov. 7, 1949, arts. 195-96.
105. CONSTITUCION ESPA&OLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, § 168 (Spain).
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However, the standard design of the rules of formal alteration in the
world's constitutions today generally does not entrench the differences between
constitution-changing and constitution-making powers. As a result, most
constitutions do not recognize the important differences between the thresholds
for formal alteration and constitutional ratification, and they therefore miss the
design possibilities for legally continuous transformative constitutional change.
What follows from the standard design of the rules of formal alteration is free
rein for courts to distinguish as they deem proper between the constitution-
changing and constitution-making powers, and therefore to invalidate formal
alterations that in the view of judges amount to transformative constitutional
changes-even when those changes are supported overwhelmingly by political
actors and the people they represent.
1. The Standard Design of Formal Rules of Change
The standard design of the formal rules of constitutional change features
only one unified track for constitutional changes. The standard design therefore
does not distinguish between alterations that simply repair or elaborate the
constitution and those that remake or replace it. In other words, the
overwhelming majority of constitutions define formal alteration exclusively
with regard to amendment. This means that the entrenched rules to alter the
constitution are not identified in connection with the constitution's formal
ratification procedure. The unified procedure in most constitutions therefore is
only rarely entrenched in relation to the procedure recognized by the legal elite
and the people as the valid and legitimate way to exercise the power to unmake
the constitution.
For example, the German Basic Law recognizes only one way to make
alterations to it. Amendments are permitted "only by a law expressly amending
or supplementing its text," and "[a]ny such law shall be carried by two thirds of
the Members of the Bundestag and two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat."l06
The same is true of the French Constitution, which requires the national
legislature to approve an amendment proposal before it is ratified in a national
referendum, though the president has the power to unilaterally bypass the
referendum requirement for proposals made by the govermnent.'0 7 The
procedure to alter the Italian Constitution is more complicated, but the general
approach remains the same: the constitutional alteration procedure does not
distinguish between the power to change or to unmake or replace the
Constitution.'08 In order to become valid, the national legislature must approve
a proposal in each House over two consecutive votes held within three
months.'09 If the proposal secures two-thirds approval, it becomes valid, but if
it fails, one-fifth of one of the two Houses, 500,000 voters, or five autonomous
Regional Councils may request that the proposal be ratified in a national
106. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 79 (Ger.).
107. 1958 LA CONSTITUTION art. 89 (Fr.).
108. Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost] (It.).
109. Id.
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referendum.110
2. The Limits of the Standard Design
The scarcity of exceptions to the standard design reinforces the general
point: the standard design cannot accommodate the distinction between
amendment and dismemberment. The standard design of formal rules of
change does not entrench the distinction between the power to merely amend
the constitution and the power to make a change that transforms its rights,
structure, or identity without breaking legal continuity. Under the standard
design, making a change of the larger magnitude instead requires political
actors and the people to invest time and resources-as well as to incur the non-
trivial risk of failure-to make a new constitution and therefore to break the
legal continuity that is valuable and perhaps necessary for stability in a
constitutional order.
For courts, the relevant distinction is between constitution-changing and
constitution-making. Courts enforce this distinction, although nowhere found in
the standard design, by invalidating what is viewed as a transformative
constitutional change brought about through the formal alteration procedures
for constitutional amendment, when such change should have been brought
about, in the view of the courts, through the relevant constitution-making
procedures. However, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that courts do not
enforce this distinction consistently or on replicable grounds.
3. The Consequences ofthe Standard Design
Consider a pair of cases from Turkey. They show how inconsistently
courts can apply the constitution-changing/-making distinction. A preliminary
point is important: the Turkish Constitution authorizes the Constitutional Court
to invalidate constitutional alterations when they have been made in violation
of the procedures of constitutional change; the Constitution does not authorize
the Court to evaluate the content of amendments for coherence with the
Constitution.
In a 2008 judgment, the Constitutional Court struck down as
unconstitutional a set of amendments on wearing headscarves in universities.1 12
The basis of the Court's decision was not a violation of the Constitution's
amendment procedure. It was instead rooted in what the Court saw as a
violation of the constitution-changing/-making distinction-a distinction that
the Court incorporated into the narrowly-worded authorization it is given to
review constitutional amendments for procedural correctness alone. The Court
110. Id.
111. TURKiYE CUMHURiYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 148 (Turk.)
("[T]he verification of constitutional amendments shall be restricted to consideration of whether the
requisite majorities were obtained for the proposal and in the ballot, and whether the prohibition on
debates under expedited procedure was observed.").
112. For a thorough discussion of the case, see Yaniv Roznai & Serkan Yolcu, An
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment-The Turkish Perspective: A Comment on the Turkish
Constitutional Court's HeadscarfDecision, 10 INT'L J. CONST. L. 175 (2012).
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imported this substantive restriction into the procedural test through Article 4
of the Constitution, which elevates several principles to the status of
unamendable characteristics of the Turkish Republic.!13  The relevant
unamendable principle in this case was secularism,1 14 which the Court held had
been violated by the constitutional amendment that allowed lifting the ban on
wearing headscarves in university.
Before the Court could enforce this content-based restriction on
constitutional change, it first had to find a way to incorporate substantive
review into the narrow procedural review that the Constitution authorizes it to
perform. In a twist that Andrew Arato believes is "very strong, even
foolproof," the Court defined the problem in terms of competence: the Court
explained that it could not approve the correctness of the amendment if the
amendment violated the substantive restriction on what could be amended-
here, secularism-because such an amendment would be procedurally invalid
in the sense of falling beyond the competence of the amending actors.115 Far
from being foolproof, however, this result undermines the textual prohibition
on judicial review of amendments on anything but procedural grounds.
Nonetheless, even in the face of the Constitution's prohibition on substantive
review, the Court struck down the amendment, invoking the conventional
theory of constituent power as the primary reason and specifying that only
constituent power can authorize a fundamental change to the Constitution.1 16
The Court's defiance of the Constitution is problematic in its own right.
But it takes on an additional dimension when we see how inconsistently the
Court has applied its own precedent.
In a more recent 2016 judgment, the Turkish Constitutional Court held
that it could not pierce the veil of procedure to review the substantive
constitutionality of an amendment because doing so would render meaningless
the Constitution's ban on content-based review of constitutional
amendments.17 The dispute concerned the Constitution's rule on parliamentary
immunity, under which members of the National Assembly enjoy broad
immunity for statements, views, and votes in connection with their
parliamentary functions, meaning they cannot be arrested, interrogated,
detained, or tried, and they are immune from criminal sentences during their
term of elected service.18 This rule, however, is subject to the important
exception that the Assembly may, by law, choose to lift parliamentary
immunity.1 9
113. TORKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 4 (Turk.).
114. Id. art. 2.
115. ANDREW ARATO, POST SOVEREIGN CONSTITUTION MAKING: LEARNING AND LEGITIMACY
242 (2016).
116. Roznai & Yolcu, supra note 112, at 184.
117. Anyasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] June 3, 2016, E. 2016/54, K. 2016/117, Resmi
Gazete [Official Gazette], June 9, 2016, No. 29737 (Turk.) (translation by Ali Acar on file with author)
[hereinafter Parliamentary Immunity Case].
118. TURKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 83 (Turk.).
119. Id. There is another constitutional rule to note: Article 85 gives members of the National
Assembly the right to appeal their loss of parliamentary immunity by a law of the National Assembly
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The dispute arose when the Turkish National Assembly adopted an
amendment temporarily lifting the Constitution's grant of parliamentary
immunity to legislators. The amendment made possible the prosecution of
members of the National Assembly who were under investigation for criminal
charges. Some members of the National Assembly filed a constitutional
challenge to the amendment, arguing that they were authorized to seek redress
from the Constitutional Court under Article 85, which gives members of the
National Assembly the right to appeal their loss of parliamentary immunity.
The Court rejected their request for judicial review, because although Article
85 would normally authorize the Court to review the lifting of immunity if it
had been passed by an ordinary law, this temporary lifting of immunity was not
done by ordinary law-it was a constitutional amendment passed using the
Constitution's formal amendment rules. And since Article 148 limits the Court
to reviewing an amendment only to the extent that it violates the procedures of
constitutional amendment, the Court here could not venture beyond that
restriction to evaluate the amendment under its authority conferred by Article
85 because that authority becomes disabled where a constitutional amendment
is concerned. Here is the relevant passage in the Court decision:
A Law of Amendment adopted through this procedure cannot be at all the subject
of judicial (constitutional) review in terms of its content; the procedural review is
possible only within the framework specified by Art. 148. Pursuant to Art. 148,
judicial review of constitutional amendments in terms of procedural requirements
is restricted to whether the requisite (qualified) majority votes were obtained for
the proposal and in the ballot, and whether the prohibition on debates under
expedited procedure was observed.1 20
The Court therefore took an exceedingly narrow perspective on its own power
of judicial review. It held that the Court is authorized to review an amendment
only for procedural correctness, and that this excludes any procedure-like the
one in Article 85-that does not relate to the adoption of an amendment.121 The
Court added that reading Article 148 any other way would hollow it and deny it
of its intended effect, which was to circumscribe the Court's authority to
review constitutional amendments. The Court affirmed that the challengers
could refile their claim under Article 148 but they had no recourse in law under
Article 85.122
The Court's ruling in this Parliamentary Immunity Case takes the position
dictated by a plain reading of the Constitution, but it is not consistent with the
reading that the Court gave to the same text in the Headscarf Ban Case. This
inconsistency is troubling in and of itself. It does not assuage matters to know
that the Court has now returned to the correct reading of the Constitution.
These two contrary judgments introduce uncertainty in the jurisprudence of the
Court on how it will in the future evaluate claims that an amendment is
directly to the Constitutional Court, which can annul their loss of immunity if it is not done in
accordance with the Constitution. Id. art. 85.
120. Parliamentary Immunity Case, supra note 117, para. 11.
121. Id. para. 13.
122. Id. paras. 14-15.
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unconstitutional. These two judgments moreover raise the question whether
one or both were driven by constitutional politics instead of constitutional law.
In either case, it should not come as a surprise that constitutional politics may
offer a better explanation for how a court resolves a claim that an amendment is
unconstitutional; the idea of constituent power may be exploited equally by
courts and amending actors.
The larger point on the rules of formal alteration is that the standard
design does little where it is needed most. First, the standard design invites
instability. At a minimum, the rules of formal alteration should prescribe a
transparent, predictable, and rational process for altering the constitution. But
the rules of change in the standard design fail to distinguish between
constitution-changing and constitution-making procedures, the result being that
the only lawful way to transform the constitution is to engage in an altogether
new constitution-making process and to risk the uncertainty entailed by
breaking legal continuity. Second, the standard design does nothing to guard
against the judicial manipulation of the rules of constitutional change. As we
have seen with case law from the Turkish Constitutional Court, even where
constitutional designers limit the power of courts to a modest form of
procedural review of constitutional amendments, the possibility and the likely
eventuality remain that courts will enlarge their own powers contrary to the
separation of powers.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DISMEMBERMENT: FORMS, THEORY, AND MUTUALITY
Constitutional dismemberment fills a void in the study of constitutional
change. It identifies a phenomenon that is increasingly evident around the
world; it situates that phenomenon in conceptual terms in the literature on
constitutional change; it suggests a judicial doctrine to evaluate constitutional
changes; and it is accompanied by a suite of strategies to structure how political
actors should change the constitution in a given jurisdiction. In this Part, I
explain the idea of constitutional dismemberment by illustrating how and why
it occurs. I show that it applies to all constitutions-codified, uncodified, and
partially codified. I also introduce the rule of mutuality, the default procedure I
suggest for the rules of change in new constitutions that do not entrench two
tracks of constitutional alteration.
A. An Amendment in Name Alone
To amend a constitution is to elaborate it in light of experience or to free
it from a discovered flaw. This understanding of an amendment begs an all-
important question: by what standard are we to judge whether the constitution
is in need of an elaboration or a fix? Is the constitution flawed when compared
to global norms of constitutional law, to universal values of human rights, to
the present views of the people? The answer is in the constitution itself. The
structure and design of the constitution suggest how to identify when the
constitution warrants an amendment, a concept derived from the Latin
imendare, meaning to remove errors or to improve. There are limits, however,
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to what counts as error-correction and improvement. An amendment must be
designed to help the constitution better achieve its purpose. A constitutional
dismemberment, in contrast, involves a fundamental transformation of one or
more of the constitution's core commitments. Consider three examples of
constitutional changes that illustrate a dismemberment in three separate
constitutional forms: Japan's codified constitution; the United Kingdom's
uncodified constitution; and Canada's partially codified constitution.
1. The War on Japan's Pacifist Constitution
There were calls to replace the Japanese Constitution almost as soon as it
was adopted in 1946. Described by many as "MacArthur's Constitution," in
reference to the U.S. General who oversaw its drafting, the Japanese
Constitution has long been regarded as a foreign imposition, not an
autochthonous text reflecting homegrown values.'23 As early as 1955, the
newly-formed Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) made it a central plank in its
platform to rewrite the Constitution in order to give Japan its own charter of
independence124 -a pledge that has long remained in the party platform.12 5 The
LDP has yet to complete its constitution-remaking mission, but it is inching
ever closer to it under Shinzo Abe, the leader of the LDP and Japan's current
prime minister.
The LDP's main target for constitutional change is the Constitution's
Peace Clause.126 The Peace Clause, entrenched in Article 9, commits Japan "to
an international peace based on justice and order" and cements into law the
Japanese people's vow to "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international
disputes."1 27 At its creation, the Peace Clause was imposed by the laws of
conquest into the law of Japan as a permanent reminder, according to one
scholar, of the consequences of defeat.12 8 Political actors mounted serious
efforts to amend Article 9 almost immediately in order to remove the stain of
conquest, but each of them failed, as did all others through the 1990s.129 In all
cases, one of the main reasons for the failure of constitutional amendment was
the strong public support for the Peace Clause.13 0 Popular acceptance of the
Peace Clause has therefore grown over time, proving how social and political
123. Sandra Madsen, The Japanese Constitution and Self-Defense Forces: Prospects for a New
Japanese Military Role, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 549, 555 (1993).
124. See Masmi Ito, LDP Returns with All Its Old Baggage, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 25, 2012),
http://www japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/25/referencelldp-returns-with-all-its-old-baggage.
125. GLENN D. HOOK & GAVAN MCCORMACK, JAPAN'S CONTESTED CONSTITUTION 8 (2004).
126. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPOJ [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan).
127. Id.
128. George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of
Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1537 (2002).
129. See JOHN W. DOWER, EMIiRE AND AFTERMATH: YOSHIDA SHIGERU AND THE JAPANESE
EXPERIENCE, 1878-1954, at 433-34 (1979); Michael A. Panton, Politics, Practice and Pacifism:
Revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 163, 182-84 (2009).
130. Mark A. Chinen, Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan and the Use of Procedural and
Substantive Heuristics for Consensus, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 163, 82-84 (2009); DOWER, supra note 129;
Panton, supra note 129.
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circumstances can change dramatically in any given country.
Today, Article 9 is a super-constitutional norm that reflects deeply-rooted
Japanese popular values. It is seen as the Constitution's most important
provision outside of the preambular assertion of popular sovereignty.131 The
national commitment to peace has become constitutive of Japan's
constitutional identity,132 a "culturally embedded norm," 3 3 and "an anchor of
[Japan's] postwar identity."I 3 4 This cultural entrenchment of Article 9 did not
occur by happenstance. Article 9 was taught as a point of pride to
schoolchildrenl35 and was used to reinforce the work of the Committee to
Popularize the Constitution, which had been convened to organize public
lectures, publish books, produce films and songs, and distribute pamphlets to
help ease the transition to the new post-war norm of pacifism. 136 Despite its
importance, however, the Peace Clause today is not formally entrenched
against amendment or repeal.137 Its susceptibility to change has allowed
political actors to undermine the spirit of Article 9,138 as its text has been
interpreted and reinterpreted by an executive agency, the Cabinet Legislation
Bureau,139 to ban only the offensive use of force and to authorize Japan to
establish Self-Defense Forces that today operate on one of the world's largest
military budgets.40 And yet the text of the Peace Clause remains unchanged,
still a symbol of Japanese values.
Formally amending Article 9 will be no easy feat. The Japanese
Constitution establishes a three-step sequence for constitutional amendment:
proposal by a two-thirds supermajority vote in each of the two houses of the
national legislature, followed by ratification by a simple majority vote in a
referendum, and finally promulgation by the Emperor.141 Abe's amendment
ambitions face a hurdle not only from an onerous amendment threshold but
131. Kenneth L. Port, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the Rule ofLaw, 13 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 127, 157 (2004).
132. See Chaihark Hahm & Sung Ho Kim, To Make "We the People ": Constitutional Founding
in Postwar Japan and South Korea, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 800, 814 (2010).
133. Akihiro Ogawa, Peace, a Contested Identity: Japan's Constitutional Revision and
Grassroots Peace Movements, 36 PEACE & CHANGE 373, 374 (2011).
134. David Arase, Japan, the Active State? Security Policy after 9/11, 47 ASIAN SURVEY 560,
562 (2007).
135. See John M. Maki, Japanese Constitutional Style, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS
FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-1967, at 27 (Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 1968).
136. See KOSEKI SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 217-22 (1997);
Craig Martin, Binding the Dogs of War: Japan and the Constitutionalization ofJus Ad Bellum, 30 U.
PA. J. INT'L L. 267, 304 n. 102 (2008).
137. Richard Albert, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 655,
674-77 (2015).
138. J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC. B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 19 (2010).
139. See Craig Martin, The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional Amendment and the
"Reinterpretation" of Japan's War Powers, 40 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 427 (2017). A related though
distinguishable practice of pre-amendment review appears to have taken root in Romania. See Bianca
Selejan-Gutan, Informal Constitutional Changes in Romania, 6 ROMANIA J. COMP. L. 35, 41 (2015).
140. See Ashley Kirk, What Are the Biggest Defence Budgets in the World?, TELEGRAPH (Oct.
27, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11936179/What-are-the-biggest-defence-
budgets-in-the-world.html.
141. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan).
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also from a conservative culture of formal alteration that has so far resisted
modifying Article 9 and the rest of the Constitution.
Abe has made some progress toward formally altering Article 9 after first
suffering a setback. When it became clear to him that he did not have the
support needed to alter Article 9 directly, he suggested a two-step solution to
change it indirectly: first, to alter the amendment rule from its high
supermajority threshold in the legislature to a lower simple majority vote, and
then, to deploy the new amendment rule to alter Article 9.142 It appeared that
Abe was trying to do indirectly what he could not do directly.143 Abe's plan
was exposed as a circumvention of the Constitution, and he faced substantial
resistance around the country,14 4 notably also from Japanese scholars who
stood united against the effort to change the amendment rule despite their
opposing views on whether to revise Article 9.145 One scholar stated
unequivocally that "[p]eople versed in constitutional law share the belief that it
is inappropriate to relax the requirements for constitutional revision."1 4 6 In
spite of this controversy, Abe has persisted with his program in the face of
significant opposition. His political coalition gained control of two-thirds of the
national legislature in upper house elections in July 2016, giving him the
amendment supermajority needed to initiate a popular referendum on amending
Article 914 7-the first time since the end of World War II that the ruling party
or coalition had possessed this power.14 8 Recent elections in October 2017 have
further strengthened his hold on power.'49
Abe may well succeed in altering Article 9 in the years remaining in his
term. But this change to Article 9's renunciation of war and its attendant
commitment to peace will be an amendment in name alone. Its effect will be
transformative. It will remove one of the core commitments in the post-war
Japanese Constitution. It would be wrong to call such a momentous
142. Tobias Harris, Shinzo Abe's Constitution Quest, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323582904578486642338035044.html; Reiji Yoshida
& Ayako Mie, Abe's Rightism: Campaign Ploy or Governance Plan?, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 2, 2012),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/02/national/abes-rightism-campaign-ploy-orgovernance-
plan/#.UiX989JORIE.
143. Editorial, LDP Out to Undermine Constitution, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://www.japantimes.cojp/opinion/2013/04/18/editorials/1dp-out-to-undermine-constitution; Colin
P.A. Jones, Tweak the Constitution Now, Think Later?, JAPAN TIMES (June 25, 2013),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/06/25/issues/tweak-the-constitution-now-think-later.
144. See, e.g., Aurelia George Mulgan, Abe Rocks Japan's Constitutional Boat, E. ASIA F.
(May 21, 2013), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/21/abe-rocks-japans-constitutional-boat); Linda
Sieg, Japan PM's "Stealth" Constitution Plan Raises Civil Rights Fears, REUTERS (May 1, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/01/us-japan-politics-constitution-idUSBRE9400ZT20130501.
145. Japan's Scholars Set Up Association to Block Constitutional Revision, JAPAN PRESS
WKLY. (May 24, 2013), https://www.japan-press.co.jp/modules/news/index.php?id=5726.
146. Id.
147. Tomohiro Osaki, LDP-Led Ruling Bloc, Allies Clear Two-Thirds Majority Hurdle in
Upper House Poll, JAPAN TIMES (July 11, 2016), http://wwwjapantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/11/
national/politics-diplomacy/ruling-bloc-wins-big-in-upper-house/#.WAY90vkrKU.
148. Tomohiro Osaki, LDP Sets Aside 2012 Draft Constitution Ahead of Diet Debate on
Revision, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/10/18/national/politics-
diplomacy/ldp-sets-aside-2012-draft-constitution-ahead-diet-debate-revision/#.WAY7ifkrKUk.
149. Motoko Rich, Japan Election Vindicates Shinzo Abe as His Party Wins Big, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/world/asia/japan-election-shinzo-abe.html.
32 [Vol. 43: 1
Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment
constitutional change an amendment because it would be far from an ordinary
amendment. This constitutional change is better understood as a constitutional
dismemberment-simultaneously a deconstruction and reconstruction of an
essential feature of the Japanese Constitution.
2. The United Kingdom After Brexit
Constitutional amendment in the United Kingdom does not occur the
same way as it does in countries with a codified master-text constitution.
Codified constitutions are commonly amended according to rules requiring
forms of higher lawmaking, entailing special procedures and heightened
approval thresholds that generally differ from those required for ordinary
lawmaking.15 0 In the United Kingdom, however, there is no formal distinction
between higher and ordinary law. Constitutional amendments are made the
same way as ordinary laws: by Parliament, which has the power to make and
repeal any law, fundamental or not.151 The lack of any special procedure or
qualified majorities to amend the Constitution of the United Kingdom makes
constitutional amendment relatively easier in the United Kingdom than
elsewhere in the world.1 52
Yet the Constitution of the United Kingdom shares an important
similarity with codified constitutions susceptible to formal amendment: both
are hierarchical legal regimes. We can identify laws in both that are
constitutional as opposed to ordinary, the former generally being ones that are
textually entrenched in a codified constitution or that acquire a special status at
the point of enactment or afterward over time. The difference is in how
constitutional laws acquire their special status: codified constitutions generally
distinguish ordinary from constitutional law in the way the law is made,
whether by special procedures or with heightened approval thresholds, while
the Constitution of the United Kingdom distinguishes ordinary from
constitutional law by the way in which political actors treat the law. As Ian
Cram has observed, "there are qualitative differences between say the Fixed-
term Parliaments Act 2011 and the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 or the
Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.",153 Some statutes are what Adam Perry and Farrah
Ahmed define as a "constitutional statute," a law that is "about state institutions
and which substantially influences, directly or indirectly, what those
institutions can and may do."1 5 4 In the United Kingdom, constitutional statutes
150. See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE IN THIERTY-SIX COUNTRIES 204-07 (2d ed. 2012); EDWARD SCHNEIER, CRAFTING
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES: THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 224-25 (2006); Richard
Albert, The State of the Art in Constitutional Amendment, in THE FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, supra note 39, at 1, 12.
151. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 39 (8th
ed. 1982).
152. One study of formal amendment difficulty ranks the Constitution of the United Kingdom
as the easiest to amend of thirty-nine "consolidated democracies," tied with the Constitution of New
Zealand. See Astrid Lorenz, How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two
Alternatives, 17 J. THEORETICAL POL. 339, 359 (2005).
153. Ian Cram, Amending the Constitution, 36 LEG. STUD. 75, 76 (2016).
154. Adam Perry & Farrah Ahmed, Constitutional Statutes, 37 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 461, 471
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are a close analogue to formal amendment, though differences remain.1
An example of a constitutional statute is the European Communities Act
1972.156 The United Kingdom acceded to the European Economic Community
in January 1973 when it passed this law, formally only an ordinary act of
Parliament. Accession entailed the incorporation of European law into the law
of the United Kingdom, a major constitutional change that was formalized into
the body of constitutional law without special authorization. The effect of the
Act was transformative: Parliament agreed to accept the European Economic
Community's obligations and privileges, and to accept the legal supremacy of
this supranational body by enacting the Act. 15 7
The consequence of this enactment was that any new rule of the European
Community would be automatically incorporated into the law of the United
Kingdom without needing to pass discrete legislation in Parliament on each
occasion that the rule was amended or supplemented with new rules. At the
time of the Act, the new rule of automatic incorporation was an important
change to the Constitution of the United Kingdom, because, as Dawn Oliver
has explained, this new rule "altered the nature" and the exercise of
parliamentary sovereignty, the cornerstone to the Constitution.158 Over the
years, the United Kingdom reinforced its interconnections with Europe through
the 1992 Treaty on European Union and the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, among
others. Parliament also passed laws that further integrated the United Kingdom
into the European project, including the Human Rights Act 1998,159 an act
incorporating the rights of the European Convention of Human Rights into the
law of the United Kingdom.
The deep integration of the United Kingdom into the European Union has
since come to a halt, and it will soon be undone. When the people of the United
Kingdom voted in the Brexit referendum on June 23, 2016, they triggered a
major period of constitutional change in the United Kingdom that will
ultimately result in the country's withdrawal from the European Union and
bring an end to the legal supremacy of the European Union in the United
Kingdom. Under the Constitution of the United Kingdom, the vehicle that will
legally end the relationship is the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 160 a bill
(2017). Whether codified in an aggregated text or not, a constitutional hierarchy develops. See Wim
J.M. Voermans, Constitutional Reserves and Covert Constitutions, 3 INDIAN J. CONST. L. 84, 87 (2009).
155. These differences have led some scholars in the United Kingdom to speak of
"constitutional reform" or "constitutional change" instead of "constitutional amendment." See Robert
Blackburn, Constitutional Amendment in the United Kingdom, in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 359, 361 (Xenophon
Contiades ed., 2013).
156. European Communities Act 1972, c. 68. This law has since been updated several times in
order to reflect agreements in treaties subsequently ratified in connection with it.
157. Id. § 2(1).
158. Dawn Oliver, The United Kingdom, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 329, 342 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011).
159. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
160. European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19 HC Bill [5]; see also Press Release, Dep't for
Exiting the European Union, Government Announces End of European Communities Act (Oct. 2,
2016), https://www.gov.uk/govemment/news/govemment-announces-end-of-european-communities-act
(announcing the U.K. government's plans to withdraw from the European Union).
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that will repeal the European Communities Act 1972, terminate the domestic
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, and instantaneously transform
European Union laws into domestic laws, thereby authorizing Parliament to
select those laws that will continue to have effect in the country and to
eliminate all those that will not.16 1
The "Great Repeal Bill" will not create a new constitution for the United
Kingdom, nor will it amend the Constitution in the conventional sense of
correcting an error so as to better achieve its purpose. This bill, and everything
it will collaterally entail, will take apart the Constitution of the United
Kingdom as it currently exists. It will self-consciously formally end the
Constitution's legally subordinate status to the law of the European Union and
it will redesign the architecture of authority in and around the Constitution,
returning to the Parliament of the United Kingdom the sovereignty that it ceded
forty-five years ago when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972. This
constitutional change will neither amend the Constitution nor create a new one.
This change is a constitutional dismemberment that transforms a fundamental
rule in the Constitution.
3. Canada at Patriation
Canada offers another xample of a successful dismemberment. Patriation
dismembered the country's constitutional structure of legal authority using an
ordinary method of constitutional change. Some background on the Canadian
Constitution is necessary to understand this example.
In contrast to the master-text U.S. Constitution and the uncodified British
Constitution, the Canadian Constitution is partially codified and uncodified.
Despite these opposing categories, all constitutions-even the ones we can
point to as paradigmatically written-are in some measure unwritten insofar as
they implicitly incorporate governmental conventions or norms about rights
that have constitutional status.16 2 What sets Canada apart is that its codified
constitution expressly recognizes that there is more to it than that which is
written. The Constitution itself declares that it is neither fully codified nor
uncodified.16 3 The Constitution defines itself as a non-exhaustive list of what it
is and where it can be found, a point the Canadian Supreme Court has
recognized in its interpretation of what constitutes the Constitution.16
This unusual constitutional arrangement has understandably confused
scholars.16 5 In an honest acknowledgement of his difficulty understanding the
Canadian Constitution, Donald Lutz chose to exclude Canada from his
161. See Alexandra Sims, What is the Great Repeal Bill? The Brexit Law to End All EU Laws
(That We Don't Like), INDEP. (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/great-
repeal-bill-brexit-law-eu-law-theresa-may-david-davis-a7343256.html.
162. See John Gardner, Can There Be a Written Constitution?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 162, 179-80 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011).
163. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. VII, s. 52(2), being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 c. 11
(U.K.).
164. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 32 (Can.).
165. Richard Albert, The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 53 ALTA. L. REV.
85,90 (2015).
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influential study of amendment difficulty rather than risk making a mistake
measuring the rigidity in the Constitution.16 6 Lutz suggested that he could not
produce a definitive count of constitutional amendments in Canada because he
could not reliably identify what possesses constitutional status under the
Constitution. 167
Adding to the confusion is the status of the Constitution Act, 1982-the
historic document that entrenched the globally admired Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,'6 1 finally conferred upon Canada the power to amend its
own Constitution,16 9 and introduced the Notwithstanding Clause to the arsenal
of weak-form constitutionalism.170 Scholars and judges have inaccurately
described the effect of the Constitution Act, 1982: some have called it an
amendment,"'7 others an addition,172 and still others a new constitution.173
None is quite right. The Constitution Act, 1982 dismembered the Constitution
of Canada as it then existed.
For all the attention it has garnered around the world as the core of the
new Canadian model of constitutionalism,17 4 the Constitution Act, 1982 is not
actually a Canadian law. It is in fact a schedule appended to the Canada Act
1982, itself a law passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom.175 The
preamble of the Canada Act 1982 acknowledges that the Parliament of Canada
"has requested and consented to" the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The Canada Act 1982 accomplishes two major objectives. It enacts the
Constitution Act, 1982 by providing: "The Constitution Act, 1982 set out in
Schedule B to this Act is hereby enacted for and shall have the force of law in
166. LUTZ, supra note 78, at 179 n.16.
167. Id.
168. See John Ibbitson, The Charter Proves to be Canada's Gift to the World, GLOBE & MAIL
(April 15, 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/the-charter-proves-to-be-canadas-gift-
to-world/article4100561.
169. J. Peter Meekison, The Amending Formula, 8 QUEEN'S L.J. 99, 99(1982-83).
170. Mark V. Tushnet, Alternative Forms ofJudicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2781, 2785-88
(2003).
171. The best example is the Canadian Supreme Court's advisory opinion on the legality of the
procedure used to change the Constitution with this new Act. The opinion itself refers to the
constitutional change as an "amendment" and indeed the reference questions themselves also speak of
the constitutional change as an amendment. See Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution,
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (Can.).
172. See Elmer A. Driedger, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 14 OTTAWA L.
REv. 366, 377 n.36 (1982).
173. See, e.g., PATRICK MONAHAN, MEECH LAKE: THE INSIDE STORY 38 (1991); Peter W.
Hogg, Supremacy of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 61 CAN. BAR. REV. 69, 71 (1983);
David S. Law & MilaVersteeg, The Declining Influence ofthe United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 762, 769 (2012); Richard H. Leach, Implications for Federalism of the Reformed Constitution of
Canada, 45 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 163 (1983); Brian Slattery, The Constitutional Guarantee of
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, 8 QUEEN'S L.J. 232, 232 (1982-83); Brian Slattery, Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms-Override Clauses Under Section 33-Whether Subject to Judicial Review Under
Section 1, 61 CAN. B. REv. 391, 395 (1983); Paul C. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New
Canadian Version, 18 J. L. REFORM 51, 51 n.2 (1984).
174. See Sujit Choudhry, Does the World Need More Canada? The Politics of the Canadian
Model in Constitutional Politics and Political Theory, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 606 (2007); Stephen
Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001); Janet
L. Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills ofRights: An Alternative Model?, 69 MOD. L. REv.7 (2006).
175. Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 44 (Can.).
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Canada and shall come into force as provided in that Act."176 The Canada Act
1982 also formalizes an extraordinary change in how Canada will thereafter be
governed under law: "No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed
after the Constitution Act, 1982 comes into force shall extend to Canada as part
of its law."177 The changes made by the Canada Act, 1982 are qualitatively
different from what an amendment does; these changes severed Canada's
constitutional cord to the United Kingdom and reconfigured the structure of
legal authority.
To appreciate the extraordinary nature of these constitutional changes, we
must return to the beginning, when the Constitution of Canada was adopted. In
1867, what we know today as the Constitution of Canada began as the British
North America Act, 1867,178 a statute passed by the Imperial Parliament to
govern relations with its most prized colonies across the Atlantic. Since then
renamed the Constitution Act, 1867, the British North America Act, 1867 did
not provide for its own amendment-an anomaly in contemporary
constitutional design since nearly all codified constitutions today entrench at
least one rule of change.179 All amendments to the Canadian Constitution were
to be made in London by the Parliament of the United Kingdom,80 the clearest
suggestion that Canada was a possession rather than a sovereign State. This
arrangement of estranged amendment continued even after the 1931 Statute of
Westminster that otherwise marked the legislative independence of dominion
states. The fault was not London's but rather Canada's: Canadian political
actors could not agree on rules for amendment, so they left the amendment
power in London's hands until Ottawa and the provinces could one day agree
on a procedure.18'
After failing nearly fifteen times to negotiate a domestic amendment
rule,1 82 federal and provincial actors in Canada finally agreed to a solution. But
by then, uncodified rules of change had developed during a half-century of
constitutional practice to the point where the Supreme Court could declare that
the body of amendment practice had produced a constitutional convention on
how to amend the Constitution. That rule was straightforward in its application
though not in its interpretation: where an amendment touches on federal-
provincial powers, "a substantial degree of provincial consent is required" to
176. Id. at s. 1.
177. Id. at s. 2.
178. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) [hereinafter Constitution Act,
1867].
179. See Francesco Giovannoni, Amendment Rules in Constitutions, 115 PUB. CHOICE 37, 37
(2003) (reporting that "less than 4% of the world's constitutions lack such a provision"). There were two
major exceptions in the Constitution of Canada: provinces were authorized to amend their own
provincial constitutions, see Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92, and the Parliament of Canada could make
certain amendments in respect of the judiciary, see id. at s. 101.
180. Peter W. Hogg, Formal Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 55 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 253, 253-55 (1992).
181. See Richard Albert, Constitutions Imposed with Consent?, in THE LAW AND LEGITIMACY
OF IMPOSED CONSTITUTIONS (Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou eds.,
forthcoming 2018).
182. See JAMES ROSS HURLEY, AMENDING CANADA'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, PROCESSES,
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 25-63 (1996).
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proceed with amendment.183 After securing provincial consent for a proposed
change, the federal government would send a joint resolution of both Houses of
the Canadian Parliament to the Parliament of the United Kingdom for it to
ratify and insert the amendment into the Canadian Constitution. 8 Every
change to the Canadian Constitution followed the same path: agreement in
Canada among political actors, and then ratification by the Parliament of the
United Kingdom. As a matter of practice, then, the power of amendment
belonged to Canada. But as a matter of constitutional law and legal
necessity,18 5 the amendment power resided in London.
The Canada Act 1982 abolished the legal authority of the Parliament of
the United Kingdom in and over Canada.18 6 A change of this sort is
qualitatively different from the corrective improvement that the Twelfth
Amendment brought to presidential selection in the United States. It is a
change on an altogether different plane of significance, far more consequential
than what we commonly associate with our understanding of an amendment.
And yet an amendment is how much of the conventional understanding in
Canada understands Patriation.
The Canada Act 1982 preserved constitutional continuity between the
original and subsequent structures of legal authority in Canada. Yet the
dismembering of the Canadian Constitution transferred the locus of domestic
constitutional authority from London to Ottawa. In 1867, London had
conferred limited legal authority upon Canada and retained for itself a vast
reserve of constitutional power. It was only over one century later in 1982 that
London ceded that power. The Canadian Constitution was dismembered as
Canada finally gained its independence from London. Canada emerged from
Patriation with a fundamentally revised configuration of powers; all legitimate
authority was now exclusively in the hands of Canadian actors, something that
had until then never been true as a matter of law.
B. The Forms ofDismemberment
These constitutional changes in Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom
are not amendments. They may be labelled as such, but they generate an
entirely new self-understanding of the constitution whose purpose, for better or
worse, is not what it was prior to the change. These three changes transform
183. Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 904-05.
184. Richard S. Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the United States, 7 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. t11, 114-23 (1984). One exception to the rule of substantial consent was the amendment of
1949, which gave the Parliament of Canada the same amendment power in relation to purely federal
subjects as the British North America Act, 1867 had given provinces in relation to their own provincial
subjects. See British North America Act (No. 2), 13 Geo. VI, c. 81 (1949) (U.K.).
185. London retained the amendment power as a legal necessity because someone had to
possess the power to amend the Constitution of Canada, and Canadian political actors could not agree
on a domestic amendment rule despite their many efforts to arrive at one-even after the 1931 Statute of
Westminster. See W.R Lederman, The Process of Constitutional Amendment for Canada, 12 McGILL
L.J. 371, 376 (1966-67).
186. There of course remains a constitutional connection to the monarchy but it is ceremonial in
the sense that neither Westminster nor Buckingham Palace would intervene in domestic Canadian
politics.
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their respective constitutions in a way that does more than merely free the
constitution from fault to better achieve its purpose. These changes destroy the
core of the constitution and breathe a new purpose into it. The constitution
itself might not be replaced in the formal sense but its identity, rights, or
structure does not escape the change without substantial modification. This is
the phenomenon I identify as a constitutional dismemberment. It is a
constitutionally continuous transformation that can occur suddenly in a big-
bang moment of constitution-unmaking or gradually by erosion or accretion; it
can occur to constitutions both codified and uncodified; and it can occur with
the effect of either enhancing or deteriorating liberal democracy. These
changes are made using the ordinary rules of amendment, and are often
described as amendments or even sometimes as new constitutions. But hey are
amendments in name alone. Conceptually, they are best understood as
dismemberments.
1. Constitutional Rights, Structure, and Identity
A constitutional dismemberment alters one or more of the constitution's
essential features-specifically, its rights, structure, or identity. These are
related categories. For example, a dismemberment o a constitution's structure
may amount to a dismemberment of its identity. But at a high level of
abstraction, these three forms of dismemberment are nonetheless
distinguishable from each other and also from smaller-scale constitutional
amendments, both corrective and elaborative. A dismemberment of a
constitutional right involves the repeal or replacement of a fundamental right
protected by the constitution-not just any right but one that is central to the
political community. A dismemberment of a constitutional structure entails a
clear break from how the constitution organizes the allocation of power, how it
balances competing claims to and the exercise of authority, or how its public
institutions function. Finally, a dismemberment of a constitution's identity
results either in the extinguishment of a core constitutional commitment or the
simultaneous extinguishment of a core constitutional commitment and the
adoption of a new one. A core constitutional commitment is neither a right nor
a structure but rather a constitutional value. Constitutional values are the
foundation of a given regime. They help us rank the regime's legal rules, moral
principles and political commitments relative to each other; they inform the
choices political actors make; and they influence how judges interpret the
constitution.87 In this subsection, I offer examples of the constitutional
dismemberment of rights in Brazil, Jamaica, and the United States; of structure
in Ireland, Italy, and New Zealand; and of identity in the Caribbean.
i. The Dismemberment of Constitutional Rights
We can find examples around the world of each of the three forms of
dismemberment-of rights, structures, or identity-some having failed where
187. Albert, supra note 24, 239-47.
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others have succeeded. For example, in the United States, the failed
establishment of a national religion would have amounted to a dismemberment
of constitutional rights. In the nineteenth century, a constitutional change to
recognize the United States as a Christian nation gained support across the
country. The idea did not make much progress in Congress, but it persisted in
the twentieth century with over fifty-five "Christian Amendment" proposals
introduced in Congress since 1947. 188 The Flanders Amendment, named after
its sponsor Senator Ralph Flanders, is one such example: "This nation devoutly
recognizes the authority and law of Jesus Christ, Savior and Ruler of nations,
through whom are bestowed the blessings of almighty God."189 Imagine that
the Flanders Amendment were reintroduced today as a modem version of the
Christian Amendment and adopted in conformity with the formal amendment
procedures of Article V. Could we properly call that change an amendment?
The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from passing a law
establishing an official religion,190 and since 1947 this prohibition has extended
to the states.191 The Free Exercise Clause prohibits Congress-and, since 1940,
the states19 2-from unconstitutionally infringing the right to freely practice
one's religion. The Court has interpreted these twin constitutional protections
as having one "common purpose" to secure liberty.193 Were the Flanders
Amendment adopted today, it would better reflect its revolutionary effect on
the rights protected under the U.S. Constitution to call this change a
dismemberment rather than an amendment. Far from continuing the
constitution-making project consistent with the existing meaning of the
Constitution, the Flanders Amendment would be a profound departure from the
present values of the Constitution.
Brazil, for its part, has recently completed a successful effort to
dismember a constitutional right. In June 2016, the interim president proposed
a constitutional amendment that would limit public spending for up to twenty
years, with annual spending growth limited to the inflation rate of the prior
year.19 4 The purpose of the amendment-which would limit public spending on
health and education in addition to other areas of public spending-was to
address the increasing budget gap that has encumbered Brazil in recent years as
tax revenues have failed to keep pace with rising expenditures.'9 5 The
188. JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2002, at 64-65 (2003).
189. See MARK DOUGLAS MCGARVIE, LAW AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: PUBLIC
VALUES AND PRIVATE CONSCIENCE 141 (2016).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... ).
191. See Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 330. U.S. 1 (1947).
192. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
193. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000).
194. Alonso Soto & Maria Carolina Marcello, Brazil Seeks 20-Year Spending Cap to Curb
National Debt, REUTERS (June 15, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-idUSKCNO
Z120S.
195. Anna Edgerton & Mario Sergio Lima, Temer Proposes Spending Cap in Effort to Fix
Brazil's Budget, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-
15/temer-proposes-spending-cap-in-attempt-to-fix-brazil-budget.
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amendment came into force in December 2016.196
This Public Spending Cap Amendment has been met with criticism from
many corners despite its capacity to help assuage the economic pressures in the
country.1 97 The reason for this rests in the Constitution's entrenchment of social
rights. The State commits in its preamble to ensuring the exercise of social
rights,'98 and this undertaking is reflected elsewhere in the Constitution's text
and in how political actors have enforced it. For example, the Constitution
identifies "social values"1" as one of its fundamental principles and declares
that one of its foremost objectives is "to eradicate poverty and substandard
living conditions and to reduce social and regional inequalities."200 The
Constitution moreover entrenches an entire section of social rights, including
the rights to food and housing.2 01 Another section explains the components of
the country's social order: the Constitution grants everyone in Brazil the right
to public healthcare,2 02 social assistance,203 and education.20 4 Workers are given
a special catalog of rights-rights to minimum wages, unemployment
insurance, and wage-reduction protection-that consists of thirty-four separate
parts, evidence of how broadly the Constitution seeks to protect labor.2 0 5 The
entrenchment of these social rights did not come by happenstance; it was a
victory for civil society groups whose "mobilized energies" sought "to change
the Brazilian reality" with "social demands" that were ultimately translated into
an extensive entrenchment of social rights in the Constitution.2 06 Unlike the rest
of the Constitution, which has undergone roughly one hundred amendments
since coming into force in 1988, the protections for social rights have not once
been substantively altered.207 That is, until this Public Spending Cap
Amendment was ratified over vocal opposition.
The realization of social rights is likely to be severely compromised with
the spending cap now in force. This is not a change of modest proportions; it
will impact an entire generation, and its effects could reverberate far beyond
that period. Juliano Zaiden Benvindo has put the point well:
It is no wonder that scholars have stressed how this amendment will signal a
196. Paulo Trevisani, Brazil's Senate Passes Constitutional Amendment to Cap Public
Spending, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brazils-senate-passes-
constitutional-amendment-to-cap-public-spending-1481647351.
197. See, e.g., Anthony Boadle & Marcela Ayres, Brazil Senate Passes Spending Cap in Win
for Temer, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics/brazil-senate-
passes-spending-cap-in-win-for-temer-idUSKBNI42203.
198. CONSTITUICAo FEDERAL [C.F.] pmbl. (Braz.).
199. Id. art. 1, § IV.
200. Id. art. 3, § III.
201. Id. arts. 6-11.
202. Id. arts. 196-200.
203. Id. arts. 203-04.
204. Id. arts. 205-14.
205. Id. art. 7, §§ I-XXXIV.
206. Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, The Forgotten People in Brazilian Constitutionalism: Revisiting
Behavior Strategic Analyses ofRegime Transitions, 15 INT'L J. CONST. L. 332, 352 (2017).
207. See Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, The Brazilian Constitutional Amendment Rate: A Culture of
Change?, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/08/the-
brazilian-constitutional-amendment-rate-a-culture-of-change.
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change in the Brazilian social contract as it was originally drafted in the
Constitution of 1988, a document originated from a broad social participation and
wherein social rights have best represented the marriage of that constitutional
moment with a new democratic impetus after years of dictatorship.208
The impact of this Public Spending Cap Amendment on the next generation's
enjoyment of social rights in Brazil, combined with how directly it undermines
the Constitution's founding and continuing commitment to social rights,
suggests that it may be more than a simple amendment. Its purpose and effect
suggest that it should instead be called a constitutional dismemberment.
We can point to an example of another successful dismemberment in
Jamaica. The Constitution of Jamaica is the joint product of an Act of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom and an Order in Council in the name of the
Queen. On July 19, 1962, Parliament enacted the Jamaican Independence Act,
1962, which set the terms of Jamaica's independence,209 and four days later an
Order in Council promulgated the Jamaican independence Constitution.2 10
Jamaica's Constitution recognizes a long list of fundamental rights and
freedoms, including: the right to life; 211 the freedoms from arbitrary arrest,2 12
detention,213 and inhuman treatment;214 and the freedoms of movement,2 15
conscience216 and assembly.217 These and all other rights were inserted into the
Constitution in a chapter denominated "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms."218
None of them, however, was intended to have a new legal effect. The chapter
on rights and freedoms was purely a restatement of existing law: the Privy
Council declared that this chapter "proceeds upon the presumption that the
fundamental rights which it covers are already secured to the people of Jamaica
by existing law."2 19 The text of the Constitution reinforces this point.220
In 2011, after decades of-at times sustained and at others interrupted-
efforts at constitutional reform, Jamaican political actors adopted a home-
grown Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedom as an amendment to the
Constitution.2 21 Formally, the Charter repeals and replaces the entirety of the
original Constitution's chapter on rights and freedoms.22 2 Derek O'Brien and
208. Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, Preservationist Constitutional Amendments and the Rise of
Antipolitics in Brazil, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.iconnectblog.com/
2016/10/preservationist-constitutional-amendments-and-the-rise-of-antipolitics-in-brazil.
209. Jamaica Independence Act 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2 c. 40 (U.K.).
210. Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1962, Court at Buckingham Palace, July 23,
1962.
211. CONSTITUTION OF JAMAICA, 1962, § 14.
212. Id. § 15.
213. Id.
214. Id. § 17.
215. Id. § 16.
216. Id. § 21.
217. Id. § 23.
218. Id. ch. III.
219. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Nasralla, [1967] 2 A.C. 238, 247 (P.C.).
220. CONSTITUTION OF JAMAICA, 1962, § 26(8).
221. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Constitutional Amendment) Act, 2011,
April 7, 2011 (Jam.).
222. Id. at sec. 2.
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Se-shauna Wheatle have explained that the effect of the Charter was to quasi-
patriate the Jamaican Constitution insofar as the Charter was passed as an Act
of the Jamaican Parliament, reflecting both popular and political consensus on
the scope of rights involving the death penalty, abortion, and sexual
orientation.22 3 There was a political imperative for political actors to support
the Charter when it came up for a final vote: the "failure to support the Charter
carried with it the risk that opponents could be characterised as . .. preferring a
system of rights protection bequeathed by the former imperial power to
something rooted in Jamaican soil and reflecting Jamaican values."224
The Charter entrenches rights that might be described as both progressive
and conservative. It expands equality rights under law,225 formalizes the right
to a healthy environment,22 6 and protects the right to vote in free and fair
elections.227 But it also protects the death penalty and traditional marriage,
making both of them immune to constitutional claims under the Charter.22 8
This combination of rights has led Arif Bulkan to highlight the contrast it
raises: "The 2011 Charter embodies a progressive realization of rights,
precisely the kind of evolution that is expected to occur in a maturing society.
Juxtaposed alongside these reforms, however, are a number of retrograde
provisions that dilute previously existing constitutional protections."229
The Charter also entrenches a significant structural reform that has some
consequences for the Constitution's rights and freedoms. The original
Constitution entrenched a derogation clause that authorized Parliament to pass
laws that were inconsistent with the Constitution's rights and freedoms.23 0 The
Charter repealed that clause, formerly entrenched in Section 50 of the original
Constitution.2 31 What results from this repeal, when combined with the new
menu of rights and freedoms, is a new rights regime beyond the possibility of
express derogation by Parliament.
The Charter was entrenched using the rules of formal amendment in the
Jamaican Constitution, and political actors identify the Charter as an
amendment. In light of the significant effects of the new Charter-to quasi-
patriate the Constitution, to entrench new rights and freedoms that sound in
local values, and to protect those rights from direct legislative infringement-
one would be right to ask whether an amendment is the proper concept to
describe the new Charter. It is more accurate to say that the Charter
223. Derek O'Brien & Se-shauna Wheatle, Post-Independence Constitutional Reform in the
Commonwealth Caribbean and a New Charter ofFundamental Rights and Freedoms for Jamaica, 2012
PUB. L. 683, 699 (2012).
224. Id.
225. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Constitutional Amendment) Act, 2011,




229. Arif Bulkan, The Limits of Constitution (Re)-making in the Commonwealth Caribbean:
Towards the 'Perfect Nation', 2 CAN. J. HuM. RTs. 81, 82-83 (2013).
230. CONSTITUTION OF JAMAICA, 1962, § 50.
231. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Constitutional Amendment) Act, 2011,
April 7, 2011, sec. 3 (Jam.).
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dismembered the Constitution's prior rights regime.
ii. The Dismemberment of Constitutional Structure
We can likewise identify instances of the successful and unsuccessful
dismemberment of constitutional structure. Ireland and Italy recently rejected
proposals to change the Senate-in the case of Ireland, to abolish the Senate,
and in the case of Italy, to reduce its power. In Italy, in December 2016, voters
overwhelmingly decided against a major constitutional reform that would have
altered thirty-three percent of the entire Constitution,2 3 2 including the structure
of the Senate, the constitutional status of the regions, and the confidence
relationship between the government and Parliament.233 This reform proposal
was presented to Italians as a simple amendment to be formalized according to
the amendment procedures in the Constitution. This constitutional change may
have been an amendment in form, but it was not an amendment in content. It
would have been a dismemberment.
The same could be said for Ireland. In the fall of 2013, Irish voters
narrowly defeated a proposal to abolish the Senate by a margin of 42,500 votes
in a referendum split 51.8 to 48.2 percent.234 Writing prior to the referendum
vote, Oran Doyle surveyed the breadth of the proposal and its consequences: it
contained over forty discrete amendments intended not only to abolish the
Senate but also to reconstitute the legislature as a unicameral parliament, to
modify the rest of the Constitution's parts that were predicated on the existence
of a Senate, and to prepare for the transition from bicameralism to
unicameralism.235 We should take care not to overstate matters, because the
Constitution confers only quite limited powers on the Senate.2 36 Still, although
the Senate's legislative powers are minimal relative to other upper chambers
and its representative function is not what it could be were Ireland a federal as
opposed to a unitary State,2 37 abolition would nonetheless have had substantial
consequences for the structure of Irish governance and the country's politics.
Had the reform proposal been ratified, there would have been seventy-
232. Steve Scherer & Gavin Jones, Renzi to Resign After Referendum Rout, Leaving Italy in
Limbo, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-referendum/renzi-to-resign-
after-referendum-rout-leaving-italy-in-limbo-idUSKBN13T019.
233. See Lorenza Violini & Antonia Baraggia, The Italian Constitutional Challenge: An
Overview of the Upcoming Referendum, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Dec. 2, 2016),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/12/the-italian-constitutional-challenge-an-overview-of-the-
upcoming-referendum.
234. Hary McGee & Steven Carroll, Seanad to be Retained after Government Loses
Referendum, IRISH TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/seanad-to-be-
retained-after-government-loses-referendum-1.1551657.
235. Oran Doyle, Ireland Considers Move to Unicameral Parliament, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG
(July 7, 2013), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/07/ireland-considers-move-to-unicameral-
parliament.
236. See Eoin Carolan, Bicameralism and its Discontents: Ireland's Senate: An Introduction,
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Oct. 16, 2014), http://verfassungsblog.de/irelands-senate-introduction-2.
237. See David Kenny, The Failed Referendum to Abolish Ireland's Senate: Defending
Bicameralism in a Small and Relatively Homogeneous Country (2016) (manuscript at 3-6),
http://www.academia.edu/24588212/The-failedreferendum-toabolish-theIrelandsSenate-defendin
g bicameralismis_a_small and relatively homogenous country.
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five separate alterations to the text of the Constitution, according to one
estimate. 238 More than the number of alterations, it is their combined effect that
matters. Gone would have been the check on the Assembly's power to pass a
bill, as would have been the capacity to delay an Assembly bill for ninety
days.239 The same would have been true of the Senate's other powers, including
the ability to refer a bill to the people in a referendum and to have a voice in the
removal of judges, the Auditor General, the Comptroller General, and the
President.24 0 More generally, the transformation of the legislature from
bicameral to unicameral would have substantially changed legislative
representation, the law-making process, the separation of executive-legislative
powers, as well as the democratic functions of the Senate.24 1 This would have
been no small change to the Constitution. The proposal was called an
amendment but its effect would have been to dismember the Constitution.
A successful dismemberment of constitutional structure occurred in New
Zealand not long ago. From 1993 to 1996, New Zealand changed its electoral
system from the traditional commonwealth model of first-past-the-post to a
modem system of proportional representation.2 42 Before the reform, New
Zealand's Members of Parliament (MPs) had long been elected by simple
plurality vote in single-member electoral districts. Under the reform, MPs
would now be elected according to a combination of proportionate votes
received by a party and by prioritized candidate rankings.2 43 What largely
prompted the change was dissatisfaction with the status quo: party
representation in Parliament had commonly failed to reflect the popular vote,2 "
and the single-party governments that had been produced by the old system
magnified legitimate concerns about the lack of political accountability in the
unicameral legislature.2 45 The change was the culmination of more than a
century-long effort to modernize the country's electoral rules.24 6
The result in the binding referendum-voters preferred the mixed-
member proportional representation system (MMP) by a margin of fifty-four to
forty-six percent247-led Parliament to reform the electoral system by way of
238. Univ. Coll. Dublin Constitutional Studies Grp., A Guide to the Referendum on the 32nd
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ordinary legislation. As in the United Kingdom, New Zealand does not have a
codified constitution. The Constitution of New Zealand changes principally by
law and convention. The New Zealand Parliament was therefore able to make
this change by a simple law; it enacted the 364-page Electoral Act 1993, and
the Act brought extensive electoral changes into law, specifically to introduce
MiMP, to create an Electoral Commission, and to repeal the Electoral Act
1956.248 The Electoral Act 1993 also made significant changes to other laws,
including the Constitution Act 1986, the Civil List Act 1979, the Remuneration
Authority Act 1977, the Local Elections and Polls Act 1976, the Ombudsmen
Act 1975, and the Public Finance Act 1989.249
Twenty years since the first election was held under the new MIMP, we
can perceive significant institutional, behavioral, and policy consequences,250
over and above its constitution-level changes. In contrast to the results under
the old first-past-the-post system, no party has since won an outright majority
of seats, in large part because more parties are now competing in and winning
races under this new system.2 51 It is undeniable that MMP has had a
transformative effect on the Constitution. The Electoral Act 1993 has
"dramatically altered the constitutional dynamics of New Zealand" and
"introduced more complexity and uncertainty to the process of governing"
because it has "shifted New Zealand's constitutional structure away from the
streamlined hierarchy of agency relationships under a plurality electoral system
to a structure requiring transactions between political parties for the exercise of
political power."252 In this light, the Electoral Act 1993 is better seen as a
dismemberment of the electoral regime that existed at the time, not an
amendment o it.
iii. The Dismemberment of Constitutional Identity
We can likewise demonstrate the dismemberment of constitutional
identity. In addition to the example above of the dismemberment of the identity
of the Japanese Constitution, the Caribbean offers a fascinating illustration of a
partially successful and partially failed dismemberment of the colonial legacy
of the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean.
Many Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions have been dismembered in
connection with the establishment of a regional court and the accession of
individual States to its appellate jurisdiction as the court of last resort. The
creation of this regional court is one step in a larger process of regional
53.9 percent to 46.1 percent).
248. Electoral Act 1993, Pub. Act. 1993, No. 87 (N.Z.).
249. Id. at ss. 271-284.
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ofElectoral Reform, in REFORMING PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 25, 34 (F. Leslie Seidle & David C.
Docherty eds., 2003).
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CONTEXT 247, 249 (Nathan F. Batto et al. eds., 2016).
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capacity building toward the eventual recognition of true post-colonial
independence.253
In February 2001, ten Caribbean States signed onto the Agreement
Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, and another two States joined in
February 2013.254 The Court enjoys both original and appellate jurisdiction,255
judges are appointed for the equivalent of life terms (until the age of seventy-
two),2 5 6 the Court is given a full staff and a complement of officers,257 and the
Court is fully financed.2 58 The Agreement was intended to give the new Court
the leading role in developing a Caribbean jurisprudence without threatening
the sovereignty of the signatory Caribbean States.259
The Agreement makes the Caribbean Court of Justice the final court of
appeal for those countries acceding to its appellate jurisdiction, thereby
replacing the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London.26 0 This is a
significant change in legal authority in the region because the Court's appellate
jurisdiction severs one of the remaining colonial vestiges of the legal
subordination of the Caribbean to the United Kingdom. The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council has for too long remained the final court of
appeal even after the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean adopted their
own independence constitutions between 1962 and 198026 1-whether because
they had grown accustomed to resolving their disputes as a final matter in
London, because they were unready to assume control of their own law, or
perhaps even because of political pressure to retain the Privy Council.262 The
rise of the Caribbean Court of Justice signals "the sunset of British colonial
rule" in the region.2 63 When the Court exercises its appellate jurisdiction, it
applies the constitution, laws, and common law of the country concemed.264
The Court is the last word on both civil and criminal matters, as well as on
those matters concerning the interpretation of national constitutions.2 6 5
Writing before the creation of the Caribbean Court of Justice, Hugh
Salmon captured the importance of the institution and why the countries of the
Caribbean should finally establish it: "The establishment of a Caribbean Court
253. See infra text accompanying notes 266-76.
254. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, opened for signature Feb. 14,
2001, http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/ccj agreement.pdf
255. Id. art. III.
256. Id. art. IX.
257. Id. art. XXVII.
258. Id. art. XXVIII.
259. Id. pmbl.
260. Id. art. XXV.
261. See David Simmons, The Caribbean Court of Justice: A Unique Institution of Caribbean
Creativity, 29 NOVA L. REV. 171, 172-76 (2005).
262. See Leonard Birdsong, The Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The Sunset of
British Colonial Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 197, 198-99
(2005).
263. Id. at 227.
264. Sheldon A. McDonald, The Caribbean Court of Justice: Enhancing the Law of
International Organizations, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 930, 931 (2004).
265. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, opened for signature Feb. 14,
2001, at art. XXV.
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of Justice represents one of those defining moments which will determine our
ability as a nation and as a region to take our destiny into our own hands."266
For Salmon, the Court was a necessary indigenous and local institution deeply
needed in the region. He questioned the place of London's court in the
Caribbean: "Can we realistically expect such jurisprudence to be fashioned in
tune with those aspirations by a judicial body however distinguished which
remains remote both in terms of distance and in terms of the depth of
understanding which can only arise from local and regional moorings?"2 67 He
stressed that it was time to "recognize that the continued existence of a final
Court of Appeal located outside the region is an inhibiting factor to the
development of an indigenous jurisprudence which is more responsive to the
values within our society and our aims and aspirations as independent
Caribbean nations."2 68
Despite these high aspirations for the Court, only four countries have so
far acceded to its appellate jurisdiction: Barbados and Guyana in 2005, Belize
in 2010, and Dominica in 2015.269 Each of the four signatories formalized its
accession either through its domestic formal amendment process, in three
cases, or, in one case, through the legislative process as authorized by the
constitution. In Barbados, Parliament formally amended the Constitution to
remove references to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and to insert
the declarative statement that "a decision of the Caribbean Court of Justice is
final and shall not be the subject of any appeal or enquiry in any tribunal or
other court."270 In Guyana, the Constitution authorizes Parliament to pass a law
authorizing the creation of a court of appeal for the Caribbean, which would
serve as the final court of appeal for the country.271 Parliament passed such a
law in 2004 to implement the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of
Justice and, specifically, among others things, to make the Court the country's
tribunal of last resort.272 In Belize, the national legislature adopted a
constitutional amendment "to remove the Privy Council as the final appellate
court for Belize and to replace it with the Caribbean Court of Justice,"273 even
substituting the words "Caribbean Court of Justice" for "Her Majesty in
Council" wherever it appeared in the Belizean Constitution.2 74 Most recently,
Dominica adopted a constitutional amendment in which the words "Judicial
Committee" were deleted and replaced with "Caribbean Court of Justice"
266. Hugh M. Salmon, The Caribbean Court of Justice: A March with Destiny, 2 FLA.
COASTAL L.J. 231,231 (2000).
267. Id. at 234.
268. Id.
269. Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Community Law and Common Law:
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Legacies, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89,90 (2016).
270. Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2003, art. 9(c) (Barb.).
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where they occurred in the Constitution2 7 5 and inserted a rule that in no case
shall an appeal "be brought from or in respect of any decision of the Court of
Appeal to the Judicial Committee."276 Future accessions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice are likely to follow this model.
But these constitutional changes are more than mere amendments.
Although political actors have formalized them using the procedures of
constitutional amendment, these changes accomplish something different from
what we understand amendments to do. These changes deconstruct the
constitution; they do not continue to build the constitution as it exists. They are
transformative alterations that simultaneously unmake the constitution while
reorienting it toward a new direction. This turn to a new direction, however,
does not constitute a new constitution, since these alterations are formalized
within the existing constitution. They are self-conscious, legally continuous
efforts to unmake colonial constitutions but do not promulgate new democratic
constitutions. These efforts have succeeded in four countries, but they have so
far failed in others.
2. Measuring Transformational Change
These examples of constitutional dismemberment around the world-in
Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Dominica, Guyana, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States-raise an
important question: what makes them dismemberments instead of
amendments? In other words, how do we measure whether a constitutional
change amounts to a transformative one that rises to the level of
dismemberment? Let me suggest three possibilities: a change can amount to a
transformative one when measured (1) against the founding constitution; (2)
against a normative vision of what a constitution should protect; or (3) against
the understanding of the relevant actors and the people at the time the change is
made. For reasons I will explain below, the third option strikes me as the best
one.
The first possible measure turns on what was first in time. What matters
here is how different the amended or dismembered constitution will be when
compared with the founding constitution. We compare the nature of the right,
structure, or identity of the constitution when the constitution came into force
at Time One with the same right, structure, or identity of the constitution at
Time Two, when the constitutional change is proposed. This is a reasonable
approach but it raises two challenges. First, uncovering an original purpose or
intent behind a constitutional provision or principle is difficult, to say the least,
and indeed in the United States this question is the battleground for arguably
the most important constitutional controversies. Measuring change against the
original meaning of a constitutional right, structure, or identity is unlikely to
yield agreement on what precisely constitutes that original meaning. In
addition, the original meaning of a constitutional right, structure, or identity
275. Constitution of Dominica (Amendment) Act, 2014, arts. 3-7.
276. Id. art. 9.
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may have since been superseded by a new informal understanding that better
reflects what the constitution means. In such a case, it would be better to
measure the nature of the change against that existing understanding rather than
against an obsolete one.
The second possible measure turns on first principles. What matters here
is how different the amended or dismembered constitution will be when
compared with a normative vision of what a constitution should protect. We
compare the nature of the right, structure, or identity of the constitution in the
present with the same right, structure, or identity of the constitution at Time
Two, when the constitutional change is proposed. If the proposed change is
inconsistent with the existing constitution and would yield a constitution that
better conforms with what we believe a constitution should look like, we can
identify the change as a dismemberment. The challenge with this approach is
its normativity. How can we reliably measure what should be in a constitution
and what a constitution should look like and protect? This is as much a
culturally and politically dependent answer as it is one of time and place. What
was once morally accepted, such as the sale of persons as chattel, is today
rejected, and what may today be morally accepted, such as the eating of
animals, may tomorrow be rejected as immoral. Agreement about what is right
is unlikely.
I choose a third measure of significance: I focus on neither what was first
in time nor what is rooted in contestable first principles and instead focus on
what, according to the relevant actors at the moment of the proposed change,
was first in their minds. What matters here is how different the amended or
dismembered constitution will be when compared with the understanding of the
relevant actors and the people at the time the change is made. We compare the
nature of the right, structure, or identity of the constitution as it is presently
understood with how the change to some right or structure or the identity of the
constitution is understood at Time Two. What is in the minds of those governed
by and operating under the constitution determines whether the change is a
simple amendment or a bigger dismemberment. In other words, the self-
understanding of the relevant actors-do they believe themselves to be
amending or dismembering the constitution-will indicate whether the change
amounts to a transformative one. A dismemberment, after all, is a self-
conscious effort to repudiate an essential characteristic of the constitution and
to dismantle one of its fundamental constituent parts while at the same time
building a new foundation rooted in principles contrary to the old. A change is
a dismemberment where the relevant actors understand themselves to be
engaged in such a transformation.
The theory of constitutional dismemberment is not rooted in a normative
understanding of the constitution. It is concerned less with defending liberal
democracy than abiding by the constitution as it is conventionally understood.
What matters is the present constitutional settlement and how changes are
made to it. Constitutional dismemberment takes no prior view of what a
constitution should do, entrench, or protect. Constitutional dismemberment
instead sets as its baseline the present commitments and understanding of the
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constitution and from there evaluates whether a constitutional change breaks so
significantly with that baseline so as to amount to a transformation of a
fundamental constitutional right, structure, or identity. A constitution, then,
may be dismembered either to improve liberal democratic outcomes or to
weaken them. We can accordingly speak of the dismemberment of the Turkish
Constitution from democratic to authoritarian, just as we can interpret the Civil
War Amendments as dismembering the infrastructure of slavery in the U.S.
Constitution. Whether a change enhances or deteriorates liberal values is
unrelated to the more important inquiry into the nature of a change as either an
amendment or a dismemberment.
3. Content and Procedure in Constitutional Change
The problem is that political actors make transformative constitutional
changes like these often without assembling the deep popular support such
significant changes ought to command. This problem is the consequence of the
standard design of the rules of change, which rarely distinguish between
changes that amount to mere amendments and those that rise to the level of
dismemberment. The standard design instead generally entrenches one
procedure to modify anything in the constitution, from small aesthetic changes
to more dramatic ones that shift the locus of authority, diminish or enhance a
right or liberty, or reconstruct he infrastructure of government. In other words,
the standard design does not vary the procedures of change according to the
content of the change itself. This standard design is short-sighted in treating all
changes the same way.
I have already identified a small number of constitutions whose rules of
change properly vary the procedures of change according to the content of the
changes. The Austrian, Costa Rican, Spanish, Swiss, and U.S. Constitutions
implicitly authorize amendments using a lower threshold of agreement than
required for dismemberment. But there is a third design-call it the modem
design-that is more nuanced than both the standard design and the few
existing examples of constitutions that distinguish between amendment and
dismemberment.
The South African Constitution reflects this more modem design. It
explicitly entrenches multiple thresholds of escalating difficulty, each specially
designated for use in connection with particular parts or provisions of the
Constitution. In the case of South Africa, three thresholds purport to cover the
universe of constitutional alteration. The highest threshold, requiring the
approval of three-quarters of the National Assembly and two-thirds of the
National Council of Provinces, must be used for changes to the rules of formal
alteration and to the Constitution's declaration of constitutional values.277 The
intermediate threshold requires two-thirds approval in both the National
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces; it must be used for changes
to provincial rights, powers, or other provincial matters including the National
277. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 74(1).
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Council of Provinces.2 78 The lowest threshold-two-thirds approval in the
National Assembly-is the default procedure for alterations not otherwise
allocated to another threshold.279
The Canadian Constitution is similar in its escalating design. It creates
five related procedures for formal alteration, each designated for use in
connection with specific parts of the Constitution. The lowest threshold
authorizes provinces to amend their own constitutions.28 0 The next-lowest
threshold confers an analogous power on the Parliament of Canada to amend
the provisions relating to Parliament itself.281 The third threshold authorizes the
two Houses of Parliament to make alterations affecting "one or more, but not
all, provinces" with the consent of the legislative assemblies of those affected
provinces.2 82 This procedure must be used for changes involving provincial-
federal matters that have regional but not national scope. The fourth requires
the approval of both Houses of Parliament and of each provincial assembly.28 3
It must be used for changes to Canada's relationship with the monarchy, the
right to provincial representation in the House of Commons relative to the
Senate, Canada's official languages beyond their provincial or regional use, the
composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, and Canada's formal alteration
procedures themselves.284 The final procedure serves as the default change
mechanism: it requires approval from both Houses of Parliament and from the
provincial assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces whose aggregate
population amounts to at least half of the total population.2 85 In addition to its
use as a default procedure for changes not otherwise assigned, it also applies to
specifically enumerated changes, including those involving proportional
representation in the House of Commons, the powers and membership of the
Senate, the method of senatorial selection, matters concerning the Supreme
Court of Canada for all items except its composition, the creation of new
provinces, and the boundaries between provinces and territories.2 8 6 As I will
explain below, we can build an effective structure of the rules of change
drawing in part from the features of this modem design.
C. The Rule ofMutuality
The rule of mutuality is the core prescription of constitutional
dismemberment for new constitutions. The rule of mutuality combines the
modem design's escalating framework for rules of change with the basic
features of those constitutions that entrench the distinction between amendment
278. Id. § 74(2)
279. Id. § 74(3)
280. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. VII, s. 45, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 c. 11
(U.K.).
281. Id. at s. 44.
282. Id. at s. 43.
283. Id. at s. 41.
284. Id.
285. Id. at s. 38.
286. Id. at s. 42.
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and dismemberment. This combination generates an escalating structure of
rules of change with procedures of variable difficulty keyed to the content of
the proposed change. The more significant the change, the more onerous the
procedure: the degree of difficulty rises in terms of the degree of direct or
mediated popular support needed to approve the change. At the high end of the
scale of difficulty, the rule of mutuality requires symmetry between the
procedure required to dismember the constitution and the procedure originally
used to ratify it. There are some exceptions to the symmetry principle in the
rule of mutuality.
1. Instability in Constitution-Making
Constitutions around the world are changing in ways that defy our
expectations about how they should. In recent years, political actors have
exploited the formally democratic institutions of constitutional change to make
new constitutions that masquerade as amendments. They have, in other words,
sought to dismember the constitution using the ordinary procedures of
amendment-to unmake the constitution using the procedures designed to
perfect it. From Colombia to Hungary, Egypt to Honduras, Turkey to Russia,
and also in the countries of the Commonwealth, we have seen increasing
evidence that the rules of formal constitutional change are inadequately
designed to combat what French constitutional theorist Georges Liet-Veaux
first described in 1943 as "fraude A la constitution."287 Constitutional fraud
occurs when political actors abide by the letter of the constitution's rules but
intend to violate its spirit. Political actors' strict adherence to the text makes it
possible for them to claim the mantle of legality all the while acting
illegitimately.
It is no secret what drives political actors to commit constitutional fraud
or to smuggle transformative constitutional changes through easy constitution-
changing procedures; they understandably wish to avoid the risk of failure that
attends the creation of a new constitution. Jon Elster has observed that "new
constitutions almost always are written in the wake of a crisis of exceptional
circumstance of some sort."288 As a result, "the task of constitution-making
generally emerges in conditions that are likely to work against good
constitution-making."289 What exacerbates these challenging beginnings of the
constitution-making process are the competing interests that may exist in the
effort to achieve a constitutional settlement: there is often misalignment among
the personal interests of constitution-makers, the group interests of the identity-
based or subnational groups, and the institutional interests of the bodies created
for the purpose of creating the constitution or of the bodies to be created by the
287. Georges Liet-Veaux, La 'fraude d la constitution": Essai d'une analyse juridique des
rdvolutions communautaires rdeentes: Italie, Allemagne, France, 59 REVUE DU DROIT ET DE SCIENCE
POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ETA L'tTRANGER 116, 145 (1943).
288. Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J.
364, 370 (1995).
289. Id. at 394.
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constitution.29 0 A good solution to the problems that prompt the constitution-
making process is therefore unlikely to emerge or be sustainable.29 1
These competing interests in constitution-making are not constrained as
they would be in a legal and transparent process that begins and ends within an
existing constitutional order. Where political actors are bound by known and
identifiable procedures of change-and where there is a political culture of
adhering to them or where pressure is applied to abide by them-the outcome
is likely to differ because the constraints can more effectively guide them
toward a legal fix. The current debate in the United States about convening a
constitutional convention to write a new constitution illustrates both the real
and perceived risks in constitution-making.2" Scholars may agree with Sanford
Levinson that the U.S. Constitution is broken,29 3 but they have so far resisted
his call to action for a new constitution, largely out of fear of a "runaway
convention, " 2 94-the concern being that the convention process cannot be
regulated by law and that anything is possible when political actors step outside
of the constitution to remake it. The reality, however, is that the content of
constitutions is "sticky," as eighty percent of a constitution generally survives
after its rewriting, suggesting that a new U.S. Constitution would remain much
like what it is today.2 9 5
The theory of constitutional dismemberment privileges evolution and
transformation while maintaining legal continuity. It invites changes big and
small to occur within the same regime without requiring political actors and the
people to step outside of the constitution in order to fix a problem, real or
imagined. The challenge of designing the rules of constitutional change is how
to compel political actors to check themselves.
2. Transformational Change with Legal Continuity
Consider the Republic of Georgia. Its Constitution has recently
undergone a historic transformation. In a series of constitutional changes
passed at once, Parliament altered the Constitution from top to bottom, making
it virtually unrecognizable when compared to its previous form.2 96 Under the
Constitution's formal rules of change, this package of major alterations became
official only after two parliamentary approval votes.297 But Georgian Dream's
290. Id. at 376-82.
291. Id. at 394.
292. America Might See a New Constitutional Convention in a Few Years, ECONOMIST (Sept.
30, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21729735-if-it-did-would-be-dangerous-thing-
america-might-see-new-constitutional-convention (describing the dangers of a constitutional
convention).
293. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006).
294. See Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National
Convention Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96VA. L. REV. 1509, 1528-31 (2010).
295. See Ozan 0. Varol, Constitutional Stickiness, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 899, 902-03 (2016).
296. Georgia Revises Constitution "Without Public Consent", OC MEDIA (June 27, 2017),
http://oc-media.org/georgia-revises-constitution-without-public-consent.
297. b 0 M )3 3 m b a m 6 b 6o 0 3 o5 [CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA] Aug. 24, 1995,
art. 102, § 3.
[Vol. 43: 154
Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment
supermajority control of Parliament left no doubt that the package of reforms
would pass. And indeed it did-over the President's initial veto.298 The reforms
will take effect after the next presidential election.299
What should concern the people of Georgia is that this major reform
amounts to more than mere tinkering with their Constitution. It is a new
constitution masquerading as a constitutional amendment. Georgian Dream
wrote protections for itself into the Constitution. The political party's
constitutional changes imposed restrictions on the powers of its political
opposition, most notably by banning electoral blocs. 3  The reforms consolidate
Georgian Dream's powers by abolishing the existing semi-presidential system
that separates powers and encourages bipartisanship.30 1 In its place, the reforms
create a pure parliamentary system that amplifies the power of the governing
majority and gives it free rein to do virtually anything it wants.30 2 The
constitutional changes also give Georgian Dream the power to stack the
judiciary in its favor; now judges of the Supreme Court will be selected by a
simple parliamentary vote.30 3 Georgian Dream's reforms also bring new social
and political values into the Constitution. They define Georgia as a "social
state,"3" place restrictions on private property,30 5 and limit marriage to the
union of one man and one woman.306 The content of these changes makes them
more than mere amendments.
This historic constitutional reform should not have been passed with an
easy legislative vote that Georgian Dream could dictate with no risk of real
opposition, let alone a threat of defeat. This extraordinary constitutional
transformation should have been passed with the popular approval of the
people in a national referendum. Georgian Dream instead effectively rewrote
the entire Constitution without building the popular consent necessary to give
legitimacy to a set of reforms so significant that they amount to a new
constitution.
No constitutional change should be beyond the power of political actors
and the people. The dismemberments Georgian Dream has entrenched into the
Constitution should not have been barred by the Constitution or by the
judiciary when evaluating the constitutionality of these changes. Nor should
Georgian Dream have had to engage the constitution-making process to make
these changes and, as a consequence, risk the instability and failure that attends
the writing of a new constitution. But nor should Georgian Dream have made
298. Thea Morrison, Georgian President Signs New Edition of Constitution, GEOR. TODAY
(Oct. 20, 2017), http://georgiatoday.ge/news/7909/Georgian-President-Signs-New-Edition-of-
Constitution.
299. CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA, Oct. 13, 2017, ch. XI, art. 78, https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/
document/view/30346?impose-translateEn.
300. Id art. 37.
301. Id. chs. I1l-IV.
302. Id.
303. Id. art. 61, § 2.
304. Id. pnbl., art. 5.
305. Id. art. 19.
306. Id. art. 30.
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dismemberments using the simple procedures of constitutional amendment. All
changes should be possible without breaking legal continuity but not without
gathering whatever quantum of agreement from peoples and institutions that is
required to legitimate the change.
As dismemberments, these transformative changes demand a higher level
of direct or mediated popular consent since their effect is to unmake the
constitution-here, specifically, both its fundamental rights and its basic
constitutional structure. These changes should have been authorized only by
constituent power, which is to say by the configuration of peoples and
institutions recognized as validly exercising the constitution-making power in
Georgia. As a default rule, where the constitution is silent about what precisely
constitutes this configuration of peoples and institutions, the constitution-
making power should be understood as that configuration of peoples and
institutions used to ratify the constitution at its creation. This is only a default
rule, to which some qualifications are attached, including one that recognizes
that what is now perceived as a legitimate configuration of peoples and
institutions may have since evolved.
3. Redeeming the Theory of Constituent Power
The logic of constituent power has endured for centuries. It has an
intuitive appeal inspired by the Lockean ambition of a stable constitutional
settlement legitimated by the consent of the governed.307 But even Locke
himself failed to be true to his own theory when he designed the formally
unamendable Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, a constitution he
designed to "be and remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of
government of Carolina forever."308 There is no constitution more antagonistic
to the principle of popular consent than an unamendable constitution that binds
the people of tomorrow to the irreversible choices of yesterday.
Yet for all of its theoretical appeal, the conventional theory of constituent
power is unhelpful for its lack of operational specificity. To say that a
transformative constitutional change may be authorized only by constituent
power, as opposed to the constituted powers, gives us a high-level theory but
not an applicable practice to translate it into action. Worse yet, its generality
creates a space of indeterminacy that makes it possible for courts to exploit the
theory when they render judgments on the constitutionality of constitutional
alterations like the ones from the Turkish Constitutional Court or elsewhere in
the world where the outcomes strike us as incorrect.30 9
Faced with the theory of constituent power that is often less useful than
not, we therefore confront a choice. We may content ourselves with the
sweeping generalities that characterize the conventional theory of constituent
307. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 47-48, § 89 (MacPherson ed., 1980).
308. See THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS OF CAROLINA art. 120 (1669); see also David
Armitage, John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government, 32 POL. THEORY 602 (2004)
(discussing Locke's role in writing the North Carolinian Constitution).
309. See supra Section I.C.3.
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power and the consequences of those generalities for the judicial interpretation
of constitutional alterations, or we may invest in redeeming the theory by
introducing particularities that allow political actors to use and enforce the
theory's basic organizing logic according to the democratic values that
underpin it.
I choose here to redeem it. I draw from the difficulty of identifying and
enforcing the dividing line between the powers of constitution-changing and
constitution-making. I also draw from our earlier reinterpretation of the design
of Article V and our exposition of the deficiencies in the standard design of
formal alteration. Tying together these different strands, I suggest a rule for
how to legitimate transformative constitutional alterations that are inconsistent
with the existing constitution: the rule of mutuality. The rule of mutuality may
be incorporated into the design of the rules of constitutional alteration. It may
also be used where a constitution's rules of formal change do not distinguish
between the procedures to make and unmake a constitution; here, it operates as
a default rule where the constitution is silent.
Recall that courts rely on the conventional theory of constituent power to
invalidate transformative constitutional changes when political actors make
those changes using the ordinary rules of constitutional alteration instead of,
according to courts, invoking constituent power to make those transformative
changes. Courts see themselves as defending the constitution from significant
alteration by anything other than a valid exercise of constituent power.310 The
problem is how to determine when constituent power has acted to validate a
major change. The rule of mutuality intervenes to constrain how courts review
the constitutionality of constitutional changes by giving observable specificity
to the theory of constituent power.
Under the rule of mutuality, a constitution may be dismembered using the
same procedure that was used to ratify it. The purpose of the rule is to offer a
justification for saving constitutional alterations from invalidation when a court
concludes that the change is inconsistent with the existing constitution. The
ratifying procedure for a new constitution is recognized as a legitimate vehicle
for creating a new constitutional settlement, and that procedure should be
sufficient-with exceptions I describe below-to transform the constitution
into something different, even contrary, as though a new constitution were
being created. Requiring political actors to respect the rule of mutuality avoids
the instability that attends the making of a new constitution because the rule
authorizes political actors to make big changes within the same constitutional
order. Unlike the conventional approach to constitutional change, which
disallows revolutionary changes on the theory that they create a new
constitution, the theory of constitutional dismemberment and its accompanying
rule of mutuality instead authorize political actors to make any change they
wish-subject to its legitimation by the relevant bodies-all the while
maintaining legal continuity and discouraging the extraordinary judicial action
of invalidating a constitutional change.
310. See supra Part I.
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The rule of mutuality comprises four factors. Some are qualifications and
others are explications. Together they round out the principle of symmetry-
between original constitutional ratification and subsequent constitutional
dismemberment-that sits at the base of the rule.
The first factor is differentiation: where the entrenched threshold for
constitutional alteration is lower than the original threshold for constitutional
ratification, only amendments may be made using that lower threshold. For
example, assume the codified federal constitution of State A entrenches a
threshold for formal alteration requiring a two-thirds supermajority agreement
in the bicameral national legislature and a simple majority agreement among
the subnational legislatures. Further assume that the constitution was ratified by
a majority vote in a specially-constituted constituent assembly followed by a
national referendum. Here, the formal alteration threshold requiring two-thirds
approval in the legislature could be used only to amend the constitution. We
would interpret the differentiated thresholds as specially designed for different
purposes; the entrenched rule for formal alteration would be intended to allow
only constitutional amendments.
The second factor is unification: where the entrenched threshold for
constitutional alteration is the same as the original ratification threshold, we
can interpret both powers of amendment and dismemberment as incorporated
under that unified entrenched threshold. Unification is evident in the fourth
procedure in Article V of the U.S. Constitution: it entrenches the procedure that
was used to ratify the U.S. Constitution at the Founding.3 1 1 Here, the formal
alteration procedure may be used both to amend and to dismember the
constitution. The alteration rule unifies the amendment and dismemberment
authorities into a single procedure. Consider more generally a codified unitary
constitution for State B establishing the same rule for constitutional alteration
as was used for constitutional ratification: a two-thirds supermajority
agreement in the bicameral legislature and a national referendum. This makes it
difficult to justify a court invalidating a transformative constitutional alteration
because this unified threshold suggests the constitutional designers believed
there ought to be no difference between the amendment and dismemberment
powers.
The third factor is symmetry: we should understand the original
constitutional ratification threshold as creating a default ceiling on the
threshold required for constitutional dismemberment. Return to the
constitutional ratification threshold for State A above: a majority vote in a
specially-constituted constituent assembly followed by a national referendum.
It would be permissible to dismember the constitution-that is to say, to
unmake it by introducing a formal alteration that changed something about the
constitution's fundamental rights, structure, or identity-by using the threshold
that had been used to ratify the constitution in the first place. The theory here is
that the decision to unmake the constitution must be validated by the same
quantum of agreement hat originally mobilized behind the choice to make the
311. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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constitution. Where constitutional designers differentiate the rules for alteration
and ratification, we can more democratically justify a court invalidating a
transformative constitutional alteration made using an amendment procedure,
because it suggests that designers wanted to distinguish the amendment and
dismemberment powers and to have their different uses enforced. The
symmetry between the thresholds to make and unmake the constitution is
intended to neutralize claims about the illegitimacy of the change.
The fourth factor is recognition: the ceiling on the threshold required for a
valid dismemberment may be lowered where political elites and the people
recognize the legitimacy of a dismemberment made using a threshold lower
than the one used to ratify the constitution. Return again to the constitution of
State A. The ratification threshold was a majority vote in a specially-
constituted constituent assembly followed by a national referendum. Ordinarily
under the theory of constitutional dismemberment, the rule of mutuality would
require political actors to respect this threshold in order to make a
transformative change to the constitution. But where the body we call "the
people"-the constituent power-has changed in its composition or in its
configuration such that political actors and the people recognize as valid a
dismemberment made with a quantum of agreement lower than the ratification
threshold, this transformative constitutional change must be accepted as a valid
exercise of constituent power. Only in rare cases, however, should the
threshold ever rise above the quantum required to ratify the constitution to
begin with. The theory of constitutional dismemberment does not seek to
discourage constitutional changes but rather to invite political actors and the
people to take active ownership of their constitution. The point here is simply
that the nature of constituent power can change over time.3 12
Together, these four factors suggest that new constitutions should
entrench an escalating structure of the rules of constitutional change within a
two-track framework that creates differentiated procedures for amendment and
dismemberment. For example, a new constitution should have one set of
procedures for amendment that is less onerous than the ratification procedure
entrenched as the dismemberment rule. In a federal State, dismemberment
might require a three-quarters approval vote in each house of the bicameral
legislature along with the approval of three-quarters of the legislatures of the
subnational states for dismemberment. In that same State, constitutional
designers could entrench an escalating structure of amendment procedures:
beginning at the least onerous end of the scale with agreement by two-thirds in
a single subnational state enough to make changes to its own constitution,
mirrored by a two-thirds rule for changes by the national legislature regarding
constitutional matters regulating its own affairs. The next highest threshold of
change would involve a two-thirds approval vote in the national legislature as
well as a simple majority vote in the legislatures of the subnational states when
involving matters of national significance. What results from this escalating
312. For a U.S. example of how this can happen, and a theoretical explication of why, see Mark
Tushnet, Peasants with Pitchforks, and Toilers with Twitter: Constitutional Revolutions and the
Constituent Power, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 639, 654 (2015).
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structure of the rules of change is a hierarchy of constitutional importance that
suggests that the higher the degree of entrenchment under the rules of change,
the more important those higher-entrenched provisions or principles. It would
make sense, then, to protect the fundamental rights, structure, and identity of
the constitution from constitutional alteration unless one of these is
dismembered according to a high threshold that leaves little question about the
validity of the constitutional consensus that has formed behind the change. This
escalating structure would have its own internal logic based on the degree of
relative insulation from alteration the provisions or principles are given under
the entrenched rules of constitutional change.
III. DISMEMBERMENT IN CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The distinction between amendment and dismemberment suggests
answers to important questions in constitutional change today. Three of the
questions at the forefront of debates on constitutional change are: (1) how the
rules of change should be designed to prevent liberal democratic degeneration;
(2) whether courts should have the power to invalidate constitutional changes
that judges believe amount to a new constitution; and (3) more generally,
whether and how constitutions should be made to endure. The theory of
constitutional dismemberment offers an approach to each.
A. The Problem ofLiberal Democratic Degeneration
The new wave of scholarship in constitutional change is concerned
principally with what we might call democratic degeneration. The basic claim
of the new wave is that political actors around the world are increasingly
exploiting the mechanisms of constitutional change to undermine the liberal
values of constitutionalism, and the tasks of constitutional scholars, judges, and
designers are, respectively, to develop theories, apply doctrines, and engineer
constitutions to prevent these attacks on constitutionalism.13 Yet the new wave
313. See, e.g., Ali Acar, De-constitutionalism in Turkey?, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG (May 19,
2016), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/05/deconstitutionalism-in-Turkey; Michael Blauberger & R.
Daniel Kelemen, Can Courts Rescue National Democracy? Judicial Safeguards Against Democratic
Backsliding in the EU, 24 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 321 (2016); Bojan Bugarid, A Crisis of Constitutional
Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: "Lands In-Between" Democracy and Authoritarianism, 13
INT'L J. CONST. L. 219 (2015); Tom Gerald Daly, Time to View Democratic Decay as a Unfied
Research Field?, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.iconnectblog.com/
2016/09/time-to-view-democratic-decay-as-a-unified-research-field; Laura Gamboa, Opposition at the
Margins: Strategies Against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela, 49 COMP. POL. 457
(2017); Aziz Z. Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018); R. Daniel Kelemen, Europe's Other Democratic Deficit: National
Authoritarianism in Europe's Democratic Union, 52 Gov'T & OPPOSITION 211 (2017); Tomasz Tadeusz
Koncewicz, Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, Constitutional Shenanigans and
Constitutional Self-Defense, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/
2015/12/polish-constitutional-drama-of-courts-democracy-constitutional-shenanigans-and-constitutional
-self-defense; Miguel Angel Martinez Meucci, Symposium on "Venezuela's 2017 (Authoritarian)
National Constituent Assembly"-Maduro's National Constituent Assembly: Constituent Power to Build
an Undemocratic Regime, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Aug. 29, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/
2017/08/symposium-on-venezuelas-2017-authoritarian-national-constituent-assemblymiguel-angel-mart
inez-meucci; Jan-Werner Milller, Protecting Popular Self-Government from the People? New
Normative Perspectives on Militant Democracy, 19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 249 (2016); Jan-Werner
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does not explain why its normative view of constitutionalism should be the
standard for evaluating the world's constitutions.
1. The New Wave
This new wave of legal scholarship in constitutional change builds on the
older scholarship in political science on competitive authoritarianism, a term
used to refer to regimes that are democratic in form but authoritarian at their
core. As Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have theorized, "[i]n competitive
authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the
principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents
violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails
to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy."314 Scholars have
observed this phenomenon around the world.3 15
For new wave scholars, Hungary is a leading expositor of liberal
democratic degeneration. The common view is that the Fidesz Party in
Hungary has at best severely damaged democracy and the rule of law and at
worst destroyed it.316 This populist nationalist party has used its elected
parliamentary majority to introduce constitution-level and sub-constitutional
reforms that have been described as conservative and Eurosceptic.3 17 The field
of constitutional change is moving toward consensus on these reforms: they are
formally legal but substantively illegitimate because, although political actors
acted in strict compliance with democratic procedures, they made non-
democratic changes to the polity. Hungary's new Constitution of 2012 is one of
David Landau's examples of this phenomenon, which he terms "abusive
constitutionalism."3 1 8 The Constitution has been criticized both for the way it
was adopted and for its content. As to its adoption, the Venice Commission has
observed that it lacked transparency and dialogue between the government and
the opposition, provided little opportunity for public debate, and was adopted
too quickly.3 19 The Venice Commission also observed that the Constitution
Milller, Defending Democracy Within the EU, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 138 (2013); Ulrich Sedelmeier,
Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and
Romania after Accession, 52 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 105 (2014).
314. Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, 13 J.
DEMOCRACY 51, 52 (2002).
315. See Stephan Giersdorf & Aurel Croissant, Civil Society and Competitive Authoritarianism
in Malaysia, 7 J. CIv. Soc'Y 1 (2011); Ellen Lust-Okar, Elections Under Authoritarianism: Preliminary
Lessons from Jordan, 13 DEMOCRATIZATION 456 (2006); Scott Mainwaring, From Representative
Democracy to Participatory Competitive Authoritarianism: Hugo Chdvez and Venezuelan Politics, 10
PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 955 (2012); Stephanie A. Mati, The Democratic Republic of the Congo?
Corruption, Patronage, and Competitive Authoritarianism in the DRC, 56 AFR. TODAY 42 (2010);
Lucan A. Way, The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine, 20 J.
COMMUNIST STUD. & TRANSITION POL. 143 (2004).
316. See Attila Agh, Decline of Democracy in East-Central Europe: The Last Decade as the
Lost Decade in Democratization, J. COMP. POL., July 2014, at 4, 14-25.
317. See Neil Buckley & Henry Foy, Poland's New Government Finds a Model in Orban's
Hungary, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/0a3c7d44-b48e-11e5-8358-9a82b43
f6b2f.
318. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 191, 208-11
(2013).
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limits the powers of the judiciary, undermines the separation of powers, and
insufficiently protects fundamental rights.320
Critics contend that Hungary's Constitution does not meet our
expectations for constitutionalism. Kim Lane Scheppele has argued that this
new constitutional framework raises obstacles to "constitutionalism and
democracy" in the country.321 According to GAbor Halmai, Fidesz enacted the
new Constitution "not with the intention to entrench constitutionalism, but
rather to constitutionally entrench its political preferences by weakening checks
and balances of its power, and guarantees of rights."32 2 All of this has led
Renita Uitz to suggest that Hungary is an illiberal democracy in formation, if
not in present reality. The governing regime has entrenched itself in power,
eroded checks and balances on its power, and been unwilling "to comply with
minimum standards of constitutionalism."323
There are as of yet no good solutions to the problem of liberal democratic
degeneration. New wave scholars themselves recognize as much, conceding
that the current generation of constitutional design has not innovated the tools
to combat it, assuming it is even possible to rely on formal rules to discipline
the exercise of political authority in regimes with weak traditions of the rule of
law.324 This is perhaps why Halmai has suggested that the answer, if indeed
there is one, is to develop a democratic culture that conforms to the values of
liberal constitutionalism.32 5 Another solution offered to the problem of liberal
democratic degeneration is more concrete. It relies on courts to evaluate the
constitutionality of constitutional changes against the standard of transnational
norms in democratic constitutions. As Rosalind Dixon and David Landau
explain, this strategy relies on courts to consider "institutional practices and
jurisprudence across a range of other democratic constitutional systems."326
Courts, they say, should compare the domestic constitutional change against
the global practice of democracies and then invalidate a constitutional change
that does not fit within the range of what the global community of liberal
democratic constitutions deems acceptable.
2. National Constitutions and their Purposes
The ambition to constrain constitutional change in the service of liberal
Constitution of Hungary, Opinion No. 618/2011, June 6, 2011, para. 145, http://www.venice.coe.int/
webforms/documents/?pdf-CDL(2011)032-e.
320. Id. paras. 147-49.
321. Kim Lane Scheppele, Understanding Hungary's Constitutional Revolution, in
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AREA 111, 122 (Armin von Bodgandy &
Pdl Sonnevend eds., 2015).
322. Gbbor Halmai, An Illiberal Constitutional System in the Middle of Europe, 2014 EUR.
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 497, 512.
323. Rendta Uitz, Can You Tell When an Illiberal Democracy Is in the Making? An Appeal to
Comparative Constitutional Scholarship from Hungary, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 279, 281 (2015).
324. See Landau & Dixon, supra note 39, at 861-62.
325. Gabor Halmai, The Decline ofLiberal Democracy in Europe's Midst, EUROZINE (Sept. 27,
2016), http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2016-09-27-halmai-en.pdf.
326. Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine
of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 606, 629 (2015).
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democratic values is admirable, but it is a normative ambition that is not
common to all constitutions, nor should it be. Constitutions have both
functional and aspirational purposes, and the two should remain distinct, given
that all constitutions have similar functions but not the same aspirations. There
is much more to say about the relationship between a constitution and
constitutionalism than is possible here, but as a basic matter, we can understand
a constitution as a set of rules for governance-rules that are aggregated or
disaggregated in one or more texts, are rooted in shared understandings of
norms that filter through laws and regulations, and are refined and reinforced
by practices that shape how political actors interact with themselves and the
governed. Functionally, a constitution separates powers by creating an internal
structure of authority that serves as a referent for disputes: it identifies either
expressly or by practice the class of persons bound by its rules; and it adopts
explicitly or implicitly a purpose to guide the conduct of its governors.
Constitutionalism, for its part, is a culturally-specific sociological principle that
concerns how a constitution is lived, how its rules are practiced, and how the
governed and the governors perceive themselves in relation to it and each
other. What new wave scholars fail to acknowledge is that liberal democratic
constitutionalism, like a liberal democratic constitution, is only one of many
possible variations.32 7
Neither a constitution nor constitutionalism necessarily entails acceptance
of or adherence to values of liberal democracy however much we may want
countries and peoples to honor them. A constitution is a vessel with no pre-
determined intrinsic moral or ideological orientation. It may be deployed for
any purpose given to it. A constitution can, of course, aspire to a higher moral
purpose than its basic functions of creating, describing, and governing the
structure and operation of government. But a constitution remains a
constitution whether or not it conforms to the modem vanguard of liberal
democratic constitutionalism. The recent scholarship on authoritarian
constitutions shows that these constitutions are as much constitutions as any
other.3 28
Take the Hungarian case for example. To say that it does not respect the
expectations of constitutionalism is inaccurate unless one has a normatively-
grounded understanding of constitutionalism. However, scholars who criticize
the Hungarian Constitution for failing to meet the standards of liberal
constitutionalism are in fact right. Leaders in Hungary have made no secret of
their intention to depart from the dominant Western conception of liberal
constitutionalism. Indeed, the Prime Minister publicly disclaimed any
aspiration to liberal democracy in a speech he delivered after he and his party
were reelected:
What is happening in Hungary today can accordingly be interpreted by stating that
the prevailing political leadership has today attempted to ensure that people's
personal work and interests, which must be acknowledged, are closely linked to the
327. Mark Tushnet, Varieties of Constitutionalism, 14 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 1 (2016).
328. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto
Simpser eds., 2014); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REv. 391 (2015).
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life of the community and the nation, and that this relationship is preserved and
reinforced. In other words, the Hungarian nation is not simply a group of
individuals but a community that must be organised, reinforced and in fact
constructed. And so in this sense the new state that we are constructing in Hungary
is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles
of liberalism such as freedom, and I could list a few more, but it does not make this
ideology the central element of state organisation, but instead includes a different,
special, national approach.329
To the extent that concerns about liberal democratic degeneration have
led scholars to endorse the idea that illiberal constitutional changes should be
invalidated, their approach betrays normative priors that are not universally
shared as a descriptive reality, whatever we may hope as an aspirational
objective for the world.
The argument that domestic constitutional changes should be constrained
by a transnational core rooted in the values of liberal constitutionalism raises a
problem of the same kind but of a different degree. It is one thing to critique
the implementation of a constitution for failing to live up to the standards one
believes best reflect the aspirations of liberal constitutionalism. But it is quite
another more serious intrusion into a nation's sphere of sovereignty and the
self-determination of its peoples to impose on a national constitution a
requirement of conformity with the values of others. Requiring conformity with
transnational values-not to mention the problems involved in identifying what
those values are and how they are to be enforced against a set of contextual
facts and institutions-undermines the fundamental purpose of having a
national constitution at all.
3. The Constitution of Consent
A more promising solution to the problem of liberal democratic
degeneration might not be a constitution-level fix. It could be a fix that comes
from below in the interactions of the people and their representatives in
government. Doyle has suggested that unwritten constitutional norms-or
constitutional conventions-can better manage constitutional change.330
Though he was writing specifically in the context of a transition from one
constitutional order to another, Doyle's insights are transferable to
constitutional changes within the same order where those changes revise the
operating framework of the existing constitution. This is to say that, rather than
amending the constitution, those changes would instead seek to dismember it.
Doyle argues that constitutional change should be constrained principally
by social rules internal to the polity governing how democratically accountable
political actors are to undertake and manage constitutional change. Doyle has
two principal objectives in his project: (1) to ensure, as much as possible, a
329. Prime Minister Viktor Orbin, Speech at the 25th BAIvanyos Summer Free Univ. &
Student Camp (July 26, 2014), http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-
speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-
student-camp.
330. See Oran Doyle, Constitutional Transitions, Abusive Constitutionalism and Conventional
Constraint, 37 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 67 (2017).
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majoritarian foundation for major constitutional change and, relatedly, to resist
the use of minoritarian controls on constitutional change to the extent the
values advanced in the use of those controls do not converge with majoritarian
preferences; and (2) to encourage political actors to self-regulate their conduct
consistent with the views of the popular majorities to which they are
accountable.33 1 Doyle's approach is similar but distinguishable from Halmai's
suggestion that, in the Hungarian case, the solution is to develop a democratic
culture of liberal constitutionalism. Doyle does not set the values of liberal
constitutionalism as the limiting reagent to legitimate constitutional change.
Instead, he argues that constitutional change should be constrained by
democratic principles-but importantly only where "democratic majorities
themselves . .. determine the contours of their democracy."332
Of course, the limit to Doyle's approach is that it relies on the good faith
of the political actors who operate the levers of change to restrain themselves
from exploiting their powers. Yet there is something appealing from a
democratic perspective about the majoritarian foundations of Doyle's theory of
conventional constraint. It rejects the minoritarian doctrine of unconstitutional
constitutional amendment, yet it nonetheless seeks a way to protect the
constitution from illegitimate changes.
There is an abundance of scholarship today on the judicial review of
constitutional amendments. Yaniv Roznai's scholarship is the most innovative
to date, drawing on his fluency in multiple jurisdictions and disciplines to
enrich our understanding of this deeply contested judicial practice.3 33 Roznai's
more recent work suggests a spectrum theory of constitutional amendment
powers. For Roznai, the more closely the amending actors embody constituent
power, the more deference courts should afford them when reviewing the
constitutionality of a constitutional amendment. In contrast, the closer the
amending actors reflect an ordinary constituted power, the less deference courts
should give them when reviewing one of their constitutional amendments.3 34
This is a sophisticated theoretical framework, but it does not translate
constituent power into a quantifiable measure of what constituent power looks
like. The rule of mutuality seeks to fill that void where a constitution is silent;
the optimal solution is to entrench procedures for partial and total reform in the
rules of change themselves.
The theory of constitutional dismemberment offers a way to quantify the
democratic majorities needed to validate a major constitutional change, even
where the change runs counter to the existing constitutional framework. The
rule of mutuality authorizes democratic majorities to make major constitutional
331. Id.at78-81.
332. Id. at 89.
333. See, e.g., Yaniv Roznai, Unamendability and the Genetic Code of the Constitution, 27
EUR. REV. PuB. L. 775 (2015); Yaniv Roznai, Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional
Amendments? Reflections on the Czech Constitutional Court's Declaration of Unconstitutional
Constitutional Act, 8 VIENNA J. INT'L CONST. L. 29 (2014); Yaniv Roznai, The Theory and Practice of
"Supra-Constitutional" Limits on Constitutional Amendments, 62 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 557 (2013);
Roznai, supra note 57, at 670-710.
334. See Roznai, supra note 39, at 37-48.
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reforms using the same or similar procedures used to ratify the constitution in
the first place. Under the principle of symmetry in the theory of constitutional
dismemberment, a constitution may be dismembered using the original
ratification threshold. Importantly, the original threshold sets the default ceiling
that political actors should observe to dismember the constitution. Political
actors may dismember the constitution using a lower threshold where it is clear
that the change is supported by a substantial democratic majority that reflects
the considered judgment of the political community. Conventional
understandings are a helpful standard to constrain political actors in
determining what does and does not claim substantial democratic majority
support. It is a contextual inquiry and, to be sure, one that requires political
actors to restrain themselves; however, the principle of symmetry quantifies the
upper limit of the majorities needed for the change.
Whether or not a given major constitutional change is consistent with
liberal constitutionalism is irrelevant to the inquiry. Recognizing that the
people of one country may wish to define their polity according to values that
differ from those defining another, the theory of constitutional dismemberment
does not impose substantive parameters on what changes are permissible or
good in a normative sense. What matters instead is the quantum of popular
support for the change. Just as the theory of constitutional dismemberment
must credit as democratically legitimate the Civil War Amendments that
destroyed the infrastructure of the United States' slavery Constitution, so too
must the theory credit a constitutional change that dismembers Japan's pacifist
Constitution, Brazil's social Constitution, and indeed any other transformative
yet legally continuous constitutional change that earns the support of a
substantial democratic majority of the relevant people.
As I will illustrate further below, this is not a strictly proceduralist
approach to constitutional change. The heart of the theory of dismemberment is
a careful evaluation of the substantive implications of the change for the
constitution. The kind of identified change-whether an amendment or a
dismemberment-will determine the procedures political actors should follow
to incorporate the change into the constitution. This approach is therefore
driven by the relationship between content and procedure and equally by
design and necessity.
B. The Problem ofJuristocracy
One of the most important trends in constitutionalism since the last great
war is what Ran Hirschl has described as "juristocracy"-the rise of courts to
the highest seat of power.3 3 5 Political actors have chosen, for strategic reasons
of hegemonic self-preservation, to confer the power of judicial review on
courts. Over time, juristocracy has brought increasingly more matters into the
purview of judicial authority, leading to what Hirschl has called the
judicialization of "mega-politics," described as "core political controversies
335. RAN HIRscHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
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that define the boundaries of the collective or cut through the heart of entire
nations."3 36 These controversies include matters commonly thought to raise
distinctly political questions: macroeconomic planning, national security,
electoral procedures, secession and independence, the formation of collective
identity, and the kinds of nation-building processes that have historically
remained beyond the realm of judicial control.337 The problem of juristocracy is
therefore a problem of democratic participation; courts commonly suffer from a
democratic deficit relative to other political branches insofar as courts are out
of the reach of electoral politics and the accountability they entail. The rise of
courts as a check on the power of constitutional alteration is an aggravated
manifestation ofjuristocracy.
Constitutional dismemberment contemplates a role for courts but avoids
the problem of juristocracy raised by the power to invalidate a constitutional
amendment. The role for courts under the theory of constitutional
dismemberment is catalytic, not obstructive. Courts retain an important
function in the review of constitutional alterations, but they should take a
defensive, collaborative, and constructive posture to the amending actors,
rather than a confrontational one.
1. In Defense of the Constitution
The purpose for judicial review of constitutional alteration should not be
to compel the people and their representatives to adopt a particular set of liberal
democratic norms. The better purpose should be to ensure that the people and
their representatives have expressed their considered judgment about the
changes they wish to make. The objective of the court should not be to defend
liberal democracy but rather to defend the constitution itself.
Two cases from Honduras highlight the problem of juristocracy in the
context of constitutional change. The Honduran Constitution limits the
president to only one four-year term 3 and makes the provision entrenching
this term limit formally unamendable.33 9 Then-President Manuel Zelaya tested
this provision when, in 2009, he proposed a referendum on whether the
unamendable term limit should be amended to allow him to extend his
presidency.34 0 The National Congress ousted Zelaya and named Roberto
Micheletti the new president,34 1 while the Supreme Court approved a military
order to detain Zelaya on charges of treason and abuse of authority.342 The
336. Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93,98 (2008).
337. Id. at 98-106.
338. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS, Jan. 11, 1982, art. 237.
339. Id. art. 374.
340. See Elisabeth Malkin, Honduran President is Ousted in Coup, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/world/americas/29honduras.html.
341. See William Booth & Juan Forero, Honduran Military Sends President into Exile:
Supportive Congress Names Successor, WASH. POST (June 28, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/28/AR2009062800635.htnm.
342. See Marc Lacey, Leader's Ouster Not a Coup, Says the Honduran Military, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/02/world/americas/02coup.html.
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Court enforced the constitutional text as written, interpreting the formally
unamendable provision entrenching a single-term limit as definitively barring
any extension of the presidential term.
Only a few years later in 2015, the Honduran Supreme Court took the
directly contrary position. In a unanimous judgment, the Court rendered
inapplicable and without effect the unamendable constitutional provision that
established a single-term presidential limit.34 3 Not too long prior, the Court had
supported the removal of Zelaya from the presidency for trying to amend this
unamendable provision. There have been other efforts to amend unamendable
provisions-most notably a successful attempt in Portugal344-- but this
Honduran example should strike us as particularly odd in light of the two
directly conflicting Supreme Court judgments separated by a period of just six
years.
There are good reasons to reject the Court's 2016 judgment. The Court
contradicted itself for what seems to be political, rather than legal,
justifications; it broke with recent precedent, and it failed to give reasonable
meaning to the Constitution's unamendable rule against amending term
limits. 34 5 There is a deeper reason why the Court's 2016 judgment was
problematic: the Court undermined the Constitution and exercised its
extraordinary power of amendment review in order to defend a self-interested
view of narrow democratic politics instead of the Constitution's own pre-
commitment to presidential rotation.
Whatever the core of a constitution, the role of a court is to defend it
unless there is evidence of substantial popular support to change it. There was
no evidence adduced in this Honduran case of popular support for the Court to
disapply the unamendable provision of a single-term limit for presidents. We
know that this unamendable provision formed part of the core of the Honduran
Constitution because its drafters chose to place it beyond the reach of the
power of amendment. There are many reasons why constitutional designers
would choose to entrench a provision against formal amendment: to formalize
a bargain or to preserve a founding norm, to transform the State or to reconcile
previously warring groups, or quite simply to express a constitutional value,
whether authentic or not. However, at a minimum, we must honor the choice as
reflecting one of the constitution's most important parts, whether functionally,
formally, or symbolically, and in any case as part of its core.
The Honduran Supreme Court should not have rendered the provision
inapplicable-a decision with an effect amounting to a constitutional
dismemberment-without confirming the substantial popular support for such a
fundamental change to the core of the Constitution. As it was, the Court
343. Leiv Marsteintredet, The Honduran Supreme Court Renders Inapplicable Unamendable
Constitutional Provisions, INT'L J. CONST. L. BLOG (May 2, 2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/
2015/05/Marsteintredet-on-Honduras.
344. See Yaniv Roznai, Amending 'Unamendable' Provisions, CONST. MAKING & CONST.
CHANGE (Oct. 20, 2014), http://constitutional-change.com/amending-unamendable-provisions.
345. See David Landau, Honduras: Term Limits Drama 2.0-How the Supreme Court Declared
the Constitution Unconstitutional, CONSTITUTIONNET (May 27, 2015), http://www.constitutionnet.org/
news/honduras-term-limits-drama-20-how-supreme-court-declared-constitution-unconstitutional.
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dismembered the Constitution on its own, a role that is not properly the Court's
but rather the people's.
The rule of mutuality offers a roadmap for how to legitimate a
constitutional dismemberment. Here the principle of symmetry in the rule of
mutuality is key: the original constitutional ratification threshold creates a
default ceiling on the threshold required for constitutional dismemberment. To
alter the core of the Honduran Constitution-represented in this case by the
unamendable constitutional provision on presidential term limits-the Court
should have been satisfied that this threshold had been met by the considered
judgment of the people. Yet there was no vote held to undo the unamendable
provision-let alone any constitutional alteration at all-because the Court
made its extraordinary decision in the context of ordinary litigation. If this
Honduran case teaches us anything it is the confirmation ofjuristocracy and the
attendant judicialization of mega-politics.
Where a constitution does not formally entrench anything against
alteration, it will be more difficult to identify what constitutes the constitutional
core. I have suggested above that a constitution's core may be located by
homing in on its most central rights, its basic constitutional structure, or its
values-based constitutional identity.346 A court can help identify the
constitutional core in these cases, though the same risk of judicial self-interest
illustrated so clearly by the Honduran case remains a problem without much of
a solution internal to the court itself.
2. Collaboration and Confirmation
The conventional theory of constituent power has long insisted that the
best way to defend the constitution is to invalidate all transformative
constitutional alterations unless those changes are formalized in a new
constitution. I have thus far argued that these far-reaching changes-
constitutional dismemberments, as I have labeled them-should not be
invalidated where the people and their representatives formalize those changes
into the existing constitution in accordance with the rule of mutuality. As I
have explained, the rule of mutuality authorizes the dismemberment of the
constitution where the people and their representatives uccessfully deploy the
same procedure that was used to ratify it. The rule of mutuality reflects the idea
of symmetry: the original constitutional threshold used to ratify the constitution
creates a default required at a later period for constitutional dismemberment.
The rule of mutuality is qualified by the factor of recognition, which holds that
the ceiling on the threshold required for constitutional dismemberment may be
lowered where legal elites and the people recognize the legitimacy of a
dismemberment made using a lower threshold than the one used to ratify the
constitution.
Courts can play a catalytic role in evaluating whether to credit a lower
threshold as properly reflecting the considered judgment of the people and their
346. For a discussion of the complexities of constitutional identity, see GARY JEFFREY
JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010).
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representatives. Rather than invalidating a constitutional alteration that the
reviewing court believes extends beyond the power of the amending actors, the
court should not strike down such a change and should instead work
collaboratively with those actors to confirm that the change is indeed the
product of considered popular judgment. In performing this task, courts can
draw from the idea of inter-temporality.
In the conventional theory of constitutional change, courts invalidate
constitutional alterations out of doubt that the amending actors represent the
will of the people. This is why courts adhere to the binary proposition that a
constitutional alteration is either an amendment or a new constitution, and that
where it amounts to a new constitution the people must exercise their
constituent power to authorize its creation.34 7 I have taken an external
perspective to show why this binary proposition is flawed. But from a
perspective internal to courts in the midst of evaluating the constitutionality of
a formal alteration, their concern is that amending actors may be exploiting
temporary majorities to make significant changes to the constitution without
the assurance that these temporary majorities represent the authenticated will of
the people. Temporary majorities may give amending actors the capacity to
meet the required thresholds to accomplish major constitutional changes, but
these majorities cannot be seen as reflecting the will of the people if they
collapse quickly. It is therefore right to interrogate the durability of the
majorities that form behind amending actors seeking to make transformative
changes to the constitution. Only durable majorities can be legitimately
representative of popular will.
The key is to test majorities for their durability. The escalating
amendment thresholds we see in Canada and South Africa are insufficient on
their own to test the durability of majorities, because a particularly strong but
fleeting majority could meet any of those thresholds at any one time. We need
a test to evaluate whether popular support for a transformative constitutional
change is stable and representative. The idea of inter-temporality recognizes
that the strength of majorities is directly proportionate to their stability of time.
Supermajority support alone cannot give democratic legitimacy to any popular
choice,. but a sustainable supermajority over time has a strong claim to
representativeness. As Jed Rubenfeld has written, even the "most solemn act of
memorialization, backed up by the unanimous vote of every citizen alive at the
moment of proclamation, does not guarantee that a nation is in fact committed
to the proclaimed purpose or principle."348 No single supermajority vote can
"claim the full authority of a popular commitment unless it succeeds over time:
unless it takes and holds." 9 Rubenfeld concludes, quite rightly, that
"[c]ommitments take time."350
Courts can promote the idea of inter-temporality by advising amending
347. See supra Section I.B.
348. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 175-76 (2001).
349. Id. at 176.
350. Id. at 175.
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actors pursuing a major constitutional change that they should confirm their
choice to proceed along these lines. Confirmation could take the form of at
least two votes separated by some period of time: the first initial vote according
to the constitutionally-required threshold to enact the change and the second
confirmatory vote again according to the same threshold. Some constitutions
adopt this model of sequential approval separated by the dissolution of the
legislature and its reconstitution after an intervening election.35 1 The interim
period between the votes can vary, but a multi-year period can cool passions
and delay radical changes,352 though no change should be forbidden altogether.
Sequencing multiple votes on major constitutional changes creates
opportunities for public discussion and legislative deliberation, invites the
people in a constitutional State to express themselves on a given constitutional
change, and tests the durability of the support behind a transformative
constitutional alteration, thereby neutralizing the risk that a fleeting majority
momentarily captures the amendment process.
The role for the court here is not to prohibit a change but rather to raise
the costs for amending actors to pursue it. By raising a flag on a transformative
constitutional change that the court believes should be held to special scrutiny,
judges can signal to the constitutional community that something worth their
attention is in the process of happening, though the court should not have the
power to stop the change on its own. The power to stop the change should
belong only to the amending actors whose choice should be modulated by the
will of a durable majority.
3. Supermajority in Constitutional Review
Constitutional review of constitutional amendments today follows the
ordinary practice of judicial review of legislation: courts may generally decide
by a simple majority to invalidate a constitutional amendment, just as courts
may generally invalidate ordinary laws by simple majority. Scholars have
inquired whether a simple majority should be sufficient to invalidate an
ordinary law.353 It is worth asking just as well whether a simple majority should
be sufficient for courts to invalidate a procedurally perfect constitutional
amendment.
Return to the Indian cases that created the basic structure doctrine. None
of the major cases we have surveyed were unanimous decisions, and indeed
two of the three were simple majority judgments that show the degree to which
the doctrine itself was contested at the time of its creation. In Golaknath, the
Indian Supreme Court split six to five on the question whether Parliament had
the power to invalidate a constitutional amendment that in some way violated
351. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY, May 17, 1814, art. 112;
REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 8:15 (Swed.).
352. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND
CONSTRAINTS 117-25 (2000).
353. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and
Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REv. 893 (2003); Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why do
Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 YALE L.J. 1692 (2014).
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fundamental constitutional rights.354 In Kesavananda-the decision in which
the Court unveiled the basic structure doctrine-judges were split seven to
six.3 5 5 The Court was less than unanimous even in Minerva Mills, a case in
which judges relied on the basic structure to annul a series of procedurally
perfect constitutional amendments.356
For a doctrine that has migrated across borders and been adopted by
constitutional and supreme courts in every region of the world, its democratic
foundations are rather weak. The doctrine of the basic structure in India-and
as it has been applied elsewhere-is rooted in the split judgments of the Indian
Supreme Court. As I have shown above, these judgments are themselves rooted
in the conventional theory of constitutional change.35 7 And as I have also
shown, the conventional theory of constitutional change in turn rests on the
legal fiction of constituent power that the people actually and mechanically
authorize the creation of constitutions. 358 The more we probe the basic structure
doctrine, the more doubts that should occur to us about the strength of its
democratic foundations, both in theory and in its application.
The theory of constitutional dismemberment seeks to redeem the theory
of constituent power by giving it a clearer, more specific, context-dependent
definition. The rule of mutuality is the core of constitutional dismemberment.
As I have shown, there are some qualifications to the rule of mutuality,
including the factor of recognition, discussed above.3 59 Courts are given an
important role in the theory of constitutional dismemberment, but it is not the
one they currently exercise in countries around the world, where we have seen
them invalidate constitutional alterations. In the theory of constitutional
dismemberment, courts would retain the power of judicial review of ordinary
legislation, but they would not have the legal authority to invalidate a
constitutional alteration. Their role instead would become advisory, and their
influence would resonate more in politics than in law. A court would issue
advisory judgments on the nature of the transformative change that amending
actors are pursuing, and on the quantum of agreement hat the court believes is
necessary to legitimate that change. The persuasiveness of a court's advisory
judgment on whether to hold a confirmatory vote would vary according to the
kind of supermajority vote the court can assemble. A simple judicial majority
would likely be insufficiently authoritative as a political matter to persuade
amending actors to hold a confirmatory vote on a transformative constitutional
change.
But a unanimous vote of the reviewing court would hold special
significance and would be more persuasive to the amending actors. A
unanimous judgment that a given constitutional change should be sent back to
the amending actors for a confirmatory vote would be more likely to compel
354. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762 (India).
355. Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India).
356. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCR 206 (India).
357. See supra Section I.B.1
358. See supra Section I.A.2.
359. See supra Section II.C.3.
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amending actors to vote again on the transformative constitutional change. A
supermajority judgment would, of course, be more persuasive than a simple
majority judgment and less persuasive than a unanimous judgment. In all cases,
the choice to hold a confirmatory vote would remain with the amending actors
after the court has issued its judgment. This would create an incentive for
courts to find agreement on key issues that they believe the people and their
representatives should consider when weighing whether to proceed with the
transformative change. The court's reasons for subjecting the change to a
confirmatory vote would provide a referent for public debate.
C. The Problem ofLegal Discontinuity
In their study of the world's constitutions past and present, Zachary
Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton inquire into the conditions that
promote constitutional endurance.3 60 They conclude that three mutually
reinforcing features-inclusion, flexibility, and specificity-can enhance the
probability that a constitution will endure.36 1 They show that a constitution is
likely to endure if it has been designed in an inclusive process, if it
accommodates changes as the polity evolves, and if its rules are detailed clearly
and specifically.3 62 They ultimately conclude, from a normative perspective,
that the answer to the question whether constitutions should endure is
contextual.363 One advantage of constitutional endurance is legal continuity.
The discontinuity in law that ordinarily attends the writing of a new
constitution can of course mark a profitable break with the past. But legal
discontinuity can also create a period of legal vacuity that breeds instability in
the absence of the rule of law.
Constitutional States that prefer to retain legal continuity rather than take
the route of discontinuity associated with adopting a new constitution would
find useful resources in the theory of constitutional dismemberment. For
codified constitutional States, the theory of constitutional dismemberment
offers a way to make and legitimate transformative constitutional changes to
the polity-all within the same constitutional order-without breaking the
formal legal continuity that can escape a constitutional State that chooses to
engage in a new constitution-making process. Constitutional dismemberment
can therefore foster constitutional endurance in the formal sense. The
constitutional endurance that the theory of constitutional dismemberment can
provide may ultimately serve the important interest of constitutional stability
insofar as Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton have shown that stable democracies do
not replace their constitutions frequently.3 *
In this Section, I explore three cases where legal continuity raises
360. ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS (2009).
361. Id. at 78-92.
362. Id. at 78-84.
363. Id. at 34.
364. Id. at 212.
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questions for constitutional actors, and where the theory of constitutional
dismemberment can be useful in finding answers. The first and second cases
concern imposed and colonial constitutions: how should amending actors make
transformative constitutional changes if they wish to retain their formal
constitutions? The third concerns the concept of constitutional resilience, a new
concept in the literature that differs from constitutional endurance. The
question here is not whether a constitution should endure but rather how it can
be reinforced to be resilient in periods of shock.
1. An Imposed Constitution: The Case ofJapan
Prior to his electoral victory in the summer of 2016, Shinzo Abe delivered
a major address in the legislature. Anticipating his future moves toward
constitutional change, Abe asked: "Isn't it time to hold deep debate about
revising the Constitution? For the future of Japan, shouldn't we accomplish in
this Parliament the biggest reform since the end of the war?"36 5 Recent moves
to amend the Japanese Constitution highlight the challenge of imposed
constitutions. The question raised by Shinzo Abe's efforts to repeal the Peace
Clause in Article 9 is how amending actors should legitimate this
transformative constitutional change.
The Constitution imposes no formal limitation on amending actors. Any
constitutional alteration may be made using the procedure entrenched in Article
96, which requires a two-thirds vote in each House to propose an amendment,
followed by ratification by a simple majority in a referendum, and finally
promulgation by the Emperor.366
Yet arguments that amending Article 9 would be illegitimate have only
grown louder as Abe has consolidated his power in the Diet, having now won a
series of convincing electoral victories. Abe has been confronted near his office
by protestors crying out, "Don't destroy Article 9.",367 Nobel Prize laureate
Kenzabura Oe created the Article 9 Association to defend the Peace Clause
from constitutional alteration.368 Yoichi Komori, a member of the Association,
has suggested that Article 9 has attained, or should attain, the status of informal
unamendability, so important it is to the nation's identity.3 69 A renowned artist
has pleaded with politicians that they "'shouldn't be messing' with the
foundation of the country."370 From abroad, Noam Chomsky has argued that
365. Martin Fackler, Prime Minister Abe Appeals to Japanese on Pacifist Constitution, N.Y.
TIMEs (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/world/asia/abe-makes-impassioned-appeal-
to-change-constitution.html.
366. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan).
367. Linda Sieg & Kiyoshi Takenaka, Japan Takes Historic Step From Post-War Pacifism,
OKs Fighting for Allies, REUTERS (July 2, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defense-id
USKBNOF52S120140702.
368. Maya Jaggi, In the Forest of the Soul, GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2005),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/feb/05/featuresreviews.guardianreview9.
369. Japan Rallies Call for Protection of War-Renouncing Constitution, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 4,
2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20171018200016/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/11/04/
national/politics-diplomacy/japan-rallies-call-protection-war-renouncing-constitution/#.Wgnz2hSyUk.
370. Jun Hongo, Hayao Miyazaki: Leave Constitution Alone, JAPAN TiMEs (July 25, 2013),
http://wwwjapantimes.co.jp/news/2013/07/25/national/miyazaki-leave-constitution-alone/#.WDXNw
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"the pacifist Constitution, in particular, is one legacy of the occupation that
should be vigorously defended," adding that "insofar as Japan's behavior is
inconsistent with the legitimate constitutional ideals, the behavior should be
changed-not he ideals."371 Critics of Abe's plan see the rules in Article 96 as
insufficient to undo Article 9, a provision that forms the core of Japan's
constitutional identity. How can a mere amendment procedure be used to repeal
what "has become the heart and soul of the people" in Japan?37 2
What seems lost in the debate is that the rules of constitutional change in
Article 96 are more difficult than the rules used to adopt the "new" Japanese
Constitution back in 1946. The new Constitution was formally an amendment
to the old Meiji Constitution; it was not adopted as an altogether new
constitution. As Robert Ward has explained, General MacArthur thought it was
important to abide by the old constitution's rules:
Technically this took the form of a bill of total amendment to the Meiji
Constitution. To avoid charges of illegality or the occurrence of a constitutional
interregnum, SCAP was most insistent that the procedure of amendment specified
in Article 73 of the Meiji Constitution be literally followed.373
Article 73 of the Meiji Constitution imposed a two-thirds quorum rule in
each house of the national legislature, and required each House to approve an
amendment by two-thirds in order for it to become valid.374 The Emperor
would then promulgate it.375 There was legal continuity between the old and
new constitutions, since the constitutional actors approving the new
Constitution of 1946 abided by the rules of constitutional alteration in the old
one. Of course, conceptually we should regard the altered Constitution as an
altogether new constitution with new foundations, but as a matter of legal fact,
there was no new constitution at all. On November 3, 1946, the Emperor
announced the promulgation and stressed that it was consistent with the rules of
Article 73 in the Meiji text:
I rejoice that the foundation for the construction of a new Japan has been laid
according to the will of the Japanese people, and hereby sanction and promulgate
the amendments of the Imperial Japanese Constitution effected following the
consultation with the Privy Council and the decision of the Imperial Diet made in
accordance with Article 73 of the said constitution.76
The 1946 amendments add the requirement of a referendum to the process of
constitutional alteration, making it even harder to amend the Constitution than
it was to create it to begin with.377
7IrKUk.
371. See David McNeill, Noam Chomsky: Truth to Power, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014),
http://www japantimes.cojp/news/2014/02/22/world/politics-diplomacy-world/noam-chomsky-truth-to-
power/#.WDXHO7IrKUk.
372. See CHAIHARK HAHM & SUNG Ho KIM, MAKING WE THE PEOPLE: DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDING IN POSTWAR JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA 96 (2015).
373. Robert E. Ward, The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
980, 1004 n.59 (1956).
374. DAINIHON TEIKOKU KENPO [MEIJI KENPO] [MEIJ CONSTITUTION], art. 73 (Japan).
375. Id. art. 6.
376. KENPO [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], Nov. 3, 1946, at ] (Japan).
377. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan).
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In the language of constitutional dismemberment, the 1946 constitutional
alteration was not an amendment, even though it was defined as such. It should
instead be understood as a constitutional dismemberment. The same would be
true of a change to Article 9: although amending actors would abide by the
procedures for constitutional amendment in Article 96, the result would be a
constitutional dismemberment, not an amendment. Under the theory of
dismemberment, the process used to formalize the change would have to abide
by the rule of mutuality, which imposes as a default ceiling the requirement
that the dismemberment procedure mirror the procedure used to ratify the
constitution. What this means in the case of Article 9 is that it would be
sufficient for amending actors to alter Article 9 using the original procedure in
Article 73, which calls for only two-thirds approval in the national legislature
in order to alter the Constitution.
But legality is of course different from legitimacy. The structure of
Article 96 is such that it unifies the entrenched threshold for constitutional
alteration with the original ratification threshold by incorporating the inferior
ratification threshold into the larger alteration threshold. This reflects the
constitutional designers' intent to make any future constitutional alteration
more difficult than it had previously been.3 7 8 The powers both of amendment
and dismemberment are incorporated into a single threshold in Article 96, but
the history of ratification in 1946 suggests that we can differentiate them.
Nonetheless, in order to meet the test of both legality and legitimacy, an effort
to alter Article 9 should satisfy the procedure in Article 96, which requires the
additional hurdle of a national referendum. It would be inconsistent with the
text of Article 96 to recognize as valid any constitutional change that had not
satisfied its onerous restrictions for constitutional alteration. The upshot from
the theory of constitutional dismemberment as applied to the case of the
imposed Constitution of Japan is therefore that the procedures of Article 96 are
sufficient in and of themselves to legitimate in law an alteration to Article 9.
But the reality is that the people and political actors could be unlikely to
recognize this as a legitimate exercise of constituent power, and this suggests
that the nature of constituent power could have changed since 1946.
2. A Colonial Constitution: The Case of Canada
In the conventional theory of constitutional change, the secession of
Quebec from Canada would result conceptually in a new constitution, even if
the change were codified as an amendment in Canada's partially codified
Constitution. The change would require a total reconfiguration of national
institutions including Parliament, where a certain number of seats are reserved
for Quebec in both the House and the Senate.37 9 In addition, the Supreme
Court, whose nine-judge bench must, according to a constitution-level law,
378. See Charles L. Kades, The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution, 104
POL. SCI. Q. 215, 245 (1989).
379. See Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 22, 37, 40.
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include three justices from Quebec, would need to be changed.so Secession
would entail enormous implications for political relations between Quebec and
Canada, citizenship, borders, national debt, the armed forces, commercial and
economic relations, mobility and migration, the environment, currency and
monetary policy, and First Nations.381 Were the secession of Quebec from
Canada formalized as an amendment to Canada's Constitution, it would
amount to more than a constitutional amendment; it would be a constitutional
dismemberment.
Yet the Supreme Court of Canada has held that Quebec's secession from
Canada may proceed by simple formal amendment. In the Secession Reference,
the Court wrote that "under the Constitution, secession requires that an
amendment be negotiated."3 82 The Court noted that although a referendum has
no "direct role or legal effect in our constitutional schedule, a referendum
undoubtedly may provide a democratic method of ascertaining the views of the
electorate on important political questions on a particular occasion."3 83 On the
strength of a clear majority vote in favor of secession, Qudbdcois political
actors could point to the "expression of the democratic will of the people" to
initiate a constitutional amendment.384 A successful referendum "would confer
legitimacy on demands for secession, and place an obligation on the other
provinces and the federal government to acknowledge and respect that
expression of democratic will by entering into negotiations" in order to
entrench an amendment formalizing Quebec's secession. 385 The Court stressed
that any amendment arising out of these negotiations would need to respect the
unwritten principles of the Canadian Constitution, including federalism,
democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and respect for minority
rights.386
But the Court's decision did not specify which of Canada's five
amendment procedures would apply to a constitutional amendment on
secession. This is surprising in light of the Court's emphasis on the primacy of
the codified parts of Canada's Constitution. As Donna Greschner has observed,
"even though the Court states that 'our Constitution is primarily a written one' .
. . and that constitutional texts 'have a primary place in determining
constitutional rules' . . . , it writes 70 paragraphs without any explicit reference
to a specific written provision on constitutional amendment."8 The reason
why the Court chose not to specify which of the five rules of constitutional
380. See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, s. 6. The Supreme Court of Canada has
constitutionalized this statute, making it no longer amendable by ordinary law. See Reference re
Supreme Court Act, ss. 5-6, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433 (Can.).
381. For a discussion of these and other implications, see THE SECESSION OF QUEBEC AND THE
FUTURE OF CANADA (Robert Young ed., 1998).
382. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 32 (Can.).
383. Id. para. 87.
384. Id.
385. Id. para. 88.
386. Id. paras. 88-105.
387. Donna Greschner, The Quebec Secession Reference: Goodbye to Part V?, 10 CONST. F.
19, 19 (1998).
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alteration applied to Quebec's secession may well be what Sujit Choudhry and
Robert Howse have speculated: that it would have been inappropriate to appeal
to the Constitution Act, 1982, because it lacks legitimacy for many in Quebec.
The Quebec provincial government rejected the Constitution Act, 1982 when it
was proposed and has yet to formally accept it to this day, even though the
constitutional text nevertheless binds Quebec as it does every other province in
the country.388
The scholarly community is divided on which amendment procedure
must be used.389 It seems clear that neither the unilateral provincial amendment
procedure nor the federal amendment procedure could be used to formalize a
provincial secession,390 nor could the regional amendment procedure be used
either.391 The debate therefore pits the general default multilateral procedure
against the unanimity procedure. 3  But the Court did explain why secession
was possible by amendment:
The amendments necessary to achieve a secession could be radical and extensive.
Some commentators have suggested that secession could be a change of such a
magnitude that it could not be considered to be merely an amendment to the
Constitution. We are not persuaded by this contention. It is of course true that the
Constitution is silent as to the ability of a province to secede from Confederation
but, although the Constitution neither expressly authorizes nor prohibits secession,
an act of secession would purport to alter the governance of Canadian territory in a
manner which undoubtedly is inconsistent with our current constitutional
arrangements. The fact that those changes would be profound, or that they would
purport to have a significance with respect to international law, does not negate
their nature as amendments to the Constitution of Canada.3 93
We are unlikely to ever read a passage like this one in a decision of the Indian
Supreme Court, or any other court that has endorsed the concept of an
unconstitutional constitutional amendment. The theory and doctrine of
unconstitutional constitutional amendment is rooted in the theory of constituent
power presupposing a distinction between the people themselves and their
agents in the constituted forms of government. Recall that, according to this
conventional theory, the constituted powers may only amend the constitution;
any change that extends beyond the significance of a mere amendment must be
accomplished by the people alone in the exercise of their constituent power.
The Canadian Supreme Court departs in the above passage from the
388. Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, Constitutional Theory and the Quebec Secession
Reference, 13 CAN. J.L. & Juus. 143, 150 (2000).
389. See Kate Puddister, "The Most Radical Amendment ofAll": The Power to Secede and the
Secession Reference, in CONSTITUTMONAL AMENDMENT IN CANADA 271, 282-86 (Emmett Macfarlane
ed., 2016).
390. Compare Constitution Act, 1982, pt. VII, s. 44, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982
c. 11 (U.K.) (authorizing unilateral federal amendment on some matters), with id at s. 45 (authorizing
unilateral provincial amendment on some matters).
391. Id. at s. 43.
392. Compare id. at s. 38 (authorizing amendment on some matters-and as the default rule for
all other matters not assigned to one or another amendment procedure-on the approval of both Houses
of Parliament and seven out of 10 provinces representing at least half of the total population), with id. at
s. 41 (authorizing amendment on some matters only upon the approval of both Houses of Parliament and
all ten provinces).
393. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 84 (Can.).
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conventional theory of constituent power. The Court explains that all
constitutional changes, be they ordinary or "radical and extensive," may be
accomplished by the constituted powers with recourse to the rules of
constitutional amendment.3 94  We can therefore interpret Canada's
constitutional amendment rules, at least as they have been interpreted by the
Supreme Court, as entrenching rules for both amendment and replacement, as
we have seen in Austria, Costa Rica, Spain, and Switzerland.395 Codifying
constitutional change procedures for the entire range of possible constitutional
alterations-from minor adjustments to major revisions-entails an advantage:
it allows the polity to maintain legal continuity in the event of a transformative
constitutional change that dismembers the constitution. But this is only the
Court's interpretation of the design of the rules of change.
The Constitution of Canada has come a long way since Confederation. It
has gone from a colonial constitution in 1867, to functionally an independence
constitution by the 1960s, and formally to an independence constitution at
Patriation in 1982. But it is worth noting that most of the formal amendment
procedures entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982 are much more difficult
than the procedure by which Canadian political actors indicated to the
Parliament of the United Kingdom their agreement to alter the Constitution. On
Canada's side, Patriation was an act of executive federalism. The terms of
Patriation were negotiated by the prime minister and the provincial premiers,
and the final agreement was passed in the Parliament of Canada as a joint
resolution of both Houses addressed to the Parliament of the United
Kingdom.396 There was neither provincial legislative ratification nor much of
anything else to authorize this transformative constitutional change to Canada's
Constitution.397 This is significant for determining the quantum of agreement
needed to formalize a provincial secession.
Recall that the rule of mutuality in the theory of constitutional
dismemberment requires transformative constitutional changes to be made in
accordance with the ratification procedure that established the constitution at its
point of origin. If we consider Patriation and the Constitution Act, 1982 as the
point of origin of Canada's modem constitutional arrangements, the rule of
mutuality would authorize a province to secede with the same measure of
political agreement required to formalize Patriation. And if we understand
provincial secession as effecting a constitutional dismemberment, as I believe
we should, this would mean that Quebec could secede from Canada after
negotiation and final agreement among the prime minister and the provincial
premiers-the same process that was used internally within Canada to patriate
the Constitution.
394. Id.
395. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
396. See House of Commons Debates, 32nd Parl., 1st Sess., Vol. 12, Dec. 2, 1981, at 13663
(Can.); Senate Debates, 32nd Parl., 1st Sess., Vol. 3, Dec. 8, 1981, at 3428 (Can.).
397. It has been reported that "no legislative assembly (save Alberta's, which debated the
November 5 agreement for one day on November 10) examined the package, held public hearings or
authorized it." JAMES ROSS HURLEY, AMENDING CANADA'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, PROCESSES,
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 65 (1996).
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This is not unlike how secession would likely unfold as a political
imperative in the event of a clear majority in Quebec expressing its desire to
secede from Canada in response to a clear question in a referendum. A
successful referendum result would trigger a duty on the part of Canadian
political actors-the prime minister along with the premiers-to negotiate with
Quebec's premier. Whether the applicable amendment procedure is the general
default multilateral procedure or the unanimity procedure, these political actors
would seek to arrive at an agreement that could command the support of their
respective legislative assemblies. The content of the agreement, then, would
likely be negotiated in the same way as Patriation-in an act of executive
federalism with consultation only to the extent necessary to mitigate the
possibility of opposition at the stage of legislative ratification. The principal
difference would be that, unlike at Patriation, legislative ratification would now
be a formal requirement pursuant to the new rules of formal amendment
entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982. On the theory of constitutional
dismemberment, however, secession could be accomplished in an act of
executive federalism alone, unless we could argue that, as in the case of Japan,
the nature of constituent power has changed since 1982.
3. Constitutional Resilience
Another variation on the problem of legal discontinuity involves the
difference between constitutional resilience and constitutional endurance. In a
follow-up to their influential study of the models of constitutional change in
democratic States,3 98 Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou describe the
difference between resilience and endurance in this way:
[C]onstitutional resilience is different from constitutional endurance: it signifies the
ability of a constitution to adapt navigating through hardships, retaining its core
purpose. Textual survival may count as endurance but not as resilience. Resilience
is endurance plus. It accounts for endurance, but endurance does not presuppose
having experienced shocks and survived them, nor the ability to absorb shocks.
What's more, resilience does not have to do with time and is not measurable with
relation to time: what is important is the continuance in performing the necessary
functions in the face of disaster. Resilience has to do with shock resistance and not
with time endurance.399
The concept of resilience incorporates four factors: legal continuity, functional
continuity, enduring text and purpose, and temporal detachment. First, a
resilient constitution can survive shocks either internal or external to the
regime. Contiades and Fotiadou use the 2008 global financial crisis to illustrate
the kind of shock that a resilient constitution is able to withstand.40 0 A resilient
constitution will have the capacity to trigger built-in mechanisms, like
amendment rules and extraordinary fast-track powers that allow it to adapt to
398. Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, Models of Constitutional Change, in
ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE, CANADA AND
THE USA, supra note 155, at 417.
399. Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, On Resilience of Constitutions: What Makes
Constitutions Resistant to External Shocks?, 9 VIENNA J. ON INT'L CONST. L. 3, 22 (2015).
400. Id. at 4-8.
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new pressures without resorting to anti- or extra-constitutional procedures.4 01
These mechanisms allow the constitution to maintain legal continuity as it
copes with the shock. Second, a resilient constitution will also retain functional
continuity, meaning that its core purpose will be achievable even when
confronted by the shock.402 There may be a period of adjustment to deal with
the shock while the constitution recalibrates to the new conditions, but the
point is that the purpose of the constitution will neither change after the shock
nor be frustrated by it. For example, if the purpose of a given constitution is to
protect human rights, that constitution cannot be described as resilient if it
violates them when the shock hits.4 0 3 Third, when faced with an internal or
external shock, the constitution's purpose endures but so does its text. Textual
endurance is not sufficient but it is a necessary factor in the resilience of
constitutions.40 4 Fourth, unlike the concept of constitutional endurance which is
time-bound, constitutional resilience is temporally detached. As Contiades and
Fotiadou explain, "[R]esilience does not have to do with time and is not
measured with relation to time: what is important is the continuance in
performing the necessary functions in the face of disaster."405 These four
factors explain constitutional resilience.
Constitutional dismemberment reinforces the idea of resilience insofar as
it offers constitutions a way to retain their legal continuity in the event of a
transformative constitutional change that may be occasioned by an internal or
external shock. The rule of mutuality and its corresponding ideas of
differentiation, symmetry, unification, and recognition are the kinds of built-in
mechanisms that political actors may invoke to save the constitution in a period
of crisis or emergency without recourse to anti- or extra-constitutional
procedures. Constitutional dismemberment is also temporally detached in the
sense that its objective is not to privilege endurance over time but rather to
privilege legal continuity, in order to extend the lifespan of a constitution. It is
on the second and third factors where constitutional resilience and
constitutional dismemberment diverge in their normative underpinnings.
Constitutional resilience is oriented principally toward retaining the purpose of
the constitution after a shock, while constitutional dismemberment recognizes
that a constitution's purpose may change-and perhaps indeed should
change-when confronted by a cataclysmic event that cannot help but change
the constitution itself and the people whose objectives it is intended to serve.
Constitutional dismemberment takes no view on the goodness of a
constitution's purpose. Constitutional dismemberment defers instead to the
considered judgment of the people and their representatives to trace and retrace
their own path, whatever it may be and however they wish to pursue it, as long
as it satisfies the twin tests of legality and legitimacy, where legitimacy is a
sociological measure, not a legal or moral one. The rule of mutuality in the
401. Id. at 7.
402. Id. at 8.
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theory of constitutional dismemberment gives the people and political actors a
roadmap to make transformative constitutional changes within the existing
constitutional framework in a way that preserves legal continuity but that need
not preserve the constitution's original purpose.
Constitutional dismemberment accommodates and indeed invites
alterations to the constitution's fundamental purpose-what he vocabulary of
dismemberment describes' as either its core constitutional rights, its core
constitutional structure, or its core constitutional identity-and it moreover
creates a way to legitimate those alterations to the constitution's purpose. In
contrast, the theory of constitutional resilience privileges the constitution's
purpose, whatever it may be. This is the consequence of protecting the
constitution's purpose from basic reconsideration after a shock intervenes. The
theory of constitutional resilience may work well in the context of the financial
crisis, but its disappointing implication in the U.S. context is that the
organizing logic and infrastructure of slavery in the U.S. Constitution should
have been made resilient enough to survive the shock of the Civil War. The
theory of constitutional dismemberment avoids that implication and suggests
both a constitutional design and a default procedure to legitimate
transformative changes that occur within the same constitutional order.
CONCLUSION-A PHENOMENON AND ITS FEATURES
Constitutional dismemberment is a phenomenon and a concept. We
cannot deny that constitutional dismemberment exists as a phenomenon today:
around the world, we continue to see efforts to make transformative
constitutional changes without breaking legal continuity. I have sought to
identify this phenomenon by giving it a name: constitutional dismemberment.
A constitutional dismemberment seeks deliberately to alter the fundamental
rights, structure, or identity of the constitution with recourse to the ordinary
rules of constitutional amendment. The conventional theory of constitutional
change denies the legitimacy of a constitutional dismemberment. Courts
therefore ordinarily disallow constitutional dismemberments for exceeding the
amendment power held by the amending actors.
Yet in the conventional theory of constitutional change, a constitutional
alteration yields only one of two results. It is either an amendment, in which
case courts recognize it as constitutional, because the amendment changes the
constitution consistent with its existing framework and presuppositions. Or,
altematively, it introduces a change to the constitution that fails to cohere with
the existing constitution, in which case courts generally invalidate the change
made as an amendment and require political actors to engage in an altogether
new constitution-making process in order to formalize the transformative
change they wish to make. The concept of constitutional dismemberment
occupies the space between an amendment and a new constitution. It
recognizes that a transformative change need not amount conceptually to a new
constitution and that, instead, the transformative change should be understood
as the unmaking of the constitution within the existing constitutional order
subject to its own intemal rules.
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Constitutional dismemberment is at once a doctrine and a theory. The
doctrine of constitutional dismemberment concerns how courts should
approach the review of constitutional alterations. Courts should be catalytic,
not obstructive; courts should not invalidate amendments but should instead
join collaboratively and constructively with political actors to verify that the
transformative change reflects the considered judgment of the people and their
representatives. I have suggested that the rule of mutuality should be the
default expectation that political actors should satisfy when they endeavor to
dismember the constitution. The rule of mutuality comprises four factors-
differentiation, symmetry, unification, and recognition-each necessary, but
none on its own sufficient to justify a transformative constitutional change. The
role of the court in its application of the doctrine of dismemberment is to
defend the constitution, to urge amending actors to verify that there is
substantial democratic support for a transformative change to the constitution,
and to protect the underlying constitutional bargain struck in the name of the
people.
The theory of constitutional dismemberment builds on the phenomenon,
concept, and doctrine of dismemberment to incorporate the full suite of
strategies to manage the process of constitutional change. The theory of
dismemberment is prompted by the theory of constituent power-a theory that
I have suggested is presently both inadequately equipped to guide political
actors in how they alter the constitution and insufficiently precise to allow the
constitutional community to evaluate the legitimacy of a transformative
constitutional change. The theory of constitutional dismemberment seeks to
redeem the theory of constituent power in light of the modern constitutional
changes we have witnessed. At its core, the theory of constitutional
dismemberment is concerned with the present constitutional settlement and
how changes are made to it; the theory does not advance a normative claim
about what makes a good constitution or what should be entrenched in a
constitution. The theory is localist, not globalist or transnationalist. It defers to
indigeneity and local norms, national sovereignty, and to the fundamental
reality that the theory of constituent power will manifest itself differently
across borders.
Constitutional dismemberment counsels jurisdiction-specific
constitutional design for the rules of constitutional alteration. Political actors
ought to structure their rules of constitutional alteration however best reflects
their historical circumstances and present political realities. Political actors
should not as a matter of course conform to values promoted by external forces
that may not cohere with their own. Where political actors do feel such
pressure, they stand on firm ground when they invoke the very meaning of a
constitution as a jurisdictionally-bounded and locally-legitimated set of rules
that governs a distinctly national institution that can, of course, be informed by
external forces but that ultimately derives its legitimacy from the consent of
those bound directly by its terms. The one exception to the presumption against
universality is the rule of mutuality: where the constitution does not entrench
rules for its own replacement, political actors may dismember the constitution
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in accordance with the procedure used to ratify the constitution at its creation.
This rule remains deeply local in its foundation: the rule of mutuality
recognizes the legitimacy in the multiplicity of ways that a constitution may
have been ratified at its point of origin.
One can accept that constitutional dismemberment occurs as a
phenomenon in constitutional States without endorsing either the judicial
doctrine or the larger theory of dismemberment. One can also accept the
phenomenon without recognizing the concept. Yet the theory of constitutional
dismemberment offers a framework both to understand constitutional change as
it happens today in the world and also to prescribe how the rules of
constitutional change should be designed.
